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15.
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20.
2 1.
22.
23.
24.
r_).

ICRD File (12/5/08-12/07/09)
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Liberty Northwest Indemnity and ~1edical Ledgers (2/18111)
SSA Judicial Decision (5113/10)
SSA Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (4/29/09)
Report of Vocational Expert Dan Brownell (5/28112)
Report of Vocational Expert Nancy Collins (9/4112)
Report of Vocational Expert Mary Barros (7/31/12 & 10/31/11)
Deposition Transcript of Jeff Mills (3/29112)
Deposition Transcript of Trudy Deon (10/6/11)
IME Report of Dr. McNulty (9/13112)
CDA Hand Therapy FCE (9/4/12 & 9/16111)
North Idaho MRI Imaging Reports (11/3/08 & 12/4/08)
Dr. Stevens IME (11/18/09) and EMG & NCS (8/19/09)
Rivers Edge Orthopedics Dr. Greendyke (615/06-10/28/09)
NorthVvest Orthopaidic Specialists Dr. Sestero (3/19/09)
Dr. Patrick Mullen (11/13/08-7130109)
IME Report of Dr. Kerr (4/17/09)
No11h Idaho Hand Rehabilitation (111 /09-6/25/09)
North Idaho Physical Therapy (8/4/09-10/28/09)
Kootenai Medical Center Records (10/4/08-12/30/08)
North Idaho Medical Care Center (4/26/06-10/16/08)
North Idaho Eye Institutes (5/25/01-811111)
Rottweiler Attack Records (DRs. Shaw·, Quinn, Witham) (2/12/06-7/29/09)
Various Prior Industrial Commission Records and LSSA (1/15/94)

Defendants' Exhibits:
26.
27.
28.

Idaho Workers' Compensation First Report of Injury or Illness
Liberty Northwest summary of benefits paid
Claimant's Personnel file
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I.
2.
3.
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5.
6.
7.

Claimant's Opening Brief, Filed November 27, 2012
Defendants' Response Brief, Filed December 17, 2012
Claimant's Reply Brief, Filed December 24, 2012
Defendants' Opening Brief: Impact ofIC Approval ofISIF Settlement Agreement Upon the
\fay 3. 2013 IC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration, Filed June 27, 2013
Claimant's Opening Brief Following Notice of Reconsideration, Filed June 28, 2013
Defendants' Reply Brief: Impact ofIC Approval ofISIF Settlement Agreement Upon the
May 3, 2013 IC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration, Filed July 18, 2013
Claimant's Reply Brief Following Notice of Reconsideration, Filed July 19, 2013
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SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRI

lMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. B

'720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT
CLAIMMJ'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

Trudy Deon
211 W. Haycraft
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

STEPHEN NEMEC
JAMES, VERNON & \VEEKS, PA.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
TELEPHONENUMBER 208-667-0683

TELEPHONE NUMBER

208-667-0683

EMPLOYER'S NA.ME AND ADDRESS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURA"ICE CARRIER'S
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

(at time of injury)

Hagadone Hospitality
c/o Sara LaPresta (Personnel Manager)
PO Box 6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
CLAIM~""!T'S

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

Liberty Northwest
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd.
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 38707

CLA.IM.AJ\1l~S

BIRTH DATE

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

10/4/08
STATE AND COU1''TY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED

WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARl\TJNG AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

Idaho, Kootenai County

OF:$

Unknown

. PURSUAJ\'TTO IDA.HO CODE§ 72-419

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (\VHAT HAPPENED)

Injured hand when electric snake wrapped around Claimant's glove and arm causing injury and tip hit her eye.
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDEl\'T OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Hand injury and H. simplex keratitis in eye.
\VHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TJMEo

Medical for eye, TPD, PPI, and PPD benefits
DATE ON V.'HJCH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER

TO VlHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN

10/4/10

Russel Kizzer, manac.er

HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN

~ ORAL

D

WRITTEN

D

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED

1.
2.
3.
4.

\\'hat medical benefits Claimant is entitled to;
The amount of permanent partial impairment to which Claimant is entitled;
\\'hether Claimant has disability in excess of impairment; and
Wnether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled.

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESEl\'TSANEWQUESTIONOF LAW ORACOMPLJCATED SET OFFACTS 9

0

YES

~ NO IF SO, PLEASE STATE WHY

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE LVDUSTRJAL SPECIAL LVDEMNJTY fl.IND MUST BE IN ACCORDA.~CE W1TH IDAHO
CODE § 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM LC. 1002
lC!OOl (Rev 3/1/2008)

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)

Appendix 1

Complaint - Page 1 of 3

PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME AND r.-.. 0RESS)

See attached

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM. IF TI!E OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

DATE

[g] YESD

NO

//12(//
I

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MA.DE FOR DEATH BENEFITS

NAME AND SOCLA.L SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY
FILING COMPLAINT

DATE OF DEATH

WA.S FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED"

DYES

RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT

DID FILING PARTY LIVE \VTIH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT"
DYES
ONO

ONO

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the~ day v-::::::::::~~~' 2°' \ , I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:

EMPLOYER'S NAME A.ND ADDRESS

SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Hagadone Hospitality
c/o Sara LaPresta (Personnel Manager)
PO Box 6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Liberty Northwest
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd.
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 38707
Attn: Chanel Holland
208-327-7518

00 U.S. Mail

D

0Fax

U.S. Mail

00 Fax

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer
Form I.C. 1003 with
the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0041(208)334-6000.
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3)
Complaint - Page 2 of 3

Patient Name:

:mDeon

Birth Date:
Address:

211 W. Haycraft, 83814
208-818-2119

Phone Number:
SSN or Case Number:

{Provider Use Only)
Medical Record Number: - - - - - 0 Pick up Copies 0 Fax Copies# _ __
0 Mail Copies
ID Confirmed by: - - - - - - - - -

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
I hereby authorize

to disclose health information as specified:
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider

To:
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/Self Insured Employer/ISIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney

Purpose of need for data:
Information to be disclosed:

Date( s) of Hospitalization/Care:

Discharge Summary
History & Physical Exam
Consultation Reports
Operative Reports
Lab
Pathology
Radiology Reports

0

Entire Record
Other: Specify

I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable):
AIDS or HIV
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information

0

DrugiAlcohol Abuse Information

I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and
that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I
understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking
the authorization won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider
will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise
revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy
service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above
information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature
below authorizes release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be
directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above.

Comolaint - Page

North Idaho Physical Therapy
North Idaho Eye Institute
Kootenai Family Care

Northwest Orthopedic Clinic
North Idaho Hand Rehabilitation
Kootenai Medical Center
River Edge Orthopedics
Kootenai MRI

1917 N. Lakewood Dr.
Coeur d'Alene, ID
1814 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
750 Syringa Dr.
Post Falls, ID 83854
16760 N. Hwy 41
Rathdrum, ID 83858
601 W. 5th Ave.
Spokane, WA 99204
943 Ironwood, #100
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
2003 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
1300 E. Mullan,#1300
Post Falls, ID 83854
2003 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

03/29/2011

PAGE

JVV!
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08:49
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StND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMiSSlON, JUDICIAL DIVISJON, P.O. BOX 837.ZO, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

WORKERSt COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNE't~S NAME, ATJDR,BSS. AND TELSl'HO'i'IB NUMBER

CLAIMANT'S (1NJ1JRED WORKER) NAME AN"D ADDRESS

STEPHEN NEMEC

Trudy Deon
21 l W. Haycraft

JAMES, VERNON & VlEEKS, P.A.
J 626 Lincoln Way

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
TELEPHONE NUMBER:

Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 l 4
TELEPHONE N',)MBER: 208-667-0683

208-667-0683

WORKERS' COM.PENSATTON fNSURANCE CARRTER'S

EMPLOYER'S NAME A.""-'D ADDRESS (al time of injury)

(NOT AD,llJ$TOR'S) NAME AWD

Hagadone Hospitality
c/o Sara LaPresta (PcrsoDJJel Manager)

A!)bl\.ES~

Liberty N orthwcst
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd.

P.O. Box 6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

P.O. Box 7507
Boise, TD 38707
CJ.AI:M'J\NT'S BrRTH DATE

CLAIMANT'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

Dl\TE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUl'AilONALDISEASE

219107
STATE AND COUNTY lN WHICH INJURY OCC~JRRW

WHEN !NJUR&l. CLAIMANT WAS EARNING A."1 AVERAGE "WEEKLY WAGE

Idaho, Kootenai County

OF:$

$9.35/hr.

. PURSUANT TO tOABO CODE I 72-119

DESCRIBE HOW IN.ITJJ'i.Y 01<_ OCCUPATJONAL DTSEASE OCCURRED (WHA.T HAT>T>ENTill)

Putting Jee melt on sidewalk and talking to boss, feet slipped out from under me.
NATURE 0'1' MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALl,EGED AS A RESULT OF ACCJ:DEN! OR OCCUPATION AL DISEASE

Fall injuring hips, shoulder, and back.
WHAT WORK!.':~S' COMPENSATION BENEi-r'rS ARE yac; CLAIMJNG AT THt$ TIME?

NIA: Claimant files this Complaint to avojd any LC.§ 72-406 apportionment defenses wh.ich the defendants bave raised in
their Answers to Discovery in LC. 2008-032836.
DATE ON 'W1:UCH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GJVEN TO EMPLOYER

TO 'W'HOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN

2/9/07

Immediate Su ervisor

HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

IRi

OR.AL

D

""'RITTEN

D

OTHETl,.1'1,EASE SPECIFY

ISSUE OR !SSUE:S JNVOLVED

J•

2.

\Vhat medical benefits Claimant is en.titled to; a""!d
The amount of permanent partiaJ impairment to which Claimant is entitled.

DO YO'll S.~!EVE TIJIS CLAIM J>RESJl'.)1;1$ A NEW QUESTION OF )"AW OR A COMPLICATED SET OT' FACTS?

0

YES

r&J

NO

IF SO. PLEASE S'l'Aii; \VJ'{Y,

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE LlVDUSTRJAL SPECTAL IllDEMN!TY FUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE
CODE§ 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM LC. 1002
TC1001 (R,i;v 3/l/2008)

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)

03 28 20 1 TUE 08 51

wrm ID.AHO

Complaint - Page l of3

TX/RX NO 8029]

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTR

.OMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. B

3720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT
CLAIMANT'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME. ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

Trudy Deon
211 W. Haycraft
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

STEPHEN NEMEC
JAMES, VERNON & \\'EEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
TELEPHONE NUMBER 208-667-0683

TELEPHONE NUMBER

208-667-0683

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURA'ICE CARRIER'S
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME A"ND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time of injury)

Hagadone Hospitality
c/o Sara LaPresta (Personnel Manager)
P.O. Box 6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Liberty Northwest
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd.
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 38707

CLAIMANT'S BIRTH DATE

CLAI!v1ANT'S SOCL•.L SECURITY NO.

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

219107
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED

WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING A'I AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

Idaho, Kootenai County

OF: $

$9.35/hr.

, PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 72-419

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (\\'HAT HAPPENED)

Putting ice melt on sidewalk and talking to boss, feet slipped out from under me.
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATJ ONAL DISEASE

Fall injuring hips, shoulder, and back.
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATJON BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THJS TIME?

NIA: Claimant files this Complaint to avoid any LC. § 72-406 apportionment defenses which the defendants have raised in
their .AJiswers to Discovery in LC. 2008-032836.
DATE ON \l/HICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER

TO WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN

219107

Immediate Su erv1sor

HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

[BJ

ORAL

D

\\TRITTEN

0

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED

1.
2.

What medical benefits Claimant is entitled to; and
The amount of permanent partial impairment to which Claimant is entitled.

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS?

0

YES

(BJ NO IF SO, PLEASE STATE \VHY

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUJIW MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE \VITH IDAHO
CODE § 72-334 A,"ND FILED ON FORM LC. 1002
!Cl 001 (Rev 3/1.'2008)

(COMPLETE OTIIER SIDE)

Complaint-Page I of3

See Attached Appendix

PHYSICIANS wttO !KEATED CLAIM.A.NT \NAME AND ADDRESS):

[RI YESD

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

NO

DATE

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS

NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY
FILING COMPLAINT

DATE OF DEATH

DID FILING PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENP

WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED?
DYES

RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT

0

ONO

YES

ONO

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day

~~~-' 20JJ., I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:

ErvfPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

SURETY'S NAME A"N"D ADDRESS

Hagadone Hospitality
c/o Sara LaPresta (Personnel Manager)
P.O. Box 6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Liberty Northwest
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd.
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 38707
Attn: Chanel Holland
208-327-7518

[Kl U.S. Mail

D

0Fax

[Kl

U.S. Mail
Fax

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Ans r on Form I.C. 1003 with
the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate o mailing to avoid
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0041(208)334-6000.
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3)
Complaint - Page 2 of 3

North Idaho Physical Therapy
North Idaho Eye Institute
Kootenai Family Care

Northwest Orthopedic Clinic
North Idaho Hand Rehabilitation
Kootenai Medical Center
River Edge Orthopedics
Kootenai MRI

1917 N. Lakewood Dr.
Coeur d'Alene, ID
1814 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
750 Syringa Dr.
Post Falls, ID 83854
16760 N. Hwy 41
Rathdrum, ID 83858
601 W. 5th Ave.
Spokane, WA 99204
943 Ironwood, #100
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

~03 Lincoln Way

eur d'Alene, ID 83814
1300 E. Mullan,#1300
Post Falls, ID 83854
2003 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Patient Name:

Deon

Birt..h Date:
Address:

(Provider Use Only)

211 W. Haycraft, 83814
208-818-2119

Phone Number:

Medical Record Number: - - - - - 0 Pick up Copies 0 Fax Copies# _ __
D Mail Copies

SSN or Case Number:

ID Confirmed by: - - - - - - - - -

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
I hereby authorize

to disclose health information as specified:
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider

To:
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/Self Insured Employer/IS IF, their attorneys or patient's attorney

City

State

Zip Code

Purpose of need for data:
Information to be disclosed:

D
D

Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care:

Discharge Summary
History & Physical Exam
Consultation Reports
Operative Reports

D
D
D
D

Lab
Pathology
Radiology Reports
Entire Record
Other: Specify

I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable):

D
D

Psychiatric or Mental Health Information

D

DrugiAlcohol Abuse Information

AIDS or HIV

I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and
that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I
understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking
the authorization won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider
will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise
revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy
service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above
information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature
below authorizes release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be
directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above.

__ ......

.:;':'::~

I

/

::A/ dl/

Jf'

,/ . i /

/;

Signature of fatiem
Date
Title

Datt
Comolaint - Page 3 •

/

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, 700 S.CLEARWATER LN, BOISE, IDAHO 83712

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
ALLEGED INJURY DATE: October 4, 2008

I. C. NO. 2008-032836
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Ms. Trudy Deon
211 W Haycraft
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Mr. Stephen J. Nemec Esq.
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRES

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME
AND ADDRESS

Hagadone Hospitality (H & J Inc.)
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp.
P. 0. Box 7507
Boise, Idaho 83707

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME
AND ADDRESS)

PO Box 6200

Kimberly A. Doyle
Law Offices of Harmon & Day
P. 0. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:

x

IT IS: (Check One)
Admitted

Denied

x

1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or about the time
claimed.

x

2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

x

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

x

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly _2L entirely_ by an accident arising
out of and in the course of Claimant's employment.

N/A

N/A

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the
employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the
trade, occupation, process, or employment.

x

N/A

6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation
of such occupational disease.
N/A

7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five months after
the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted.

x

x

8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho
Code, Section 72-419: $ 388.00
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Act.

10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?
IC1003

NONE

I

Answer-Page 1 of 2

l

(Continued from front)
11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses.
A. Defendants deny all allegations of the Complaint not admitted herein.
B. Whether Claimant's current condition is causally related to the 10/04/2008 alleged accident or is a pre-existing or subsequent condition;
C. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional medical benefits;
D. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional TTDffPD benefits;
E. Whether Claimant has an additional permanent partial impairment and/or permanent partial disability arising out of the 10/04/2008 incident,
and if so, appropriate apportionment; and
F. Whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled.
G. Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer since discovery in this matter has only just begun.

Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the
Complaint. A copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their
attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately
the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a
Complaint has been filed. Rule 111(0), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form l.C. 1002.
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. _ _ YES _ _ NO
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.
No

Amount of Compensation Paid to Date

Dated

PPD

TTDffPD

Medical

$2,039.40 (PPI)

$14,209.30

$19,318.56

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

YJ"'lt-1_::::

I hereby certify that on the ~day of

Jcvo.

, 2011, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY:
Mr. Stephen J. Nemec Esq.
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
via:

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

Signature

l

/

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, 700 S.CLEARWATER LN, BOISE, IDAHO 83712

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

ALLEGED INJURY DATE .. Feb ruary 9 2007
'

I. C. NO. 2007-005950
CLAIMANTS NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Ms. Trudy Deon
211 W Haycraft
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Mr. Stephen J. Nemec Esq.
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADORES

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME
AND ADDRESS

Best Western Coeur D'Alene Inn
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Liberty Northwest Ins. Co.
P. 0. Box 7507
Boise, Idaho 83707

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME
AND ADDRESS)

414 W. Appleway Ave.

Kimberly A. Doyle
Law Offices of Harmon & Day
P. 0. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

x

The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating·
IT IS: (Check One)

Admitted

Denied

x

1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or about the time
claimed.

x

2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

x

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

x

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly .2L_entirely _by an accident arising
out of and in the course of Claimant's employment.

NIA

NIA

x

N/A

6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation
of such occupational disease.
N/A
x

x

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the
employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the
trade, occupation, process, or employment.

7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five months after
the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted.
8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho
Code, Section 72-419: $ unknown at this time
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Act.

10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?
NONE

-

IC1003

Answer-Page 1 of 2

Continued from front)
11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses.

A. Defendants deny all allegations of the Complaint not admitted herein.
B. Whether Claimant's current condition is causally related to the industrial accident or is related to a pre-existing or subsequent injury or
condition;
C. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional medical benefits (Claimant's 2122107 North Idaho Medical Care Center chart note states "no return
visit necessary");
D. Whether Claimant has a permanent partial impairment arising out of the industrial incident and, if so, appropriate apportionment.
E. Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer since discovery in this matter has only just begun.

Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the
Complaint. A copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their
attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately
the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a
Complaint has been filed. Rule 111(0), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form l.C. 1002.
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

YES

NO

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.
No

Amount of Compensation Paid to Date

Dated

PPD/PPI

TTDfrPD

Medical

$0.00
(surety is not aware of any
PPI or permanent restrictions
given on this claim)

$0.00

$678.20

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
•
4
I hereby certify that on the lE day of • • 2011, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:
PLEASE COMPLETE

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY:
Mr. Stephen J. Nemec Esq.
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
via:

-T- personal service of process
_V_ regular U.S. Mail

I

~·

@S/09/2011

I

12:55

JVW

208554

PAGE

':IGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX 83720,

01/05

eorsc; IDAHO 83720...0041

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (ISIF)

1

CLAIMANT'$ NAME ANO ADDRESS

CLAIMAN1"S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

:'.Vis. Trndy Deon
211 W. Haycraft
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

STEPHEN .T. NEMEC
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

EMF"LOYER'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Hagadone Hospitality (H & J Inc.)
P.O. Box 6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Kimberly Doyle
Liberty Northwest
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

LC. NUM6ER OF CURRENT CLAIM
I

2008-032836

II

-D-AT_E_O_F_IN_J_U_RY-------------------<

,_i

I
I 10/4/2008

WORKERS' COMPENSATlON INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT
ADJUSTERS) NAME AND ADDRESS

Liberty Northwest
PO Box 7507
Boise, ID 83 707-15 07

NATURE AND CAUSE OF PRE-EXISTING F"HYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, CURRENT INJURY. OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Claimant was attacked by dogs on Febmary 16, 2006 suffering a variety of injuries to both lower extremities;
fibromyalgia; arthritis; head injury as a child. See also attached documentation.
STATE WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CLAIMANT IS TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED:

Claimant had a pre-existing "permanent physical impairment" that was manifest prior to the cmre11t injuries,

that constituted a "subjective" hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or re~employment. that a work
related injury occurred, and by reason of the "combined effects" of both the pre-existing pen:nanent partial
impai1111ents and the subsequent back injury that also resulted in permanent impairment, or by reason of the
work-related aggravations and acceleration of the pre-existing permanent partial impairments, Claimant now
suffers total and permanent disability.

E

DATE

COMF"LAlNT AGAINST ISIF
Appendix 2
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0FdGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (ISIF)

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Ms. Trudy Deon
211 W. Haycraft
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

STEPHEN J. NEMEC
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Hagadone Hospitality (H & J Inc.)
P.O. Box 6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816

Kimberly Doyle
Liberty Northwest
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

1.C. NUMBER OF CURRENT CLAIM

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT
ADJUSTERS) NAME AND ADDRESS

2008-032836
DATE OF INJURY

10/4/2008

Liberty Northwest
PO Box 7507
Boise, ID 83707-1507

NATURE AND CAUSE OF PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, CURRENT INJURY, OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Claimant was attacked by dogs on February 16, 2006 suffering a variety of injuries to both lower extremities;
fibromyalgia; arthritis; head injury as a child. See also attached documentation.
STATE WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CLAIMANT IS TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED:

Claimant had a pre-existing "permanent physical impairment" that was manifest prior to the current injuries,
that constituted a "subjective" hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or re-employment, that a work
related injury occurred, and by reason of the "combined effects" of both the pre-existing permanent partial
impairments and the subsequent back injury that also resulted in permanent impairment, or by reason of the
work-related aggravations and acceleration of the pre-existing permanent partial impairments, Claimant now
suffers total and permanent disability.

DATE

COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF
Appendix 2

Certificate of Service

I certify that on ,/

2 . ~} l ( , I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:
Claimant's Address

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
Department of Administration
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-7901
Employer's Attorney's Name and Address
Fax: 800-972-3213
Kimberly Doyle
Liberty Northwest
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

NOTICE:

Ms. Trudy Deon
211 W. Haycraft
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Surety's Name and Address
Fax: 208-327-7518
Liberty Northwest
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 83707

Pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code §72-334, a notice of claim must first be filed with the Manager of ISIF not
less than 60 days prior to the filling of a complaint against ISIF.
You must attach a copy of Form IC 1001 Workers' Compensation Complaint, to this document
An Answer must be filed on Form IC 1003 within 21 days of service in order to avoid default.

COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF
Appendix 2

JMMISSION, JUDICIAL DMSION, P.O. B(

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRL

,720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT
CLAIMANT'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

Trudy Deon

STEPHEN NEMEC
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

211 W Haycraft
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
TELEPHONENUMBER:

1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 208-667-0683

208-667-0683

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S
(NOT ADWSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

of injury)

Hagadone Hospitality
c/o Sara LaPresta (Personnel Manager)
PO Box6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
CLAIMANT'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

Liberty Northwest
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd.

P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 38707

CLAil"1ANT'S BIR.TI:! DATE

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

10/4/08
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED

WHEN INmRED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

Idaho, Kootenai County

OF: S

Unknmvn

, PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 72-419

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED)

Injured hand when electric snake wrapped around Claimant's glove and arm causing injury and tip hit her eye.
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLE!v'.S ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Hand injury and H. simplex keratitis in eye.
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAJMING AT TilIS TIME?

Medical for eye, TPD, PPL and PPD benefits
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER

TO WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN

10/4/10

Russel Kizzer, man

HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

00

ORAL

D

WRITTEN

D

er

OTIIER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ISSUE OR ISSUES lNVOLVED

1.
2.

J.
4.

Vt'hat medical benefits Claimant is entitled to;
The amount of permanent partial impairment to which Claimant is entitled.;
Whether Claimant has disability in excess of impairment; and
\\lhether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled.

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OFFACTS?

0

YES

00

NO

IF SO, PLEASE STATE WHY.

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE JN ACCORDANCE WITH IDAHO
CODE§ 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM LC. 1002
1Cl001 (Rev. 3/112008)

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)

Appendix 1

Complaint - Page J of3

PHYSICIANS 'WHO TREATED CLAJMANT (NAME AND ADDRESS)

See attached

[&] YESD NO

I AM J:!'-..1TERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER P•.<\RTIES AGREE.

DATE

l/tll!/

I•GNArnOF~ORmDRNEY~
J.NE

I

C

"""""

PLEASE ANS'\\''ER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS

NAME AND SOCIAL SECURIITNUMBER OF PARTY
FILING COMPLAINT

DATE OF DEATH

WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED?
DYES
ONO

RELATION TO DECEASED CLAJMANT

DID FlLlNG PARTY LIVE WITil DECEASED Ar TIME OF ACCIDENT?

0

YES

DNo

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on

the·~ day o~c...__'=- , 2~, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:

'
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

SlTRETY'S NA.ME A.cl-ID ADDRESS

Hagadone Hospitality
c/o Sara LaPresta (Personnel Manager)
PO Box6200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Liberty Northwest
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd.
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 38707
Attn: Chanel Holland
208-327-7518

Ix I U.S. Mail

D

0Fax

U.S. Mail

lX] Fax

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company senred with a Complaint must file an Answe
Form I.C.1003 with
the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of senrice as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0041 (208)334-6000.
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3)
Complaint - Page 2 of 3

Patient Name:

Trud

m Deon

Birth Date:
Address:

(Provider Use Only)

211 W. Haycraft, 83814
208-818-2119

Phone Number:

Medical Record Number: - - - - - 0 Pick up Copies D Fax Copies# _ __
D Mail Copies

SSN or Case Number:

ID Confirmed by: - - - - - - - -

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
to disclose health information as specified:

I hereby authorize

Provider Name - must be specific for each provider

To:
Insurance Companyffhird Party Administrator/Selflnsured Employer/ISIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney

State

City

Zip Code

Purpose of need for data:
(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim)
Information to be disclosed:

D
D
D
D
D

D
D

Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care:

Discharge Summary
History & Physical Exam
Consultation Reports
Operative Reports
Lab

Pathology
Rad.iology Reports

D

Entire Record

D

Other: Specify

I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable):

D

D
D

AIDSorHIV
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information

I understand tl:iat the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law {45 CFR F>art 164) and
that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I
understand tnat this authorization may be revoked-in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking
the authorization won't apply to info[mation already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider
will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise
- revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, cop_y
service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above
information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature
below authorizes release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be
directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above.
~-''

,/ :·.{{ ~01"1:.r:-

,·-)

~

. .r,/'/ /:,:

.l

/:

••

<.

_r__, - - - - - -

- - ' - ' - ' - . . . ; , ; _ -- ·--•'--''--'-~;i.. "-"'----"~=-·!-,---...,...._._..,._

,,.--/ Date

Signature of Patient
Signature of Legal

RcpreS>:.~ntati\'C

Signature of Witness

~~~~(//r.J·~{'

& Rdatiomhip ;o Patii..'.nt.':\uthority lO Act

Title

Date
Date

North Idaho Physical Therapy
North Idaho Eye Institute
Kootenai Family Care

Northwest Orthopedic Clinic
North Idaho Hand Rehabilitation
Kootenai Medical Center
River Edge Orthopedics
Kootenai MRI

1917 N. Lakewood Dr.
Coeur d'Alene, ID
1814 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
750 Syringa Dr.
Post Falls, ID 83854
16760 N. Hwy 41
Rathdrum, ID 83858
601 W. 5th Ave.
Spokane, WA 99204
943 Ironwood, #100
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
2003 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
1300 E. Mullan,#1300
Post Falls, ID 83854
2003 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

I
Send Original to: Industrial Commission, Judici

ision, 317 Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83 720-600

I.C. NO.: 08-032836

ANS\VER TO COMPLAINT
INJURY DATE: 10/04/2008

Claimant's Name and Address:

Claimant's Attorney's Name and Address:

TRUDY DEON
211 W. HAYCRAFT
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

STEPHEN J. NEMEC
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

Employer's Name and Address:

Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier's (Not Adjuster's)
Name and Address:

HAGADONE HOSPITALITY (H & J, INC.)
P.O. BOX 6200
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816

LIBERTY NORTHWEST
P.O. BOX 7507
BOISE, ID 83707-1507

Attorney Representing Employer or Employer/Surety (Name and
Address)

Attorney Representing Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (Name
and Address)

KIMBERLY DOYLE
LIBERTY NORTHWEST
P.O. BOX6358
BOISE, ID 83707-6358

THOMAS W. CALLERY
J()NES, BROWRR & C4.LIERY
POBOX854
LEWISTON ID 83501

The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:

IT IS: (Check One)
ADMITTED
.

DENIED
.

x

. ..

.. -·

1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actUally OC£urred on or about the
time claimed.

x
x
x

2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act.
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly _ _ _ or entirely
accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment

NIA

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of
the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to
the trade, occupation, process, or employment
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the
manifestation of such occupational disease.

x
NIA
Unknown to
ISIF

x

by an

7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five
months after the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted.
8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho
Code, Section 72-419:
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self insured under the Idaho worker's
Compensation Act.

10. What Benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?

NONE FROM ISIF

Page l of2

11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affinnative defenses.

PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT A ATTACHED HERETO AND INCORPORt\.TED HEREIN
BY REFERENCE AS THOUGH SET FORTH IN FULL

Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy of
your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause the
claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments
due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 111 (D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho
Worker's Compensation Law, applies. Comph:.ints against the Industrial Si)ecial Indemnity Fund must be filed or, Form 1.C. l 002.

I am interested in mediating this claim, if the other parties agree.

Yes

No

Do you believe this Claim presents a new question of law or a complicated set of facts? If so, please state.
~o

, mount o fC ompensat10n Pa1"d to D ate
PPD

TTD

Medical

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

Dated

G/ /if

,

\.

(...___,

-(~

\

\

Please Complete
/

I hereby certify that on the ( !>

day of June, 2011, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

Employer and Surety's
Name and Address
KIMBERLY DOYLE
LIBERTY NORTHWEST
P.O. BOX 6358
BOISE, ID 83707-6358

Claimant's Name and Address:
TRUDY DEON
c/o STEPHEN J. NEMEC

I626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

via: - - - Personal Service of Process
regular U. S. Mail

!CJ003

via:

Personal Service of Process
_X_ _ regular U. S. Mail

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
(If Applicable)

via:

Personal Service of Process
_ _ regular U. S. Mail

Answer - Page 2 0:2

FX_HIBIT 'A'
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund recently received the Workers' Compensation Complaint
against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund and contemplates the initiation of formal
discovery. The Fund has limited medical records available and is unable at this time to
accurately either admit or deny portions of the Complaint and reserves the right to amend this
Answer as necessary and warranted by subsequent discovery.

2.

Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled.

3.

Claimant did not suffer from a known manifest, pre-existing, permanent physical impairment
within the meaning ofldaho Code Section 72-332(2).

4.

Any permanent physical impairment suffered by the Claimant was not a hindrance or obstacle to
Claimant's employment or re-employment.

5.

If Claimant is totally disabled, it is not due to the aggravation and acceleration of a pre-existing
condition nor due to the combined affects of pre and post injury conditions.

6.

Claimant is capable of retraining for employment suitable to Claimant's alleged limitations but
has either failed to pursue suitable employment or to cooperate in retraining for such
employment.

Answer- Page 3 o:2
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
Claimant,
)
)
)
v.
)
H & J, INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN
)
COEUR D'ALENE INN & CONFERENCE)
CENTER,
)
)
)
Employer,
)
)
and
)
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
)
CORPORATION,
)
)
)
Surety,
)
)
and
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
)
SPECIAL JJ\TDEMNITY FUND,
)
Defendants.
)

TRUDY DEON,

IC 2007-005950
IC 2008-032836

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE

Pursuant to the Motion to Consolidate filed by Defendants on April 12, 2011, and the
response of the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) filed on June 29, 2011, stating that theISIF
has no objection to consolidation, and seeing no other response or objection thereto,
The Industrial Commission of the State ofldaho hereby ORDERS that those claims presently
pending before the Commission knmvn as IC Numbers 2007-005950 and 2008-032836 are
consolidated into a single proceeding. Future pleadings require reference to the two IC numbers
listed above, but only a single document need be filed with the Commission.
DATED this }srr day of July, 2011.
INTIUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Alan Reed Taylor, Referee

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE - 1

ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 1SI day ofJuly, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE was served by regular United States mail upon each of the
following persons:
STEPHEN J 1\TEMEC
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COElJRD'ALEl\TE ID 83814-2435
KIMBERLY A DOYLE
POBOX6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
THOMAS \V CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501-0854

SC

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE-2

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
Claimant,
)
)
v.
)
H & J, INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN
)
COEUR D'ALENE INN & CONFERENCE)
CENTER,
)
)
Employer,
)
)
)
and
)
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
)
CORPORATION,
)
)
)
Surety,
)
)
and
)
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
)
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FL'ND,
)
)
)
Defendants.

TRUDY DEON,

IC 2007-005950
IC 2008-032836

NOTICE OF HEARING
AND
NOTICE OF PRE-HEARING
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on

October 16, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. (PDT), for one half day in the Industrial Commission Field
Office, 1111 Ironwood Dr., Suite A, in the City of Coeur d'Alene, County of Kootenai, State of
Idaho, on the following issues:
1.

Whether, and to what extent, Claimant is entitled to the following benefits:
a. Medical care;
b. Temporary Partial and/or Temporary Total Disability benefits (TPD/TTD);
c. Permanent Partial Impairment (PPI);
d. Disability in excess of impairment; and
e. Attorney fees

NOTICE OF HEARING AND NOTICE OF PRE-HEARING TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE - 1

2.

\Vhether the condition for which Claimant seeks benefits was caused by the
industrial accident.

3.

Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing and/or
subsequent injury/condition.

4.

\Vhether apportionment for a pre-existing or subsequent condition pursuant to
Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate.

5.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot
doctrine or otherwise.

6.

\Vhether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is liable under Idaho Code § 72332.

7.

Apportionment under the Carey Formula.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a telephone conference will be held in the above
matter on September 24, 2012, at 10:00 a.m. (MDT). The Referee will initiate the calls. All
parties shall be prepared to discuss the status of the hearing set above.
DATED this

/ ;rt~day of January, 2012.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

NOTICE OF HEARING AND NOTICE OF PRE-HEARING TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
- day of January, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING AND NOTICE OF PRE-HEARING TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the following:
STEPHEN J NEMEC
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814-2435
ROGER L BROWN
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
THOMAS W CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501-0854
and by regular United States mail to:
M&M COURT REPORTING SERVICES
816 E SHERMAN AVE STE 7
COEUR DALENE ID 83814-4921
and by e-mail to:
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FIELD OFFICE- COEUR D'ALENE

sb

NOTICE OF HEARING AND NOTICE OF PRE-HEARING TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE-3

10/C2/2012

14:10

208554

JVW

PAGE

JAMES & VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208)-664-1684

Stephen J. Nemec, ISB # 7591
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDA.HO

CASE NO.: 2007-005950
2008-032836

TRUDY DEON,
Claimant,

vs.
HAGADONE HOSPITALITY~
Employer,

CLAIMANT'S PRE-HEARING NOTICE
OF WITNESSES, EXIIlBITS AND POSTHEARING DEPOSITIONS

and
LIBERTY NORTH\VEST INSURANCE CO.,
Surety,

and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRlAL SPECIAL
Thi'DEMNITY FUJ\1)
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Stephen J. Nemec of the ·

firm Jam.es, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. and pursuant to Rule X of the Judicial Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho states as follows:

CLAIMANT'S PREHEARING NOTICE OF 'WITNESSES, EXHIBITS, A1"1) POST-HEARING DEPOSITIONS-1

10/02 2012 TUE 15:15

TX/RX NO 8810]

01/04

/

10/C2/2012

1.

PAGE

JVW

208554
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The hearing is on the issues of:
A

Whether and to what extent. Claimant is entitled to the following benefits:
a.

Medical Care;

b.

Temporary Partial and/or Temporary TotaJ. Disability benefits

(TPD!TTD);
c.

Permanent Partial Impairment;

d.

Disability in Excess of Impairment; and

e.

Attorney Fees

B.

\Vb.ether the condition. for which Claimant seeks benefits was caused by
the industrial accident;

C.

Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing
and/or. subsequent injury/condition;

D.

Whether apportionment for a pre-existing or subsequent condition
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-406 is appropriate;

E.

\Vhether Claimant is entitled to permanent total. disability pursuant to the
odd-lot doctrine or otherwise;

F.

\Vb.ether the IndustriaJ. Special Indemnity Fund is liable under Idaho Code
§72-332;

G.

Apportionment under the Carey Formula.

2.

It is unknown whether this case ""ilJ settle prior to hearing.

3.

Claimant will rely on exhibits listed in Defendant Liberty Northwest and

Defendant ISIF Preheating Notice of Exhibits and -will also introduce the following
exhibits:

Cl::AIMAJ~T'S

l.

ICRD File (12/5/08-12/07/09)

2.

SSA Earnings History vvith SSD Benefit Information (7128/11)

3.

Liberty Northwest Indemnity and Medical Ledgers (2118/11)

PREHEARING NOTICE OF VIITNESSES, EXHIBJTS, AND POST-HEARING DEPOSITlONS-2
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4.

SSA Judicial Decision. (5113/l 0)

5.

SSA Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (4/29/09)

6.

Report of Vocational Expert Dan Brownell (5/28/12)

7.

Report ofVocationaJ Expert Nancy Collins (9/4/12)

8.

Report of Vocational Expert Mary Barros (7/31/l2 & 10/31 / l 1)

9.

Deposition Transcript of JeffMiUs (3/29/12)

10.

Deposition Transcript of Trudy Deon (l0/6/11)

11.

IME Report of Dr. McNulty (9/13/12)

12.

CDA Hand Therapy FCE (9/4112 & 9116/1 l)

13.

North Idaho MRI Imaging Reports (11./3/08 & 12/4/08)

14.

Dr. Stevens IME (11118/09) andEMG & NCS (8/19/09)

15.

RiversEdge Orthopedics-Dr. Greendyke (6/5/06-10/28/09)

l 6.

Northwest Orthopaedic Specialists-Dr. Sestero (3/19/09)

17.

Dr. Patrick Mullen (11113/08-7/30/09)

18.

IME Report of Dr. Kerr (4/17/09)

19.

North Idaho Hand Rehabilitation (l/1/09~6/25/09)

20.

North Idaho Physical Therapy (8/4/09-10/28/09)

21.

Kootenai Medical Center Records (10/4/08-12/30/08)

22.

North Idaho Medical Care Center (4/26/06~ 10/16/08)

23.

North Idaho Eye In.stitute (5/25/01-8/1/l l)

24.

Rottweiler Attack Records (Drs. Shaw, Quinn, Witham) (2/12/06-7/29/09)

25.

Various Prior Industrial Commission Records and LSSA (1/15/94)

Claimant :reserves the right to supplement the above exhibit listing.

CLAIMANT'S PREHEARING NOTICE OF WITNESSES, EXHIBITS, AND POST-HEARING DEPOSITIONS-3

03/04

10/32/2012
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It is expected that the Claimant will testify live at hearing aJong -with Jaywitnesses

4.

A.rvada Schumacher, Martha Burtis, Rodney Burtis, .Kristina Veentjer. It is also expected tl1at Dr.

McNulty and Dan Bro-.vne11 may testify via post-hearing deposition or at hearing as their schedule
pennits. Claimant reserves the right to depose additional treating physicians as needed.

DATED fuis

2nd

day of October, 2012 .

. JAMES, VERNON & \VEEKS,P.A

~.N..qt!!:_ec_:!!!!!!--~
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
2nd
day of
October
. 2012 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the following ind1viduals by the
method indicated below:
Fax: 800-972-3213
Roger Brown
Hannon & Day
P.O. Box 6358
3505 E. Overland Rd.
Meridian, ID 83642
208-327-7561
Roger.Brovm@LibertyMutual.com
Attv. for H & J & Ljberty NW
Mailed
By Hand
Overnight Mail
Fax

x

Fax: 208-746-9553
Thomas W. Callery
Jones , Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
208-743-3591
tcallery@lewiston.com
Atty. for IS1P

x

Mailed

By Hand
Overnight Mail

Fax

CLAIMANT'S PREHEARING NOTICE OF WTI'NESSES, EXHIBITS, AND POST-HEARING DEPOSITIONs-4
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Roger L. Brown (ISB 5504)
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON & DAY
P .0. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
Telephone (208) 895-2583

Fax(800)972-3213
Employees of the Liberty Mutual Group
Attorney for Defendants Employer /Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Trudy Deon,
Claimant,

v.
H & J Hospitality, Inc., d/b/a Best Western
Coeur d'Alene Inn, Employer, and
Uberty Northwest Insurance Corp., Surety,
and Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund,
Defendants.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

)

I. C. No.: 2008-032836

)
)
}
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2007-005950
DEFENDANT, H & J
HOSPITALITY, INC., D/B/A
BEST WESTERN COEUR
D'ALENE INN'S JOINT
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE
OF WITNESSES, EXHIBITS,
AND POST-HEARING
DEPOSITIONS

COMES NOW Defendants, Best Western Coeur d'Alene lnn, Employer, and
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation, Surety, by and through their attorney of
record, Roger L

Brown, and certify to the Industrial Commission in accord with

Industrial Commission Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule VIII and Rule X,
the following:
1.

The following joint supplemental exhibits may be introduced by Defendants at

hearing:
26.
27.
28.

First report of injury dated 10/4/08;
Liberty NW Summary of benefits paid;
Claimant's personnel file;
Defendants reserve the right to supplement the above exhi,!=>i~ list

1-

DEFENDANT, H & J HOSPITALITY, INC., D/B/A BEST WESTERN COEUR D'ALENE INN'S
JOINT SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF WITNESSES~ EXHIBITS, AND POST-HEARING
DEPOSITIONS

10/05/2012 FRI 16:44 !TX/RX NO 86531

/

Roger L. Brown (ISB 5504)
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON & DAY
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
Telephone (208) 895-2583
Fax(800)972-3213
Employees of the Liberty Mutual Group
Attorney for Defendants Employer /Surety

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Trudy Deon,

)
)
Claimant,
)
)
v.
)
H & J Hospitality, Inc., d/b/a Best Western
)
)
Coeur d'Alene Inn, Employer, and
)
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp., Surety,
)
and Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund,
)
~~~~~D_e_fe_n_d_an_t_s·~~~~~~~~)

I. C. No.: 2008-032836
2007-005950
I

DEFENDANT, H & J
HOSPITALITY, INC., D/B/A
BEST WESTERN COEUR
D'ALENE INN'S JOINT
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE
OF WITNESSES, EXHIBITS,
AND POST-HEARING
DEPOSITIONS

COMES NOW Defendants, Best Western Coeur d'Alene Inn, Employer, and
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation, Surety, by and through their attorney of
record, Roger L. Brown, and certify to the Industrial Commission in accord with
Industrial Commission Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule VIII and Rule X,
the following:
1.

The following joint supplemental exhibits may be introduced by Defendants at

hearing:
26.
27.
28.

First report of injury dated 10/4/08;
Liberty NW Summary of benefits paid;
Claimant's personnel file;
Defendants reserve the right to supplement the above exhibit [i§t.

1-

DEFENDANT, H & J HOSPITALITY, INC., D/B/A BEST WESTERN COEUR D'ALENE INN'S
JOINT SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF WITNESSES, EXHIBITS, AND POST-HEARING
DEPOSITIONS

2.

Defendants intend to call Claimant as a witness at the hearing and may call

Mary Barros-Bailey and J. Craig Stevens, M.D., depending upon their schedules and
availability.
3.

Defendants have tentatively scheduled the

post-hearing deposition of Mary

Barros-Bailey and J. Craig Stevens, M.D., (should they be unavailable to testify at
hearing), and reserve the right to supplement this disclosure should a determination be
made to schedule any additional post-hearing depositions.
DATED this

S It

day of October, 2012.

LAW OFFICES OF HARMON & DAY

. Brown, Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on OctoberJ1.t'., 2012, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy, via facsimile of the foregoing document, upon:
Stephen J. Nemec, Esq.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Via Facsimile: (208) 664-1684

L_'ZJt?,t-.. cf ~~~
Ro~.

2-

Brown

DEFENDANT, H & J HOSPITALITY, INC., D/B/A BEST WESTERN COEUR D'ALENE INN'S
JOINT SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF WITNESSES, EXHIBITS, AND POST-HEARING
DEPOSITIONS

/

Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P. 0. Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553
tcallery@lewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TRUDY DEON,
Claimant,
vs.

HAGADONE HOSPITALITY,

) Case No.: I. C. 2007-005950
)
I. C. 2008-032836
)
)
)
)
) EXCHANGE OF EXHIBITS AND

) DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO RULE 10
)
and
)
)
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CO.,)
Employer,

and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
IND El~1t~ITY

FlT~JD,

COMES NOVY' the State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, by and through its
Attorney of Record, THOMAS W. CALLERY, of the firm of Jones, Brower & Callery,
P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Industrial Commission of the State ofldaho hereby states as follows:

EXCHANGE OF EXHIBITS &
DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO RULE 10

1.

The Defendant State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund hereby adopts

the Claimant's Exhibits 1 through 25 contained in the Claimant's Rule 10 compliance.
2.

The follmving additional exhibits are being offered by the Defendant State of

Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund:
1. ' Claimant's prior Industrial Commission records for LC. 88-619272

2.

Claimant's prior Industrial Commission records for I.C. 90-704093

Pursuarit to Rule 10 (E), the following post-hearing depositions are scheduled by
the ISIF for evidentiary purposes:
Dr. Nancy Collins, Ph.D.

DATED this

4th

day of October, 2012.

Attorney for Defendant ISIF

EXCHANGE OF EXHIBITS &
DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO RULE 10

-2-

I
II

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 4th day of October, 2012, a true and correct copy of the Exchange of
Exhibits and Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 10 was served by the method indicated below and
addressed upon the following:
~

STEPHEN J. NEMEC
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 LINCOLN \VAY
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

D
D
D

ROGER BRO\VN
HAI~\10:N & DAY
P.O. BOX 6358
BOISE, ID 83707-6358

D
D
D

EXCHANGE OF EXHIBITS &
DISCLOSURE PURSUAI\T TO RULE 10

~

-3-

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile transmission to: - - U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hann Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile transmission to: - - -

Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

FI LED
r .,,

1304 Idaho Street
P. 0. Box854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553

.•~

r

,--.
j

,r
I_
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~

--
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

~

tcallery@lewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRLA..L COJ\1MISSION OF THE STATE OF IDA.HO

TRUDY DEON,
Case No. I.C. 07-005950
LC. 08-032836

Plaintiff,
VS.

HAGADONE HOSPIT~A..LITY,
Employer,

STIPULATION A.1\:1) AGREEMENT OF
LUMJ> SUM DISCHARGE A..N"D ORDER

. LIBERTY NORTH\VEST JNSURA.NCE CO.,

OF APPROVAL Al\'D DISCHARGE

Surety,
and

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRLA..L SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUl\1D,

I

Defendants.

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this

9

day of

Dcll'fl, f' ):(2012,

by and between TRUDY DEON, hereinafter referred to as Claimant, and THE STATE OF

IDAHO, JNDUSTRIAL SPECLA..L Il\1DEMNTIY FUND, hereinafter referred to_ as the Fund;

STIPULATION AND AGREE1\1ENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCH..t\.RGE A~'D
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 1

WITNESSETH:
Vv7HEREAS, Claiinant has filed a claim for benefits under the WorkeI's Compensation
laws of the State ofldaho, being Case Nos. LC. 07-005950 and I.C. 08-032836.
WHEREAS, said case includes a claim against the Fund filed by the Claimant contending
that prior physical impairments consisting of a cervical spine injury and a left lower extremity
injury that existed prior to October 4, 2008, when the Claimant was injured when her ·right glove
got caught in an auger, resulting in a twisting injury to her right hand and wrist, which said
injuries combined resulting in Claimant being totally and permanently disabled.
\~7HEREAS,

it is the desire of the Claimant and the Fund to finally compromise and settle

the dispute between the Fund and Claimant, subject to the approval of the Com...TTiission.
vVHEREAS, the Claimant suffered from a cervical spine injury and a left lower extremity
· injury prior to the industrial accident that occurred on October 4, 2008.
WHEREAS, the Claimant incurred her left lower extremity injury second&.··y to a dog bite
in 2006. According to Dr. McNulty, the Claimant suffered a 7% whole person impairment for
loss of the plantar flexion strength in her lower left extremity.
"WrIBREAS, the Claimant entered into a lump sum agreement in a previous claim for
benefits under the Worker's Compensation laws of the State of Idaho, being Case No. I.C. 88619272 and Case No. I.C. 90-704093, awarding the Claimant a 6% whole person impairment for
her industrial accidents of 1988 and 1990 based on an independent medical evaluation. Other
medical providers, however, including Dr. Steven Sears, M.D., indicated that the Claimant could
return to work Vtrith no restrictions and had no ratable impairment for her cervical condition.

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
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vrHEREAS, the Claii."lliUlt was treated conservatively for the injury to her ring and little
finger consistent with a pip chronic jomt sprain of the right hand. The Claimant continues to
suffer from chronic right hand pain and dysfunction. She received a 6% impairment of the ring
finger, and a 6% impairment of the little finger, which converts to a 3% upper extremity
impairment and further converts to a 2% whole person impairment for the injury of October 4,
2008 from Dr. John McNulty, M.D.
Vv'lffiREAS, the Claimant underwent an independent medical evaluation by Dr. J. Craig
Stevens, M.D., on November 18, 2009, at the request of the Surety. Dr. Stevens was of the
opinion the Claimant suffered a 2% upper extremity impairment apportioned to the injury of
October ,4, 2008, which converts to a 1% whole person impairment.
"WHEREAS, the Claimant is currently 57 years of age ·with a date of birth o
nd is currently a resident of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
w'lffiREAS, the Claimant has been employed as a forest service worker, short order
relief cook, certified nurse assistant, personal care attendant, draftsperson, and an HVAC
technician during her lifetime.
"WHEREAS, the Claimant is a high school graduate. She has an Associate's Degree in
drafting from North Idaho College, as well as a certificate in HV AC work from North Idaho
College.
YVHEREAS, the Fund and the Claimant stipulate and agree that Claimant is totally and
permanently disabled based upon the combined effects of the Claimant's pre-existing cervica_l
spine injury and left lower extremity injury, combining with the injury to her right hand and

wrist

STIPULATION A.'1\'D AGREEMENT
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v\THEREAS, based upon the medical records, the Claimant and the Fund stipulate that a

60140 Carey Formula apportionment with the Fund being responsible for 60% of the Claimant's
. total and permanent disability is appropriate in this case. This Carey Formula apportionment is
based upon the impairment for Claimant's cervical spine injury and left lower extremity, and the
significant impairment to Claimant's right hand and wrist as a result of the October 4, 2008,
accident.

It further takes into account the conflicting evidence concerning the Claimant's

I

.

cervical impairment and her ability to return to medium level work as an HV AC technician after

her cervical injury and lower extremity injury.
VVHEREAS, the Claimant was deemed to be at maximum medical Lilprovement m
November 2009.
\\THEREAS, it is in the best interest of justice and of each and all the parties hereto that
the above claim be fully, finally and forever settled, satisfied and discharged upon a lump sum
payment to the Claimant in the sum of Seventy Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($70,000.00) to be
· paid by the Fund.
VVHEREAS, the parties acknowledge and agree that the $70,000.00 lump sum to be paid
to Claimant under the terms of this agreement constitutes compensation on a claim of total and
permanent disability that will affect Claimant for the rest of her life.
VVHEREAS, the Claimant has financial needs that currently exist that would be satisfied

by a lump sum payment as opposed to statutory monthly payments.

\hlHERRA.S, the Claimant has had a compromised health condition, including a cervical
spine injury, left lower extremity injury and right hand and wrist injury, it is reasonable for the

Claimant to forego statutory annuity payments at this time in exchange for the certainty of a
. lump sum payment.

STIPULATION Al\TD AGREEMENT
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Claimant's current age of 57 years. Further, the Claimant's date of stability being November

II

2009 would result in Claimant not being entitled to full statutory benefits from the Fund based on

I

a 60/40 Carey apportionment until November 2013, at which time, the Claimant would be 58

l
~

years of.age.

~

'

I

WHEREAS, the decision to accept a lump su::n, as opposed to a monthly annuity, has

ti

fi

:I

been made after consultation by Claimant with her legal counsel, including consideration of the
Claimant's needs for immediate cash and that monthly annuity payments cease upon death
without SlLrvivor benefits.
Vv1IBREAS, by law, the Fund would have no liability unless the Claimant was totally and

permanently disabled.
WHEREAS, the Fund and the Claimant admit and agree that the Claimant is totally and

permanently disabled.
WHEREi\S, it is the desire of the parties hereto to fully and finally compromise and

settle said dispute subject to the approval of the Commission.

NOW THEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove stated, and in consideration of the
mutual covenants and conditions contained herein, IT IS AGREED by

a..~d

between the parties

hereto as follows:
1.
.

above-entitl~d

It is in the best interests of justice and of each and all of the parties hereto that the

claim be fully, finally and forever settled, satisfied and discharged upon a lump

su.."'D. payment to Claimant in the sum of $70,000.00, to be paid by the Fund.

STIPULATION AND AGREEML~
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2.

In consideration of the $70,000.00 payment by the Fund, the Claimant. fully

Ireleases the Fund from any further liability of any kind for past injuries and conditions,
relinquishing any right to, in the future, again make claim against the Fund as a result of past,
present and future accidents, injuries, illnesses, diseases, or conditions of any kind.

3.

It is agreed that all damages, disability, loss, expense and injury ii1 any way

resulting from or related to the industrial accident involved in this matter, foreseen and
recognized or not, and whether the same have accrued or may hereafter accrue, are included in
the above-captioned claim and are encompassed in and fully and finally sei:tled and discharged
by this agreement.
4.

The parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be

deemed to adjudicate said accident, and resultant impairment industrial in nature or origin under
covered employment by Employer, as provided by the Workers' Compensation laws of the State
of Idaho.
5.

Claimant does indemnify and agree to save the Fund ha:.lllless from and against

any further claim or loss of any and every kind a:.-ising out of or related to said industrial accident
and any resultant loss, damage or injlli-y, including any and all claims i..ri any way related to
Claimant's condition.
6.

It is specifically understood and agreed that the Fund is fully, finally and forever

released of and from any and all liability or claims of any nature whatever, whether now existing
or hereafter discovered, in any way relating to Claimant's condition or the treatment thereof or
any disability resulting therefrom.
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7.

Claimant is represented herein and has been counseled by STEPHEN J.1't'EMEC,

whose name shall be included as a payee on any settlement draft,

same to be delivered to said

attorney by the Fund.

8.

Claimant's obligations to pay attorney fees and reimburse her attorney for costs

advanced arise from a written Contingent Fee Agreement From the lump sum payment to be
paid pursuant to this Agreement, the Claimant and her attorney represent that the sum of
$20,262.71 shall be paid to Claimant's attorney as fees and costs in accordance ffith their
agreement, and that the Claimant, after deduction of attorney fees and costs of litigation, shall
receive the net sum of $49,737.29.
9.

The parties aclmowledge and agree that the $70,000.00 lump sum to be paid to

Claimant under the terms of this agreement constitutes compensation for total and permanent
disability that will affect Claimant the rest of her life. Claimant's remaining life expectancy is 27
years or 324 months according to the 2007 Social Security Acturu.-ial Life Table.
Therefore, even though paid :in a lump sum, the Claimant's net benefits after deduction of
attorney fees in the amount of $17,500.00 and costs :in the amount of $2,762.61 shall be
considered to be $153.51 a month for 324 months beginning December 1, 2012.

10.

Upon the Commission approving this agreement and excepting only payment of

. said Lump Sum by the Fund as aforesaid, the Fund shall be, and by these presents is fully, finally
and forever discharged and released of and from any and all liability on account of the alleged
industrial accident of Claimant
11.

The terms of this agreement shall be binding upon all of the above parties, their

heirs, representatives, successors and assigns.
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12.

All parties waive the right of appeal or to re-open these proceedings as a part of

the consideration of and for this Agreement. Tne parties hereby specifically and expressly agree,
as a part of the consideration herein, that all parties waive the right to reconsideration of an
award otherwise provided under the Workers' Compensation Laws of Idaho, §72-718, Idaho
Code.
13.

All portions of this instrument constitute binding covenants of the parties, and no

portion is a mere recital. ·
14.

By this instrument, the Claimant requests the Commission's approval hereof and

Order of Discharge pursuant hereto, and the Fund does join in said petition a.."'ld stipulates that it
should be granted. Claimant acknowledges that she has, -with the assistance of her counsel,
carefully read this Agreement and legal instrument in its entirety, understands its contents and
has executed the same lmowing that this agreement forever concludes

ai1d

fully and finally

disposes of any and all claims of every kind and character she has or may have against the Fund
on account of the industrial accident Claimant further understands that this agreement forever
precludes Claimant from filing any future claims against the Fund on account of any fature
accidents, injuries or diseases and that these proceedings are concluded and forever closed by
reason hereof, subject only to Commission approval and Order, as aforesaid.
15.

Acceptance of this Agreement by Claimant according to the terms and conditions

stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge the Fund from liability for any claims forever,
regardless of whether such claims a.."ise from the industrial accident which is the subject of this
cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or infirmities existing prior
hereto, or hereafter arising.
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DATED this /

f
~

~

day

of__,_.&'---~--'-f_,_, 2012.

APPROVED:

l

I'

9

/~

A

:1Ju

/-/!ll.id1.J /hvt--- ~'y-J

fa EON, Claimant

'fRUDY

<

Attorney for Claimant

----~·

E, Manager
...,cial Indemnity Fund
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THOMAS W. CALLERY, Attorney for

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund

ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE
lTPON LUMP SUM PAr1vffiNT

I
I
l

I

I
'

The foregoing Stipulation and Agreement having duly and regularly come before this
Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and the Claimant, TRUDY DEON, are
and will be served by approving said Agreement and granting the Order of Discharge as prayed
for,
NOW THEREFORE, said foregoing Stipulation and Agreement shall be, and th.e same is,

'

hereby APPROVED:
Further, said Petition shall be and hereby rs GRANTED, and the above-entitled
proceedings are DISMISSED \VITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this

<()

day of

~012.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Member
~

!;1) /;2/2/±z~/-,
•
Member

STIPULATION A..'1\"'D AGREEMEl'fl'
OF LUMP SUM DISCHA.RGE A..1.1':'1)
ORDER OF APPROVALANDDISCHARGE-10

'

t'

(

/

,

(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8 day of ·,.J\JV~~2012, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be served upon:

j
;
i.

I
I

THOMAS W. CALLERY
ef
JO:N""ES, BRO\VER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 0

I
I
~

P.O. BOX 854

I

LEWISTON, ID 83501

;

'~

STEPHEN J. :NEMEC
JA.MES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814
JAMES F. KILE

o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Q/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D
Hand Delivered
D
Facsimile

~ U.S.Mail

INDUSTRI/u. SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND D
P.O. BOX 83720
0

Hand Delivered
Facsimile

BOISE, ID 83 720-7901

by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last lrnown address as set forth above.
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,
IC 2007-005950
IC 2008-032836

Claimant,
V.

H & J, INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN COEUR
D'ALENE INN & CONFERENCE CENTER,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDATION

Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION,
Surety,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the aboveentitled matter to Referee Alan Taylor, who conducted a hearing in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho on
October 16, 2012. Claimant, Trudy Deon, was present in person and represented by Steven
Nemec, of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Defendant Employer, H & J, Inc., d/b/a Best Western Coeur
d'Alene Inn & Conference Center (H&J) and Surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation,
were represented by Roger Brown, of Boise, Idaho.

Claimant settled with State of Idaho,

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF), prior to hearing.

The parties presented oral and

documentary evidence. No post-hearing depositions were taken and briefs were later submitted.
The matter came under advisement on December 24, 2012.

FINDINGS OFFACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 1

ISSUES

The issues to be decided are: 1
1.

The extent of Claimant's permanent partial impairment.

2.

The extent of Claimant's permanent disability, including whether Claimant is

permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine or otherwise.
3.

Whether apportionment for a pre-existing or subsequent condition pursuant to

Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate.
4.

Apportionment under the ~ formula.

5.

Claimant's entitlement to additional medical benefits.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Claimant alleges that she is totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot
doctrine solely as a result of her 2008 industrial accident at the Coeur d'Alene Inn and resulting
injury to her dominant right hand.

She also asserts entitlement to medical benefits for a

functional capacity evaluation performed September 16, 2011. Defendants readily acknowledge
Claimant's 2008 industrial accident and have provided extensive medical and temporary
disability benefits. However, Defendants contend that Claimant is employable and suffers no
permanent disability beyond 2% upper extremity impairment or in the alternative, that
Claimant's permanent disability is minimal.
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED

The record in this matter consists of the following:
1.

The Industrial Commission legal file;

1

The issue of Claimant's entitlement to an award of attorney fees was noticed for
hearing. However, as Defendants correctly note, Claimant argues no claim for attorney fees in
her briefing. This issue is therefore deemed abandoned.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 2

2.

Claimant's Exhibits 1-25, admitted at hearing;

3.

Defendants' Exhibits 26-28, admitted at hearing;

4.

The testimony of Claimant, Daniel

Bro~nell,

and Mary Barros-Bailey, taken at

the October 16, 2012 hearing.
All objections posed during the pre-hearing depositions are overruled.
After having considered the above evidence and the arguments of the parties, the Referee
submits the following findings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the Commission.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Claimant was born in 1955 and is right-handed. She was five feet five inches tall,

57 years old, and resided in Coeur d'Alene at the time of the hearing. She graduated from high
school in Montana in 1974, but had trouble with reading and spelling.

She worked as a

dishwasher and cook at a cafe during the summer while in high school. From 1975 to 1976, she
worked for the school district as a rehabilitation technician for disabled children.

In that

capacity, Claimant worked directly under the supervision of a licensed physical therapist. From
approximately 1976 until 1986, Claimant worked seasonally for the U.S. Forest Service, planting
trees and maintaining campgrounds. From 1979 to 1980, she pursued nurse's training but had
difficulty with reading and spelling.

She ultimately obtained a CNA certification but never

worked as a CNA. From approximately 1984 to 1988 she worked as a dishwasher and cook at a
cafe.
2.

From 1988 until 1993, Claimant worked for Alpha Health Services as a

rehabilitation technician caring for disabled children and adults. On two occasions Claimant was
assaulted by a patient while working. The most severe assault occurred in 1990, when Claimant
was driving a car.

A patient riding in the front passenger seat became agitated, grabbed
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Claimant's head, and violently forced it underneath the car's dashboard, injuring her neck and
shoulders. Claimant subsequently underwent cervical and bilateral first rib resection surgeries.
She was compelled to change occupations and later received a 6% whole person permanent
impairment rating for her neck and shoulder injuries. She obtained a two-year associates degree
in drafting.
3.

From 1997 until 2002, Claimant worked for Boeing as a drafting technician. She

performed hand and computerized drafting. She earned a 3-D drafting certificate while working
at Boeing.

In 2002, Claimant was laid off at Boeing.

Thereafter she obtained an HV AC

certificate from North Idaho College. She worked at a furniture factory, building and sanding
furniture while she earned her certificate.
4.

In 2003, Claimant began working full-time as a maintenance technician for

Employer H&J at the Coeur d'Alene Inn, a 150-bed motel. Her duties included all aspects of
room and kitchen maintenance and repair except removing and replacing carpets.

She also

maintained the pool and removed snow. She walked 80% of her work day and regularly lifted 50
pounds.
5.

In February 2006, Claimant was at home feeding four Rottweiler dogs in a fenced

area when one of the dogs pulled her down. Three of the Rottweilers attacked her, lacerating her
scalp and left arm, and very seriously lacerating both of her legs. She managed to escape from
the fenced area and a friend transported her to a hospital emergency room.

Claimant was

hospitalized for two weeks and underwent extensive suturing and surgeries, including skin
grafting on both of her legs. She was off work for several months, and then gradually returned to
work part-time. After approximately one year she resumed full-time work at the Coeur d'Alene
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Inn.

She was later rated with a 7% whole person permanent impairment due to her lower

extremity injuries, including nerve damage, sustained in the Rottweiler attack.
6.

By October 2008, Claimant was earning $9.75 per hour and working 40 hours per

week. H&J also provided health insurance and an IRA account as part of her compensation.
7.

On October 4, 2008, Claimant was called into the kitchen at the Coeur d'Alene

Inn to clean out the drain. She used a small power auger or electric snake. During Claimant's
efforts to clear the drain, the auger caught Claimant's right glove and right hand. Another
employee had previously removed the safety shut-off switch from the auger and Claimant was
unable to free her hand or shut off the auger. The electric snake encircled, twisted, and crushed
her right hand and wrist until another employee responded to Claimant's shouts and unplugged
the auger. The electric snake also struck Claimant's right eye or eyelid. Claimant was taken by
ambulance to the emergency room at the Kootenai Medical Center. She was diagnosed with
right hand sprain, right fourth and fifth finger sprain, and contusion.
8.

Approximately one week after the accident, Claimant developed irritation and

blurry vision in her right eye. She presented to North Idaho Immediate Care and was diagnosed
with pink eye.

However, Patrick Mullen, M.D., later diagnosed herpes simplex keratitis in

Claimant's right eye, but opined it was not related to her industrial accident.

No medical

evidence relates Claimant's right eye condition to her industrial accident.
9.

In November 2008, Claimant underwent a right hand MRI. Michael Ludwig,

M.D., reviewed the MRI, examined Claimant's right hand, and diagnosed disruption of the A2
pulley system of the fourth digit with palmar bowing of the flexor tendon, partial disruption of
the A2 pulley system of the fifth digit with palmar bowing of the flexor tendon, and nondisplaced fracture of the distal aspect of the proximal phalanx of the fifth digit. Dr. Ludwig
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referred Claimant to Dr. Mullen, a hand surgeon. Dr. Mullen noted collateral ligament tears at
the PIP joints of Claimant's right ring and little fingers. He suspected right wrist injuries and
ordered a right wrist MRl which was read as normal. Claimant wore a cast on her right hand for
approximately six weeks. Dr. Mullen prescribed physical therapy and braces.

He referred

Claimant to Anthony Sestero, M.D., who prescribed further physical therapy.
10.

In December 2008, Claimant began utilizing the services of Industrial

Commission rehabilitation consultant Beth Grigg.
11.

On April 28, 2009, Claimant commenced light-duty work part-time using her

right hand for repetitive motion no more than four hours per day. She continued to experience
debilitating right hand and wrist pain.
12.

On June 3, 2009, Claimant's supervisor reported to Ms. Grigg that although

Claimant had a release to full-time work on that date, he did not believe Claimant was physically
capable of performing all of her pre-injury job duties.
13.

In August 2009, Claimant came under the care of Spencer Greendyke, M.D. On

August 12, 2009, Dr. Greendyke released Claimant for full-time work but restricted her to lifting
no more than five pounds with her right hand. He also ordered EMG testing. On August 19,
2009, Craig Stevens, M.D., performed EMO testing and \\'Tote:
The study reveals ulnar neuropathy at the right elbow with involvement of both
the dorsal cutaneous branch as well as the origin of the ulnar sensory fibers
adjacent to the canal of Guyon. . . . . This ulnar neuropathy is moderate in severity
but certainly appears consistent with her symptoms. The study does reveal some
persisting ulnar sensory nerve function but definite evidence that an injury has
occurred.
Exhibit 14, p. 155 (emphasis supplied).
14.

On October 28, 2009, Dr. Greendyke found Claimant had reached maximum

medical improvement.
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15.

No later than November 6, 2009, Claimant's light-duty employment at Coeur

d'Alene Inn was terminated. H&J had no available work within her restrictions.
16.

On November 18, 2009, Dr. Stevens performed an independent medical

examination of Claimant at Defendants' request. Dr. Stevens found Claimant medically stable
and rated her permanent impairment at 2% of the upper extremity due to her EMG-documented
ulnar neuropathy and upper extremity collateral ligament injuries. He declined to impose any
work restrictions and opined Claimant should be released to full-duty work without restriction.
17.

After being terminated from her employment at Coeur d'Alene Inn, Claimant

filed for unemployment benefits and registered with the Idaho Department of Labor, looking for
work. Claimant also continued meeting with rehabilitation consultant Beth Grigg, who assisted
Claimant in her employment search. Ms. Grigg recorded Claimant's report that she was not able
to grip a phone for long, turn a screwdriver, type on a keyboard, lift dishes, carry groceries,
\vring out wash rags, or perform fine finger manipulation with her right hand.
18.

In December 2009, Ms. Grigg closed Claimant's file because she had not

followed up on any of the job leads Grigg provided. Claimant told Ms. Grigg that she did not
know what work she could physically perform.
19.

On May 13, 2010, Claimant was adjudged disabled by the Social Security

Administration due to her industrial right hand injury and residual dog attack injuries.
20.

Claimant ultimately applied for a "couple dozen" jobs, including drafting

positions and jobs at Lowes and Home Depot. She received no job offers.
21.

On September 16, 2011, Claimant underwent a hand functional assessment by

Virginia Taft, P.T., at the Coeur d'Alene Hand Therapy & Healing Center. The assessment
concluded that Claimant would need to have primarily left-handed work and that she was
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restricted to lifting five pounds with her right hand, 20 pounds ·with both hands, and minimal
repetition. Her range of motion was noted to be minimally limited but with pain on finger
extension and gripping or twisting movements. Finger manipulation of common objects showed
minimal to severe limitation with decreased speed. Ms. Taft concluded that retraining was a
questionable option due to Claimant's hand, vision, and age limitations.
22.

On September 4, 2012, Ms. Taft authored an addendum to her September 16,

2011 functional capacity evaluation.

She reported that Claimant's hand function had not

improved since her September 2011 assessment. Taft noted that Claimant had sensation deficits
of numbness and tingling with activity, which increased with sustained gripping or twisting. Taft
reported that Claimant's sensory loss interfered with her right hand coordination and speed and
that Claimant showed severe limitation in speed of movement when repeatedly lifting as little as
one pound. Taft also noted that Claimant "used her right hand as an assist rather than as her
dominant hand. She modified as possible using right index/middle fingers and thumb rather than
full grip, her left hand or she used 2 hands, for example, to lift a coffee cup." Exhibit 12, p. 144.
Taft concluded that Claimant could not return to her previous job or to a cashiering position as
such would require sustained repetitive movement and lifting.
23.

On September 13, 2012, John McNulty, M.D., examined Claimant and diagnosed

chronic right wrist, ring, and little finger sprain, weak grip, and ulnar sensory loss at the right
wrist and hand. He opined that she suffered permanent impairments of 1% of the whole person
due to her chronic right ring finger PIP joint sprain, 1% of the whole person due to her chronic
right little finger PIP joint sprain, and 2% of the whole person due to her right ulnar sensory
nerve injury due to her 2008 industrial accident. Dr. McNulty also found Claimant suffered
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permanent impairments of 6% of the whole person secondary to her pre-existing cervical spine
injury and 7% of the whole person secondary to her pre-existing lower extremity condition.
24.

At the time of hearing, Claimant was receiving approximately $1,004.00 per

month in Social Security Disability benefits.
25.

At hearing, Claimant testified that she performs home exercises and used hot

paraffin, a TENS unit, and over-the-counter medication to manage the pain in her right hand and
wrist. She wears a

~Tist

brace when doing any right-handed activities.

Although she is right-

handed, she does not use her right hand to operate her cell phone, load the dishwasher, lift her
clothes basket, comb her hair, brush her teeth, operate her TV remote, or button the buttons on
her clothing.

All of these activities she performs only with her non-dominant left hand.

Claimant can no longer pick up a gallon of milk with her right hand. She no longer paints, knits,
crochets, sews, gardens or remodels her home because of her right hand condition. She cannot
type or keyboard with her right hand because she cannot repetitively stretch her fingers to reach
the upper row of keys.

Claimant testified that she suffers constant right hand pain which

increases with activity and that her right hand condition is her greatest limitation.
26.

At hearing, Claimant testified that standing and walking cause leg pain as a result

of the Rottweiler attack. She walks with a shuffling gait and is limited by leg pain to walking no
more than half a mile.
27.

Claimant's right eye herpes infection significantly impairs her vision and requires

ongoing medication and avoidance of bright light irritation. She has adequate vision in her left
eye to qualify for a driver's license. With a brace on her right hand, she is able to operate a
manual transmission.
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28.

Having observed Claimant at hearing, and compared her testimony with other

evidence in the record, the Referee finds that Claimant is a credible witness.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

29.

The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally

construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793
P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). Facts, however,
need not be construed liberally in favor of the worker when evidence is conflicting. Aldrich v.
Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363, 834 P.2d 878, 880 (1992).
30.

Permanent impairment. "Permanent impairment" is any anatomic or functional

abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which
abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or non-progressive at the time of evaluation.
Idaho Code § 72-422. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent impairment" is a medical appraisal of
the nature and extent of the injury or disease as it affects an injured employee's personal
efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as self-care, communication, normal living
postures, ambulation, traveling, and non-specialized activities of bodily members. Idaho Code §
72-424.

When determining impairment, the opinions of physicians are advisory only.

Commission is the ultimate evaluator of impairment.

The

Urrv v. Walker & Fox Masonry

Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989).
31.

Claimant herein alleges permanent impairments to her neck, legs, and right hand.

On September 13, 2012, Dr. McNulty opined that Claimant suffered permanent impairments of
6% of the whole person due to her pre-existing cervical spine injury and 7% of the whole person
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due to her pre-existing lower extremity condition secondary to the Rottweiler attack. The record
establishes, and Defendants do not contest, these impairment ratings.
32.

The parties dispute the extent of Claimant's permanent impairment due to her

right hand condition. On August 19, 2009, Dr. Stevens performed EMG testing of Claimant's
upper right extremity and concluded Claimant's "ulnar neuropathy is moderate in severity" and
"certainly appears consistent with her symptoms."

Exhibit 14, p. 155 (emphasis supplied).

However, on November 18, 2009, Dr. Stevens performed an independent medical examination at
Defendants' request and noted that Claimant had presented for EMG testing on August 19, 2009,
and that he had then "determined that she exhibited features of a verv mild ulnar neuropathy."
Exhibit 14, p. 162 (emphasis supplied).

Dr. Stevens found Claimant medically stable on

November 18, 2009, and characterizing her ulnar sensory deficit as very mild, rated her
permanent impairment at 2% of the upper extremity due to her ulnar neuropathy and upper
extremity collateral ligament injuries. He declined to impose any work restrictions and opined
Claimant should be released to full duty without restriction.
33.

On September 13, 2012, Dr. McNulty examined Claimant and opined that she

suffered permanent impairments of 1% of the whole person from her chronic right ring finger
PIP joint sprain, 1% of the whole person from her chronic right little finger PIP joint sprain, and
2% of the whole person from her right ulnar sensory nerve injury-all due to her 2008 industrial
accident.

Dr. McNulty's impairment rating is more persuasive that Dr. Stevens' as it is

supported by the MRI findings documenting A2 pulley disruption of the PIP joints of Claimant's
right ring and little fingers and is further supported by Dr. Stevens' August 19, 2009 EMG
testing wherein he found ulnar neuropathy of moderate severity.
34.

Claimant has proven that she suffers permanent physical impairments of 6% of
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the whole person due to her pre-existing cervical condition, 7% of the whole person due to her
pre-existing lower extremity condition and 4% of the whole person due to her right hand
condition.

Claimant has proven she suffers whole person permanent impairments of 17%,

including 4% whole person impairment due to her 2008 industrial accident.
35.

Permanent disability.

The next issue is the extent of Claimant's permanent

disability, including whether she is totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot
doctrine. "Permanent disability" or "under a permanent disability" results when the actual or
presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent
impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected.
Idaho Code§ 72-423. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability" is an appraisal of the injured
employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the
medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors provided in Idaho
Code § 72-430. Idaho Code § 72-425. Idaho Code § 72-430 (1) provides that in determining
percentages of permanent disabilities, account should be taken of the nature of the physical
disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to handicap the employee in procuring or
holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple injuries, the occupation of the employee,
and his or her age at the time of accident causing the injury, or manifestation of the occupational
disease, consideration being given to the diminished ability of the affected employee to compete
in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area considering all the personal and
economic circumstances of the employee, and other factors as the Commission may deem
relevant. The focus of a determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to
engage in gainful activity. Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1995). Pursuant
to Idaho Code § 72-422, the proper date for disability analysis of a claimant's labor market
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access is the date of hearing, and not the date that maximum medical improvement has been
reached. Brown v. Horne Depot, 152 Idaho 605, 272 P.3d 577 (2012).
36.

Claimant asserts that her 2008 industrial accident at Coeur d'Alene Inn renders

her totally and permanently disabled. Her permanent disability must be evaluated based upon
her medical factors, including the physical restrictions arising from her permanent impairments,
and non-medical factors, including Claimant's capacity for gainful activity and ability to
compete in the open labor market within her geographical area.
37.

Physical restrictions. In November 2009, Dr. Stevens opined that Claimant had

no physical restrictions due to her 2008 industrial accident. He explained that although objective
diagnostic medical testing disclosed persisting abnormalities, Claimant would not further injure
herself by working without restrictions.

Dr. Stevens' opinion is premised in part on his

November 2009 conclusion that Claimant's industrial accident caused very mild ulnar
neuropathy of her upper right extremity, contradicting his conclusion after EMG testing in
August 2009 that her accident caused ulnar neuropathy of moderate severity.
38.

Claimant's September 2011 hand functional capacity evaluation by Virginia Taft

at the Coeur d'Alene Hand Therapy & Healing Center concluded that Claimant would need to
have primarily left-handed work and that she was restricted to lifting five pounds with her right
hand, 20 pounds with both hands, and minimal repetition. Taft's 2012 addendum noted that
Claimant "used her right hand as an assist rather than as her dominant hand" and concluded that
Claimant could not return to her previous job or to a cashiering position. Exhibit 12, p. 144. Dr.
McNulty agreed with Ms. Taft's evaluation and restricted Claimant from lifting more than 20
pounds and from repetitive lifting and grabbing with her right hand.

He further noted that

Claimant's pre-existing lower extremity impairment limited her ability to climb stairs or ladders.
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39.

Claimant's supervisor at H&J reported that after Claimant's release to full-duty

work in 2009, she was not able to perform all of her pre-injury duties. Her employment at Coeur
d'Alene Inn was terminated for this very reason.
40.

The Referee finds Ms. Taft's and Dr. McNulty's opinions regarding Claimant's

restrictions more consistent, accurate, and persuasive than Dr. Stevens' opinion.
41.

Abilitv to compete in the open labor market.

Three vocational experts have

opined regarding Claimant's ability to compete in her labor market, Nancy Collins, Mary BarrosBailey, and Daniel Brownell. The conclusions of each are examined below.
42.

Nancy Collins. Vocational expert Nancy Collins, Ph.D., interviewed Claimant

and reviewed her work history, medical records, and physical restrictions. On September 4,
2012, Dr. Collins authored a report on behalf of ISIF, who later settled with Claimant prior to
hearing. In her report, Dr. Collins concluded that Claimant was not totally disabled but opined:
Considering the opinion of Dr. Stevens, Ms. Deon has no disability in excess of
impairment. Considering restrictions that limit her to some light and sedentary
jobs that do not require repetitive use of her right dominant hand, she will
experience a 90% loss of access to the labor market. In my opinion, she will not
experience a significant earnings loss. Based on a wage of $9.70 per hour in her
time of injury job and an $8.50 return to work wage, she will experience a 12%
loss of earning capacity. Ms. Deon is 56 years of age and I do think her age
should be considered in her disability rating. In my opinion, Ms. Deon's
disability inclusive of impairment is 56% based on restrictions from Dr. Dickey,
Dr. Greendyke and the hand assessment. . . . . This analysis assumes equal value
is given to the two vocational factors of earning capacity and labor market access.
Exhibit 7, pp. 64-65.
43.

Dr. Collins' report does not demonstrate extensive familiarity with the degree of

competition present in Claimant's current labor market.

Additionally, in reaching her

conclusions, Dr. Collins did not have the benefit of Virginia Taft's September 4, 2012 addendum
to the functional capacity evaluation, or Dr. McNulty's September 13, 2012 report in which he
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agreed with Ms. Taft's conclusions. Nevertheless, Dr. Collins found 56% permanent disability
by equally weighting Claimant's loss of labor market access (90%) and her estimated wage loss
based on the difference between her time of injury wage and her likely post-accident wage
(12%). Thus 90% + 12%

=

102% ..,_ 2

51% to which Dr. Collins apparently added 5% for

Claimant's age to reach her disability rating of 56%.
44.

Dr. Collins' calculations did not take into account Claimant's full compensation

package at the time of her 2008 accident, including IRA and health insurance benefits through
H&J which Dan Brownell testified effectively increased her compensation by as much as 30%.
Brownell testified that most jobs in Claimant's labor market do not provide these benefits. If Dr.
Collins had calculated Claimant's wage loss based on a time of injury wage of $9.75 per hour,
plus 30% benefits, thus totaling $12.68, versus a likely post-injury wage of $8.50, Claimant's
wage loss would equal: ($12.68 - $8.50) ..,_ $12.68 or 33%. The calculation would then be:
(90% + 33%) ..,_ 2 = 62%. Adding 5% for Claimant's age would then yield a 67% permanent
disability rating. Furthermore, Dr. Collins reported that her disability rating considered only the
disability attributable to Claimant's right upper extremity injury and no other condition. Thus
Dr. Collins' calculations did not include Claimant's pre-existing 6% cervical impairment or her
pre-existing 7% bilateral lower extremity impairment or any permanent disability attributable
thereto. Were these acknowledged impairments to be added, the result would approximate 80%
(67% + 13%) permanent disability.
45.

Mary Barros-Bailey. Vocational expert Mary Barros-Bailey, Ph.D., testified in

behalf of Defendants. She has 22 years of experience in vocational rehabilitation, including 19
years in Idaho. Dr. Barros-Bailey has evaluated disability cases from Alaska to Idaho to Brazil.
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She met with Claimant in 2011 and reviewed her medical records. On October 11, 2011, Dr.
Barros-Bailey issued her vocational report concluding that Claimant:
has substantially reduced ability to access the labor market to the level of a 73%
loss of access. She would still be able to access a variety of jobs, however, that
do not require regular bilateral work and pay within $1 of her wage at injury (e.g.
cashiers at median wages of $9.01 per hour per the 2011 Idaho Occupational
Employment and Wage Survey), thus resulting in a slight wage of [sic] earning
capacity .....
For Ms. Deon, age is a factor in that her functional age combined with all her
medical conditions is probably greater than her chronological age and should be
considered in disability. Consequently, considering Trudy's age, work and
education histories, transferable skills, functional restrictions associated with the
industrial injury, and other non-medical factors, I believe she has sustained a 45%
disability inclusive of impairment. Note that given no functional assumptions
available in previous Industrial Commission records, there is no basis upon which
to apportion this disability opinion.
Exhibit 8, pp. 82-83. Dr. Barros-Bailey's report does not demonstrate extensive familiarity with
the degree of competition present in Claimant's current north Idaho labor market.
46.

In July 2012, Dr. Barros-Bailey issued a supplemental report criticizing Dan

BrO\vnell's finding that Claimant suffered 85% permanent disability.

Dr. Barros-Bailey

indicated that Claimant was earning only $9.70 per hour at the time of her industrial accident and
that even a minimum wage job would result in only a 25% reduction in Claimant's wages.
47.

At hearing, Dr. Barros-Bailey testified that she uses the average of an injured

worker's loss of labor market access and estimated wage loss as the starting point to determine
permanent disability. She testified that in evaluating Claimant's permanent disability, she added
Claimant's loss of labor market access (73%) and her estimated wage loss based on the
difference between her time of injury wage and her likely post-accident wage of $9.01 per hour
as a cashier, equaling 7%. Thus 73% + 7%

=

80%-:- 2

40%. Dr. Barros-Bailey then adjusted

the average upward by adding 5% for Claimant's age, to arrive at a final disability rating of 45%.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 16

48.

Significantly, Dr. Barros-Bailey apparently misread the September 16, 2011 Hand

Function Assessment by Virginia Taft who concluded that if Claimant were: "to return to work,
she would need to have primarily left handed work with a weight load on the right of less than 5#
lifting, up to 20# with both hands, minimum repetition, and self paced."

Exhibit 12, p. 147

(emphasis supplied). Instead, Dr. Barros-Bailey stated in her report:
The second [medical] opinion is the 9/16/11 functional capacity evaluation that
estimates Trudy to lift no more than 5# with her left hand and to lift no more than
20# bilaterally. Note that Trudy is right hand dominant and there were no
limitations or restrictions indicated to the dominant upper extremity. She would
also need to have minimal repetition and self pacing on the left upper extremity.
Exhibit 8, p. 82 (emphasis supplied).
49.

In addition to misunderstanding Taft's September 16, 2011 evaluation, Dr.

Barros-Bailey was not provided, and thus did not consider, the functional capacity evaluation
addendum authored by Ms. Taft on September 4, 2012.

Therein Ms. Taft concluded that

Claimant could not return to "her previous job or to a cashiering position which would require
sustained repetitive movement and lifting." Exhibit 12, p. 144. Hence, Dr. Barros-Bailey did
not fully consider Claimant's right hand lifting restriction or her restriction against repetitively
using her right hand.

Dr. Barros-Bailey was not provided, and thus did not consider Dr.

McNulty's September 13, 2012 report wherein he agreed with Ms. Taft's conclusions.
50.

Dr. Barros-Bailey acknowledged that her calculations did not take into account

Claimant's full compensation package at the time of her accident, including IRA and medical
benefits through H&J which are not provided by most employers in her labor market and which
effectively increased her compensation by as much as 30%.
51.

Dr. Barros-Bailey also acknowledged that her disability rating considered only the

disability attributable to Claimant's right upper extremity injury and no other condition. Thus
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Dr. Barros-Bailey's calculations did not include Claimant's pre-existing 6% cervical impairment
or her pre-existing 7% bilateral lower extremity impairment or any permanent disability
attributable thereto.
52.

Daniel Brownell. Claimant called Daniel Brownell to testify at hearing.

Mr.

Brownell served as a vocational rehabilitation consultant for the Industrial Commission for 29
years in Coeur d'Alene, retiring in 2010. He is intimately familiar with the labor market in the
Coeur d'Alene area, has performed thousands of job site evaluations, and has placed numerous
individuals in jobs within that area. Bmwnell testified that as of August 12, 2012, there were
6,531 unemployed workers in Kootenai County and that shortly prior to hearing Verizon had laid
off another 200 employees.
53.

Mr. BrO\vnell testified that H&J is the fifth or sixth largest employer in

Claimant's labor market and employs literally "hundreds and hundreds of employees and lots of
facilities, lots of diversified work" including parking lot attendants. Transcript, p. 76, 11. 6-7.
Yet Claimant was laid off due to lack of work as H&J had no work available for Claimant within
her medical restrictions. Brownell also testified that Claimant's time of injury wage of $9.75 per
hour plus benefits should be evaluated with the understanding that her benefits at H&J added 2030% to her compensation and that most jobs in her labor market do not provide those benefits.
He affirmed that if those benefits were considered, her hourly wage would total $12.00 to $13 .00
per hour. Transcript pp. 88-89.
54.

Mr. Brownell met with Claimant several times commencing in September 2011.

He familiarized himself with her medical records, work history, educational background, injuries
and resulting work limitations. He noted that Claimant struggled with reading and spelling in
high school and in her attempt to complete a nursing program. She needed a special tutor to help
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her obtain her associates degree in drafting at North Idaho College because she was only reading
at an eighth grade level. Brownell testified that Claimant's drafting and HV AC training are now
outdated and not marketable.

He opined that Claimant's extended period of unemployment

subsequent to her 2008 industrial accident was a significant factor diminishing the likelihood of
acquiring future employment. Brownell considered Dr. McNulty's opinion the most recent and
up to date physician's opinion of Claimant's condition and restrictions. BrO\vnell also relied
upon the functional capacity evaluation performed in September 2011 by Virginia Taft and the
September 2012 addendum to that evaluation.

He opined that Claimant's most significant

physical limitation was her restriction from repetitively using her dominant right hand. Mr.
Brownell opined that Claimant could not return to any of her prior occupations and that very
rarely are there jobs in her labor market that would be regularly available and compatible with
her physical limitations.
55.

Mr. Brownell reviewed Dr. Barros Bailey's report and did not agree with Dr.

Barros-Bailey's conclusion that Claimant could work as a cashier. Rather, Brovmell cited Dr.
McNulty's and Virginia Taft's conclusions and opined that Claimant could not work
competitively as a cashier due to her 2008 industrial injury. He also opined that Claimant would
not be competitive for work as a parking lot attendant or ticket taker due to her right hand
limitations. Brownell concluded:
Based upon the claimant's entire case profile inclusive of age, education, work
skills and current physical capabilities, there are extremely limited work
opportunities. Also considered is the fact that these positions are filled and a
competitive unemployed labor force of hundreds await the competition for a new
job opening. Ms. Deon would also require a sympathetic employer who would
accommodate all her physical limitations.
Exhibit 6, p. 49.
56.

Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant suffers permanent disability of 85 to 90% or
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greater, inclusive of permanent impairment.

He opined that none of this disability was

attributable to her cervical, shoulder, bilateral leg or right eye conditions. Brov.111ell testified that
he considered all of Claimant's permanent impairments in arriving at his permanent disability
rating; however none of the pre-existing impairments were included in his rating, only
Claimant's right hand and wrist injury. Transcript p. 108. He testified that Claimant had lost
access to 90% of the labor market and that the 10% of the labor market which she could still
potentially access was comprised of unskilled sedentary jobs for which she would have to
compete with 6,500 other job-seekers to obtain. Brov.111ell demonstrated keen familiarity with
the extent of competition in Claimant's labor market. He concluded that Claimant was "barely"
employable and needed "definitely a sympathetic employer" in order to return to work.
Transcript p. 95, 11. 10-11.
57.

Further analysis of the vocational opinions.

disability rating opinions are helpful.

All of the vocational experts'

However, none is entirely persuasive and without

limitation.
58.

Dr. Barros-Bailey's disability rating of 45% is unpersuasive because it arises from

failure to consider Claimant's full compensation (including her IRA and health insurance) at
H&J, a material misreading of Virginia Taft's 2011 hand functional capacity evaluation, failure
to consider the 2012 addendum to that evaluation, failure to consider Dr. McNulty's 2012 report,
and the erroneous assumption that Claimant could work competitively as a cashier. 2
59.

Dr. Collins' disability rating of 56% is not entirely persuasive because it fails to

consider Claimant's full compensation package (including her IRA and health insurance) at
H&J.

Nor does it consider the permanent disability arising from Claimant's pre-existing

2

As previously noted, Dr. Barros-Bailey was never provided these 2012 reports.
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permanent impairments of 13%. As noted above, were these items to be considered, the result
would approximate a permanent disability rating of 80%.
60.

Rating an injured worker's permanent disability by averaging her estimated loss

of labor market access and expected wage loss, as Drs. Collins and Barros-Bailey have done in
the instant case, can provide a useful point of reference. However, the averaging method itself is
not without conceptual and actual limitations.

As the loss of labor market access becomes

substantial, and the expected wage loss negligible, the results of the averaging method become
less reliable in predicting actual disability. For illustration, as judged by the averaging method, a
hypothetical minimum wage earner injured sufficiently to lose access to 99% of the labor market
may theoretically suffer no expected wage loss if she can still perform any minimum wage job.
Calculation of such a worker's disability according to the averaging method would produce a
permanent disability rating of only 49.5% ([99% + 0%]

2) even though her actual probability

of obtaining employment in the remaining 1% of an intensely competitive labor market may be
as remote as winning the lottery. The averaging method fails to fully account for the reality that
the two factors are not fully independent.
61.

As the residual labor market becomes increasingly small, the disability rating

obtained by the averaging method becomes increasingly skewed, especially in labor markets
with high unemployment rates where competition for the remaining portion of suitable jobs will
be fierce.

This is exactly Claimant's situation herein.

All of the vocational experts

acknowledged that Claimant has lost access to a substantial portion of her labor market. Dr.
Barros-Bailey noted that Claimant suffered only a minimal expected wage loss. Mr. Brownell
testified that Claimant must compete with over 6,500 unemployed workers who are seeking jobs
in Claimant's labor market.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 21

62.

Mr. Bmwnell's disability rating is less persuasive because it overstates Claimant's

permanent disability on its face. Brownell testified that Claimant suffers an 85-90% or greater
permanent disability rating entirely due to her right upper extremity limitations. This rating does
not consider the permanent disability arising from Claimant's pre-existing permanent
impairments of 13%. Under Bmwnell's evaluation, were these impairments to be considered
also, the sum would produce a permanent disability rating exceeding 100% (90% + 13%)intuitively excessive.
63.

Having considered all of the vocational experts' permanent disability ratings, the

Referee declines to fully adopt any of the offered ratings. The Commission is the ultimate
evaluator of disability.
64.
O\A!TI

Claimant has unsuccessfully looked for work in the Coeur d'Alene area on her

and through the unemployment office. She did not fully avail herself of Beth Grigg's

assistance and failed to follow-up on job leads Grigg provided. Claimant's

O\Ai'll

job search,

which she testified included submitting a "couple dozen" applications, is not consistent with a
diligent and earnest effort to find employment. There is no indication that Brownell performed
an independent job search specifically on Claimant's behalf. However, Brownell's conclusionthat Claimant would need a sympathetic employer to accommodate all of her limitations such
that she could find employment-is amply supported by the record as a whole.

Brownell

testified that Claimant would not be competitive for ticket taker positions, parking lot attendant
positions, or the like. He also persuasively testified that Claimant's time of injury Employer is
the fifth or sixth largest employer in North Idaho, employing literally hundreds of workers, and
that if H&J could not accommodate Claimant's limitations, Claimant was unlikely to find an
employer that would-except for a sympathetic employer.
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65.

Based on Claimant's permanent impairments totaling 17% of the whole person,

her permanent physical restrictions, particularly those to her dominant right upper extremity, and
considering all of her medical and non-medical factors, including her age of 56 at the time of the
industrial accident, limited formal education, reading challenges, inability to return to previous
positions, outdated specialized training, and limited transferable skills, Claimant's ability to
compete in the open labor market and engage in regular gainful activity after her 2008 industrial
accident has been greatly reduced.

The Referee concludes that Claimant has established a

permanent disability of 85%, inclusive of her 17% whole person impairment.
66.

Odd-lot.

A claimant who is not 100% permanently disabled may prove total

permanent disability by establishing he is an odd-lot worker. An odd-lot worker is one "so
injured that he can perform no services other than those which are so limited in quality,
dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist." Bybee v.
State. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 81, 921 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1996). Such
workers are not regularly employable "in any well-knmvn branch of the labor market - absent a
business boom, the sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a
superhuman effort on their part." Carev v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,
112, 686 P.2d 54, 57 (1984). The burden of establishing odd-lot status rests upon the claimant.
Durnaw v. J. L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 153, 795 P.2d 312, 315 (1990). A claimant
may satisfy his burden of proof and establish total permanent disability under the odd-lot
doctrine in any one of three ways:
employment without success; (2) by

(1) by showing that he has attempted other types of
sho~ring

that he or vocational counselors or employment

agencies on his behalf have searched for other work and other work is not available; or (3) by
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showing that any efforts to find suitable work would be futile. Lethrud v. Industrial Special
Indemnitv Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995).
67.

In the present case, Defendants assert that Claimant is employable and not an odd-

lot worker. Claimant has not demonstrated that she unsuccessfully attempted other types of
employment.

As noted above, Claimant has testified she submitted a "couple dozen"

applications and has been registered with job service for approximately four years. This suggests
a modest unsuccessful work search. However, far more persuasive, is Mr. Brownell's testimony
that it would require a sympathetic employer to accommodate Claimant's limitations in order for
her to obtain employment. As concluded above, Brovvnell's opinion in this regard is persuasive
and tantamount to a showing that efforts to find suitable work regularly and continuously
available in the open labor market would be futile. Claimant has established a prima facie case
that she is an odd-lot worker, totally and permanently disabled, under the Lethrud test.
68.

Once a claimant establishes a prima facie odd-lot case, the burden shifts to

defendants "to show that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to
the claimant." Carey v. Clear\:vater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 112, 686 P .2d 54,
57 (1984). Defendants must prove there is:
An actual job within a reasonable distance from [claimant's] home which
[claimant] is able to perform or for which [claimant] can be trained. In addition,
the [defendants] must show that [claimant] has a reasonable opportunity to be
employed at that job. It is of no significance that there is a job [claimant] is
capable of performing if he would in fact not be considered for the job due to his
injuries, lack of education, lack of training, or other reasons.
Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 407, 565 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1977).
69.

In the present case, Defendants through Dr. Barros-Bailey identified only one

type of job-cashier-that she believed was suitable for Claimant given her physical restrictions.
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Mr. Brownell testified convincingly that Claimant is not competitive for a cashier position given
the restrictions enumerated by Virginia Taft and agreed upon by Dr. McNulty.
70.

Defendants have not shown that there is an actual job regularly and continuously

available which Claimant can perform and at which she has a reasonable opportunity to be
employed. Claimant has proven that she is totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the oddlot doctrine commencing November 18, 2009, the date Dr. Stevens found her medically stable
from her 2008 industrial injuries.
71.

Idaho Code § 72-406(1) apportionment. Inasmuch as Claimant is totally and

permanently disabled, the issue of apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-406(1) is moot.
72.

Carey apportionment. The next issue is apportionment pursuant to the Carey

formula. Although Claimant settled with ISIF prior to hearing, a determination of ISIF' s liability
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332 must be made before the extent of Defendants' liability can be
determined pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater Countv Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d
54, (1984).
73.

Idaho Code § 72-332(1) provides in pertinent part that if an employee who has a

permanent physical impairment from any cause or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by injury
arising out of and in the course of employment, and by reason of the combined effects of both
the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury suffers total and permanent disability, the
employer and its surety will be liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the
disability caused by the injury, and the injured employee shall be compensated for the remainder
of his income benefits out of the ISIF account.
74.

Idaho Code § 72-332(2) further provides that "permanent physical impairment" is

as defined in Idaho Code § 72-422, provided, however, as used in this section such impairment
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must be a permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such
seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining reemployment if the claimant should become unemployed. This shall be interpreted subjectively
as to the particular employee involved; however, the mere fact that a claimant is employed at the
time of the subsequent injury shall not create a presumption that the pre-existing physical
impairment was not of such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining
employment.
75.

In Dumaw v. J. L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990), the

Idaho Supreme Court identified four requirements a claimant must meet to establish ISIF
liability under Idaho Code § 72-332. These include: (1) whether there was indeed a pre-existing
impairment; (2) whether that impairment was manifest; (3) whether the impairment was a
subjective hindrance to employment; and (4) whether the impairment in any way combined with
the subsequent injury to cause total disability. Dumaw, 118 Idaho at 155, 795 P.2d at 317.
76.

Pre-existing, manifest impairments.

The pre-existing physical impairments at

issue herein are those to Claimant's neck and shoulders (6%), and legs (7%), prior to her 2008
industrial accident. There is no dispute that her neck and shoulder, and her leg conditions existed
and were manifest in 1990 and 2006 respectively.

Claimant's neck, shoulder, and leg

impairments constitute pre-existing conditions for purposes of Idaho Code § 72-332 because
each preexisted and was manifest prior to her 2008 industrial accident. The first and second
prongs of the Dumaw test have been met.
77.

Hindrance or obstacle. The third prong of the Dumaw test considers "whether or

not the pre-existing condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment for the
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particular claimant." Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 172, 786 P.2d 557, 563
(1990).
78.

Claimant underwent cervical and bilateral first rib resection surgeries shortly after

suffering her 1990 assault injury.

Thereafter she changed employment, obtained drafting

training, and commenced working in a lighter industry.

Mr. Brownell acknowledged that

Claimant's job change was necessitated by her cervical limitations. Her pre-existing cervical
condition thus constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment.
79.

Claimant's pre-existing leg condition limited her walking ability. She testified

that even after recovering from the Rottweiler attack, she could only walk approximately onehalf mile due to the pain in her legs. Dr. McNulty opined that her leg condition limited her
ladder and stair climbing ability.
80.

The Referee finds that Claimant's pre-existing neck, shoulder, and leg

impairments constituted a hindrance to her employment. The third prong of the Dumaw test is
met.
81.

Combination. Finally, to satisfy the "combines" element, the test is whether, but

for the industrial injury, the worker would have been totally and permanently disabled
immediately following the occurrence of that injury.

This test "encompasses both the

combination scenario where each element contributes to the total disability, and the case where
the subsequent injury accelerates and aggravates the pre-existing impairment." Bvbee v. State,
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 81, 921P.2d1200, 1205 (1996). Significantly,
ISIF is not liable where the last industrial injury, itself, renders a worker totally and permanently
disabled. Selzler v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 124 Idaho 144, 857 P.2d
623 (1993).
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82.

The record in the instant case does not establish that Claimant's pre-existing

cervical and shoulder condition combines with her 2008 injuries to render her totally and
permanently disabled. To the contrary, the upper extremity restrictions arising from Claimant's
2008 industrial accident entirely supersede those resulting from her cervical and shoulder
condition.
83.

The record contains some evidence that Claimant's pre-existing leg impairment

contributes to her total and permanent disability. As noted, her pre-existing leg condition limited
her standing and walking tolerances and Dr. McNulty opined that her leg condition precluded her
from working on ladders or frequently using stairs.

However, Mr. Brownell persuasively

testified that Claimant's right upper extremity condition alone precluded her from competing in
the open labor market and relegated her to employment only by a sympathetic employer. Dr.
Barros-Bailey acknowledged that upper extremity limitations are among the most disabling
conditions. Neither Dr. Collins nor Dr. Barros-Bailey opined that Claimant's pre-existing leg
condition combined with her upper extremity condition to produce disability.
84.

The record does not establish that Claimant's pre-existing leg condition combined

with her 2008 industrial accident to render her totally and permanently disabled.

Rather,

Claimant's right upper extremity condition alone renders her totally and permanently disabled.
Thus apportionment pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,
118, 686 P.2d 54, 63 (1984), is not appropriate.
85.

Medical care. The final issue is Claimant's entitlement to medical care. Idaho

Code § 72-432(1) mandates that an employer shall provide for an injured employee such
reasonable medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service,
medicines, crutches, and apparatus, as may be reasonably required by the employee's physician
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or needed immediately after an injury or manifestation of an occupational disease, and for a
reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may
do so at the expense of the employer. Of course an employer is only obligated to provide
medical treatment necessitated by the industrial accident, and is not responsible for medical
treatment not related to the industrial accident. Williamson v. \Vhitman Corp./Pet. Inc., 130
Idaho 602, 944 P.2d 1365 (1997). A claimant must provide medical testimony that supports a
claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability.

Langlev v. State,

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 785, 890 P.2d 732, 736 (1995).
86.

Claimant herein requests medical benefits for reimbursement for a functional

capacity evaluation recommended by Dr. Greendyke and performed September 16, 2011, by
Virginia Taft.

When Defendants refused to provide the evaluation, Claimant, at the

recommendation of her attorney, had the evaluation perfonned at her own expense. Defendants
in their briefing do not expressly contest Claimant's request for reimbursement. The evaluation
was recommended by her then treating physician and is compensable.
87.

Claimant has proven her entitlement to reimbursement for her functional capacity

evaluation by Virginia Taft.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Claimant has proven she suffers whole person permanent impairment of 17%,

including 4% whole person impairment due to her 2008 industrial accident.
2.

Claimant has proven she suffers permanent disability of 85% inclusive of

impairment, and has proven that she is an odd-lot worker, totally and permanently disabled under
the Lethrud test.
3.

Apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code 72-406 is moot.
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4.

Apportionment pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107

Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984), is not appropriate.
5.

Claimant has proven her entitlement to reimbursement for her ·functional capacity

evaluation by Virginia Taft.
RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Referee
recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and conclusions as its own and issue an
appropriate final order.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ATTEST:

Assistant Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of
, 2012, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
STEVEN J NEMEC
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814
E SCOTT HARMON
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,
IC 2007-005950
IC 2008-032836

Claimant,
V.

H & J, INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN COEUR
D'ALENE INN & CONFERENCE CENTER,

FINDINGS OFFACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER

Employer,
and

Fl LE

LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION,
Surety,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the aboveentitled matter to Referee Alan Taylor, who conducted a hearing in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho on
October 16, 2012. Claimant, Trudy Deon, was present in person and represented by Steven
Nemec, of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Defendant Employer, H & J, Inc., d/b/a Best Western Coeur
d'Alene Inn & Conference Center (H&J) and Surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation,
were represented by Roger Bro\\'ll, of Boise, Idaho.

Claimant settled with State of Idaho,

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF), prior to hearing.

The parties presented oral and

documentary evidence. No post-hearing depositions were taken and briefs were later submitted.
The matter came under advisement on December 24, 2012.
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ISSUES

The issues to be decided are: 1
1.

The extent of Claimant's permanent partial impairment.

2.

The extent of Claimant's permanent disability, including whether Claimant is

permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine or otherwise.
3.

Whether apportionment for a pre-existing or subsequent condition pursuant to

Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate.
4.

Apportionment under the Carey formula.

5.

Claimant's entitlement to additional medical benefits.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Claimant alleges that she is totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot
doctrine solely as a result of her 2008 industrial accident at the Coeur d'Alene Inn and resulting
injury to her dominant right hand.

She also asserts entitlement to medical benefits for a

functional capacity evaluation performed September 16, 2011. Defendants readily acknowledge
Claimant's 2008 industrial accident and have provided extensive medical and temporary
disability benefits. However, Defendants contend that Claimant is employable and suffers no
permanent disability beyond 2% upper extremity impairment or in the alternative, that
Claimant's permanent disability is minimal.
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED

The record in this matter consists of the follo\\ling:
1.

The Industrial Commission legal file;

1

The issue of Claimant's entitlement to an award of attorney fees was noticed for
hearing. However, as Defendants correctly note, Claimant argues no claim for attorney fees in
her briefing. This issue is therefore deemed abandoned.
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2.

Claimant's Exhibits 1-25, admitted at hearing;

3.

Defendants' Exhibits 26-28, admitted at hearing;

4.

The testimony of Claimant, Daniel Brownell, and Mary Barros-Bailey, taken at
the October 16, 2012 hearing.

All objections posed during the pre-hearing depositions are overruled.
The

undersigned

Commissioners

have

chosen

not

to

adopt

the

Referee's

recommendation and hereby issue their own findings of fact, conclusions of law and order.
FINDINGS OFFACT
1.

Claimant was born in 1955 and is right-handed. She was five feet five inches tall,

57 years old, and resided in Coeur d'Alene at the time of the hearing. She graduated from high
school in Montana in 1974, but had trouble with reading and spelling.

She worked as a

dishwasher and cook at a cafe during the summer while in high school. From 1975 to 1976, she
worked for the school district as a rehabilitation technician for disabled children.

In that

capacity, Claimant worked directly under the supervision of a licensed physical therapist. From
approximately 1976 until 1986, Claimant worked seasonally for the U.S. Forest Service, planting
trees and maintaining campgrounds. From 1979 to 1980, she pursued nurse's training but had
difficulty with reading and spelling.

She ultimately obtained a CNA certification but never

worked as a CNA. From approximately 1984 to 1988 she worked as a dishwasher and cook at a
cafe.
2.

From 1988 until 1993, Claimant worked for Alpha Health Services as a

rehabilitation technician caring for disabled children and adults. On two occasions Claimant was
assaulted by a patient while working. The most severe assault occurred in 1990, when Claimant
was driving a car.

A patient riding in the front passenger seat became agitated, grabbed
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Claimant's head, and violently forced it underneath the car's dashboard, injuring her neck and
shoulders. Claimant subsequently underwent cervical and bilateral first rib resection surgeries.
She was compelled to change occupations and later received a 6% whole person permanent
impairment rating for her neck and shoulder injuries. She obtained a two-year associates degree
in drafting.
3.

From 1997 until 2002, Claimant worked for Boeing as a drafting technician. She

performed hand and computerized drafting. She earned a 3-D drafting certificate while working
at Boeing.

In 2002, Claimant was laid off at Boeing. Thereafter she obtained an HV AC

certificate from North Idaho College. She worked at a furniture factory, building and sanding
furniture while she earned her certificate.
4.

In 2003, Claimant began working full-time as a maintenance technician for

Employer H&J at the Coeur d'Alene Inn, a 150-bed motel. Her duties included all aspects of
room and kitchen maintenance and repair except removing and replacing carpets.

She also

maintained the pool and removed snow. She walked 80% of her work day and regularly lifted 50
pounds.
5.

In February 2006, Claimant was at home feeding four Rottweiler dogs in a fenced

area when one of the dogs pulled her down. Three of the Rottweilers attacked her, lacerating her
scalp and left arm, and very seriously lacerating both of her legs. She managed to escape from
the fenced area and a friend transported her to a hospital emergency room.

Claimant was

hospitalized for two weeks and underwent extensive suturing and surgeries, including skin
grafting on both of her legs. She was off work for several months, and then gradually returned to
work part-time. After approximately one year she resumed full-time work at the Coeur d'Alene
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Inn.

She was later rated with a 7% whole person permanent impairment due to her lower

extremity injuries, including nerve damage, sustained in the Rottweiler attack.
6.

By October 2008, Claimant was earning $9.75 per hour and working 40 hours per

week. H&J also provided health insurance and an IRA account as part of her compensation.
7.

On October 4, 2008, Claimant was called into the kitchen at the Coeur d'Alene

Inn to clean out the drain. She used a small power auger or electric snake. During Claimant's
efforts to clear the drain, the auger caught Claimant's right glove and right hand. Another
employee had previously removed the safety shut-off switch from the auger and Claimant was
unable to free her hand or shut off the auger. The electric snake encircled, twisted, and crushed
her right hand and "Wrist until another employee responded to Claimant's shouts and unplugged
the auger. The electric snake also struck Claimant's right eye or eyelid. Claimant was taken by
ambulance to the emergency room at the Kootenai Medical Center. She was diagnosed with
right hand sprain, right fourth and fifth finger sprain, and contusion.
8.

Approximately one week after the accident, Claimant developed irritation and

blurry vision in her right eye. She presented to North Idaho Immediate Care and was diagnosed
with pink eye.

However, Patrick Mullen, M.D., later diagnosed herpes simplex keratitis in

Claimant's right eye, but opined it was not related to her industrial accident.

No medical

evidence relates Claimant's right eye condition to her industrial accident.
9.

In November 2008, Claimant underwent a right hand MRI. Michael Ludwig,

M.D., reviewed the MRI, examined Claimant's right hand, and diagnosed disruption of the A2
pulley system of the fourth digit with palmar bowing of the flexor tendon, partial disruption of
the A2 pulley system of the fifth digit with palmar bowing of the flexor tendon, and nondisplaced fracture of the distal aspect of the proximal phalanx of the fifth digit. Dr. Ludwig
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referred Claimant to Dr. Mullen, a hand surgeon. Dr. Mullen noted collateral ligament tears at
the PIP joints of Claimant's right ring and little fingers. He suspected right wrist injuries and
ordered a right wrist MRI which was read as normal. Claimant wore a cast on her right hand for
approximately six weeks. Dr. Mullen prescribed physical therapy and braces.

He referred

Claimant to Anthony Sestero, M.D., who prescribed further physical therapy.
10.

In December 2008, Claimant began utilizing the services of Industrial

Commission rehabilitation consultant Beth Grigg.
11.

On April 28, 2009, Claimant commenced light-duty work part-time using her

right hand for repetitive motion no more than four hours per day. She continued to experience
debilitating right hand and vvTist pain.
12.

On June 3, 2009, Claimant's supervisor reported to Ms. Grigg that although

Claimant had a release to full-time work on that date, he did not believe Claimant was physically
capable of performing all of her pre-injury job duties.
13.

In August 2009, Claimant came under the care of Spencer Greendyke, M.D. On

August 12, 2009, Dr. Greendyke released Claimant for full-time work but restricted her to lifting
no more than five pounds with her right hand. He also ordered EMG testing. On August 19,
2009, Craig Stevens, M.D., performed EMG testing and wrote:
The study reveals ulnar neuropathy at the right elbow with involvement of both
the dorsal cutaneous branch as well as the origin of the ulnar sensory fibers
adjacent to the canal of Guyon. .. .. This ulnar neuropathy is moderate in severity
but certainly appears consistent with her symptoms. The study does reveal some
persisting ulnar sensory nerve function but definite evidence that an injury has
occurred.
Exhibit 14, p. 155 (emphasis supplied).
14.

On October 28, 2009, Dr. Greendyke found Claimant had reached maximum

medical improvement.
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15.

No later than November 6, 2009, Claimant's light-duty employment at Coeur

d'Alene Inn was terminated. H&J had no available work within her restrictions.
16.

On November 18, 2009, Dr. Stevens performed an independent medical

examination of Claimant at Defendants' request. Dr. Stevens found Claimant medically stable
and rated her permanent impairment at 2% of the upper extremity due to her EMO-documented
ulnar neuropathy and upper extremity collateral ligament injuries. He declined to impose any
work restrictions and opined Claimant should be released to full-duty work without restriction.
17.

After being terminated from her employment at Coeur d'Alene Inn, Claimant

filed for unemployment benefits and registered with the Idaho Department of Labor, looking for
work. Claimant also continued meeting with rehabilitation consultant Beth Grigg, who assisted
Claimant in her employment search. Ms. Grigg recorded Claimant's report that she was not able
to grip a phone for long, turn a screwdriver, type on a keyboard, lift dishes, carry groceries,
·wring out wash rags, or perform fine finger manipulation with her right hand.
18.

In December 2009, Ms. Grigg closed Claimant's file because she had not

followed up on any of the job leads Grigg provided. Claimant told Ms. Grigg that she did not
know what work she could physically perform.
19.

On May 13, 2010, Claimant was adjudged disabled by the Social Security

Administration due to her industrial right hand injury and residual dog attack injuries.
20.

Claimant ultimately applied for a "couple dozen" jobs, including drafting

positions and jobs at Lowes and Home Depot. She received no job offers.
21.

On September 16, 2011, Claimant underwent a hand functional assessment by

Virginia Taft, P.T., at the Coeur d'Alene Hand Therapy & Healing Center. The assessment
concluded that Claimant would need to have primarily left-handed work and that she was
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restricted to lifting five pounds with her right hand, 20 pounds with both hands, and minimal
repetition. Her range of motion was noted to be minimally limited but with pain on finger
extension and gripping or twisting movements. Finger manipulation of common objects showed
minimal to severe limitation with decreased speed. Ms. Taft concluded that retraining was a
questionable option due to Claimant's hand, vision, and age limitations.
22.

On September 4, 2012, Ms. Taft authored an addendum to her September 16,

2011 functional capacity evaluation.

She reported that Claimant's hand function had not

improved since her September 2011 assessment. Taft noted that Claimant had sensation deficits
of numbness and tingling with activity, which increased with sustained gripping or t\\'isting. Taft
reported that Claimant's sensory loss interfered with her right hand coordination and speed and
that Claimant showed severe limitation in speed of movement when repeatedly lifting as little as
one pound. Taft also noted that Claimant "used her right hand as an assist rather than as her
dominant hand. She modified as possible using right index/middle fingers and thumb rather than
full grip, her left hand or she used 2 hands, for example, to lift a coffee cup." Exhibit 12, p. 144.
Taft concluded that Claimant could not return to her previous job or to a cashiering position as
such would require sustained repetitive movement and lifting.
23.

On September 13, 2012, John McNulty, M.D., examined Claimant and diagnosed

chronic right wrist, ring, and little finger sprain, weak grip, and ulnar sensory loss at the right
wrist and hand. He opined that she suffered permanent impairments of 1% of the whole person
due to her chronic right ring finger PIP joint sprain, 1% of the whole person due to her chronic
right little finger PIP joint sprain, and 2% of the whole person due to her right ulnar sensory
nerve injury due to her 2008 industrial accident. Dr. McNulty also found Claimant suffered
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permanent impairments of 6% of the whole person secondary to her pre-existing cervical spine
injury and 7% of the whole person secondary to her pre-existing lower extremity condition.
24.

At the time of hearing, Claimant was receiving approximately $1,004.00 per

month in Social Security Disability benefits.
25.

At hearing, Claimant testified that she performs home exercises and used hot

paraffin, a TENS unit, and over-the-counter medication to manage the pain in her right hand and
\VTist. She wears a wrist brace when doing any right-handed activities.

Although she is right-

handed, she does not use her right hand to operate her cell phone, load the dishwasher, lift her
clothes basket, comb her hair, brush her teeth, operate her TV remote, or button the buttons on
her clothing.

All of these activities she performs only with her non-dominant left hand.

Claimant can no longer pick up a gallon of milk with her right hand. She no longer paints, knits,
crochets, sews, gardens or remodels her home because of her right hand condition. She cannot
type or keyboard with her right hand because she cannot repetitively stretch her fingers to reach
the upper row of keys.

Claimant testified that she suffers constant right hand pain which

increases with activity and that her right hand condition is her greatest limitation.
26.

At hearing, Claimant testified that standing and walking cause leg pain as a result

of the Rottweiler attack. She walks with a shuffling gait and is limited by leg pain to walking no
more than half a mile.
27.

Claimant's right eye herpes infection significantly impairs her vision and requires

ongoing medication and avoidance of bright light irritation. She has adequate vision in her left
eye to qualify for a driver's license. With a brace on her right hand, she is able to operate a
manual transmission.
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28.

Having observed Claimant at hearing, and compared her testimony with other

evidence in the record, the Referee found that Claimant is a credible witness. The Commission
finds no reason to disturb the Referee's findings and observations on Claimant's presentation or
credibility.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

29.

The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally

construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793
P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). Facts, however,
need not be construed liberally in favor of the worker when evidence is conflicting. Aldrich v.
Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363, 834 P.2d 878, 880 (1992).
30.

Permanent impairment. "Permanent impairment" is any anatomic or functional

abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which
abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or non-progressive at the time of evaluation.
Idaho Code § 72-422. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent impairment" is a medical appraisal of
the nature and extent of the injury or disease as it affects an injured employee's personal
efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as self-care, communication, normal living
postures, ambulation, traveling, and non-specialized activities of bodily members. Idaho Code §
72-424. \Vhen determining impainnent, the opinions of physicians are advisory only. The
Commission is the ultimate evaluator of impairment.

Urry v. Walker & Fox Masonry

Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989).
31.

Claimant herein alleges permanent impairments to her neck, legs, and right hand.

On September 13, 2012, Dr. McNulty opined that Claimant suffered permanent impairments of
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6% of the whole person due to her pre-existing cervical spine injury and 7% of the whole person
due to her pre-existing lower extremity condition secondary to the Rottweiler attack. The record
establishes, and Defendants do not contest, these impairment ratings.
32.

The parties dispute the extent of Claimant's permanent impairment due to her

right hand condition. On August 19, 2009, Dr. Stevens performed EMG testing of Claimant's
upper right extremity and concluded Claimant's "ulnar neuropathy is moderate in severity" and
"certainly appears consistent with her symptoms." Exhibit 14, p. 155 (emphasis supplied).
However, on November 18, 2009, Dr. Stevens performed an independent medical examination at
Defendants' request and noted that Claimant had presented for EMG testing on August 19, 2009,
and that he had then "determined that she exhibited features of a very mild ulnar neuropathy."
Exhibit 14, p. 162 (emphasis supplied).

Dr. Stevens found Claimant medically stable on

November 18, 2009, and characterizing her ulnar sensory deficit as very mild, rated her
permanent impairment at 2% of the upper extremity due to her ulnar neuropathy and upper
extremity collateral ligament injuries. He declined to impose any work restrictions and opined
Claimant should be released to full duty without restriction.
33.

On September 13, 2012, Dr. McNulty examined Claimant and opined that she

suffered permanent impairments of 1% of the whole person from her chronic right ring finger
PIP joint sprain, 1% of the whole person from her chronic right little finger PIP joint sprain, and
2% of the whole person from her right ulnar sensory nerve injury-all due to her 2008 industrial
accident.

Dr. McNulty's impairment rating is more persuasive that Dr. Stevens' as it is

supported by the MRI findings documenting A2 pulley disruption of the PIP joints of Claimant's
right ring and little fingers and is further supported by Dr. Stevens' August 19, 2009 EMG
testing wherein he found ulnar neuropathy of moderate severity.
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I

34.

Claimant has proven that she suffers permanent physical impairments of 6% of

the whole person due to her pre-existing cervical condition, 7% of the whole person due to her
pre-existing lower extremity condition and 4% of the whole person due to her right hand
condition.

Claimant has proven she suffers whole person permanent impairments of 17%,

including 4% whole person impairment due to her 2008 industrial accident.
35.

Permanent disability. The next issue is the extent of Claimant's permanent

disability, including whether she is totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot
doctrine. "Permanent disability" or "under a permanent disability" results when the actual or
presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent
impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected.
Idaho Code§ 72-423. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability" is an appraisal of the injured
employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the
medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors provided in Idaho
Code § 72-430. Idaho Code § 72-425. Idaho Code § 72-430 (1) provides that in determining
percentages of permanent disabilities, account should be taken of the nature of the physical
disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to handicap the employee in procuring or
holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple injuries, the occupation of the employee,
and his or her age at the time of accident causing the injury, or manifestation of the occupational
disease, consideration being given to the diminished ability of the affected employee to compete
in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area considering all the personal and
economic circumstances of the employee, and other factors as the Commission may deem
relevant. The focus of a determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to
engage in gainful activity. Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1995). Pursuant
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to Idaho Code § 72-422, the proper date for disability analysis of a claimant's labor market
access is the date of hearing, and not the date that maximum medical improvement has been
reached. Brown v. Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605, 272 P.3d 577 (2012).
36.

Claimant asserts that her 2008 industrial accident at Coeur d'Alene Inn renders

her totally and permanently disabled. Her permanent disability must be evaluated based upon
her medical factors, including the physical restrictions arising from her permanent impairments,
and non-medical factors, including Claimant's capacity for gainful activity and ability to
compete in the open labor market within her geographical area.
37.

Physical restrictions. In November 2009, Dr. Stevens opined that Claimant had

no physical restrictions due to her 2008 industrial accident. He explained that although objective
diagnostic medical testing disclosed persisting abnormalities, Claimant would not fu1iher injure
herself by working without restrictions.

Dr. Stevens' opinion is premised in part on his

November 2009 conclusion that Claimant's industrial accident caused very mild ulnar
neuropathy of her upper right extremity, contradicting his conclusion after EMG testing in
August 2009 that her accident caused ulnar neuropathy of moderate severity.
38.

Claimant's September 2011 hand functional capacity evaluation by Virginia Taft

at the Coeur d'Alene Hand Therapy & Healing Center concluded that Claimant would need to
have primarily left-handed work and that she was restricted to lifting five pounds with her right
hand, 20 pounds with both hands, and minimal repetition. Taft's 2012 addendum noted that
Claimant "used her right hand as an assist rather than as her dominant hand" and concluded that
Claimant could not return to her previous job or to a cashiering position. Exhibit 12, p. 144. Dr.
McNulty agreed v.rith Ms. Taft's evaluation and restricted Claimant from lifting more than 20
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pounds and from repetitive lifting and grabbing with her right hand. He further noted that
Claimant's pre-existing lower extremity impairment limited her ability to climb stairs or ladders.
39.

Claimant's supervisor at H&J reported that after Claimant's release to full-duty

work in 2009, she was not able to perform all of her pre-injury duties. Her employment at Coeur
d'Alene Inn was terminated for this very reason.
40.

The Referee found Ms. Taft's and Dr. McNulty's opinions regarding Claimant's

restrictions more consistent, accurate, and persuasive than Dr. Stevens' opinion.

The

Commission finds no reason to disturb the Referee's findings and observations on Ms. Taft's and
Dr. McNulty's credibility.
41.

Ability to compete in the open labor market.

Three vocational experts have

opined regarding Claimant's ability to compete in her labor market, Nancy Collins, Mary BarrosBailey, and Daniel Brownell. The conclusions of each are examined below.
42.

]\Taney Collins.

Vocational expert Nancy Collins, Ph.D., interviewed Claimant

and reviewed her work history, medical records, and physical restrictions. On September 4,
2012, Dr. Collins authored a report on behalf of ISIP, who later settled \Vith Claimant prior to
hearing. In her report, Dr. Collins concluded that Claimant was not totally disabled but opined:
Considering the opinion of Dr. Stevens, Ms. Deon has no disability in excess of
impairment. Considering restrictions that limit her to some light and sedentary
jobs that do not require repetitive use of her right dominant hand, she will
experience a 90% loss of access to the labor market. In my opinion, she will not
experience a significant earnings loss. Based on a wage of $9.70 per hour in her
time of injury job and an $8.50 return to work wage, she will experience a 12%
loss of earning capacity. Ms. Deon is 56 years of age and I do think her age
should be considered in her disability rating. In my opinion, Ms. Deon's
disability inclusive of impairment is 56% based on restrictions from Dr. Dickey,
Dr. Greendyke and the hand assessment. .... This analysis assumes equal value
is given to the two vocational factors of earning capacity and labor market access.
Exhibit 7, pp. 64-65.
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43.

Dr. Collins' report does not demonstrate extensive familiarity with the degree of

competition present in Claimant's current labor market.

Additionally, in reaching her

conclusions, Dr. Collins did not have the benefit of Virginia Taft's September 4, 2012 addendum
to the functional capacity evaluation, or Dr. McNulty's September 13, 2012 report in which he
agreed with Ms. Taft's conclusions. Nevertheless, Dr. Collins found 56% permanent disability
by equally weighting Claimant's loss of labor market access (90%) and her estimated wage loss
based on the difference between her time of injury wage and her likely post-accident wage
(12%). Thus 90% + 12%

=

102% -:- 2

=

51 % to which Dr. Collins apparently added 5% for

Claimant's age to reach her disability rating of 56%.
44.

Dr. Collins' calculations did not take into account Claimant's full compensation

package at the time of her 2008 accident, including IRA and health insurance benefits through
H&J which Dan Brownell testified effectively increased her compensation by as much as 30%.
Bro~nell

testified that most jobs in Claimant's labor market do not provide these benefits. If Dr.

Collins had calculated Claimant's wage loss based on a time of injury wage of $9.75 per hour,
plus 30% benefits, thus totaling $12.68, versus a likely post-injury wage of $8.50, Claimant's
wage loss would equal: ($12.68 - $8.50)
(90% + 33%)

+

+

$12.68 or 33%. The calculation would then be:

2 = 62%. Adding 5% for Claimant's age would then yield a 67% permanent

disability rating.
45.

A1ary Barros-Bailey. Vocational expert Mary Barros-Bailey, Ph.D., testified in

behalf of Defendants. She has 22 years of experience in vocational rehabilitation, including 19
years in Idaho. Dr. Barros-Bailey has evaluated disability cases from Alaska to Idaho to Brazil.
She met with Claimant in 2011 and reviewed her medical records. On October 11, 2011, Dr.
Barros-Bailey issued her vocational report concluding that Claimant:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER-15

has substantially reduced ability to access the labor market to the level of a 73 %
loss of access. She would still be able to access a variety of jobs, however, that
do not require regular bilateral work and pay within $1 of her wage at injury (e.g.
cashiers at median wages of $9.01 per hour per the 2011 Idaho Occupational
Employment and Wage Survey), thus resulting in a slight wage of [sic] earning
capacity.....
For Ms. Deon, age is a factor in that her functional age combined with all her
medical conditions is probably greater than her chronological age and should be
considered in disability. Consequently, considering Trudy's age, work and
education histories, transferable skills, functional restrictions associated \Vith the
industrial injury, and other non-medical factors, I believe she has sustained a 45%
disability inclusive of impairment. Note that given no functional assumptions
available in previous Industrial Commission records, there is no basis upon which
to apportion this disability opinion.
Exhibit 8, pp. 82-83. Dr. Barros-Bailey's report does not demonstrate extensive familiarity with
the degree of competition present in Claimant's current north Idaho labor market.
46.

In July 2012, Dr. Barros-Bailey issued a supplemental report criticizing Dan

Brm:vnell's finding that Claimant suffered 85% permanent disability.

Dr. Barros-Bailey

indicated that Claimant was earning only $9.70 per hour at the time of her industrial accident and
that even a minimum wage job would result in only a 25% reduction in Claimant's wages.
47.

At hearing, Dr. Barros-Bailey testified that she uses the average of an injured

worker's loss of labor market access and estimated wage loss as the starting point to determine
permanent disability. She testified that in evaluating Claimant's permanent disability, she added
Claimant's loss of labor market access (73%) and her estimated wage loss based on the
difference between her time of injury wage and her likely post-accident wage of $9.01 per hour
as a cashier, equaling 7%. Thus 73% + 7%

=

80% + 2 = 40%. Dr. Barros-Bailey then adjusted

the average upward by adding 5% for Claimant's age, to arrive at a final disability rating of 45%.
48.

Significantly, Dr. Barros-Bailey apparently misread the September 16, 2011 Hand

Function Assessment by Virginia Taft who concluded that if Claimant were: "to return to work,
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she would need to have primarily left handed work with a weight load on the right of less than 5#
lifting, up to 20# with both hands, minimum repetition, and self paced."

Exhibit 12, p. 147

(emphasis supplied). Instead, Dr. Barros-Bailey stated in her report:
The second [medical] opinion is the 9/16/11 functional capacity evaluation that
estimates Trudy to lift no more than 5# with her left hand and to lift no more than
20# bilaterally. Note that Trudy is right hand dominant and there were no
limitations or restrictions indicated to the dominant upper extremity. She would
also need to have minimal repetition and self pacing on the left upper extremity.
Exhibit 8, p. 82 (emphasis supplied).
49.

In addition to misunderstanding Taft's September 16, 2011 evaluation, Dr.

Barros-Bailey was not provided, and thus did not consider, the functional capacity evaluation
addendum authored by Ms. Taft on September 4, 2012.

Therein Ms. Taft concluded that

Claimant could not return to "her previous job or to a cashiering position which would require
sustained repetitive movement and lifting." Exhibit 12, p. 144. Hence, Dr. Barros-Bailey did
not fully consider Claimant's right hand lifting restriction or her restriction against repetitively
using her right hand.

Dr. Barros-Bailey was not provided, and thus did not consider Dr.

McNulty's September 13, 2012 report wherein he agreed with Ms. Taft's conclusions.
50.

Dr. Barros-Bailey acknowledged that her calculations did not take into account

Claimant's full compensation package at the time of her accident, including IRA and medical
benefits through H&J which are not provided by most employers in her labor market and which
effectively increased her compensation by as much as 30%.
51.

Daniel Brownell. Claimant called Daniel Brownell to testify at hearing. Mr.

Brownell served as a vocational rehabilitation consultant for the Industrial Commission for 29
years in Coeur d'Alene, retiring in 2010. He is intimately familiar with the labor market in the
Coeur d'Alene area, has performed thousands of job site evaluations, and has placed numerous
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individuals in jobs within that area. Brownell testified that as of August 12, 2012, there were
6,531 unemployed workers in Kootenai County and that shortly prior to hearing Verizon had laid
off another 200 employees.
52.

Mr. BrO\vnell testified that H&J is the fifth or sixth largest employer in

Claimant's labor market and employs literally "hundreds and hundreds of employees and lots of
facilities, lots of diversified work" including parking lot attendants. Transcript, p. 76, 11. 6-7.
Yet Claimant was laid off due to lack of work as H&J had no work available for Claimant within
her medical restrictions. BrO\vnell also testified that Claimant's time of injury wage of $9.75 per
hour plus benefits should be evaluated with the understanding that her benefits at H&J added 2030% to her compensation and that most jobs in her labor market do not provide those benefits.
He affirmed that if those benefits were considered, her hourly wage would total $12.00 to $13.00
per hour. Transcript pp. 88-89.
53.

Mr. BrO\vnell met with Claimant several times commencing in September 2011.

He familiarized himself with her medical records, work history, educational background, injuries
and resulting work limitations. He noted that Claimant struggled with reading and spelling in
high school and in her attempt to complete a nursing program. She needed a special tutor to help
her obtain her associates degree in drafting at North Idaho College because she was only reading
at an eighth grade level. Brownell testified that Claimant's drafting and HVAC training are now
outdated and not marketable. He opined that Claimant's extended period of unemployment
subsequent to her 2008 industrial accident was a significant factor diminishing the likelihood of
acquiring future employment. Brownell considered Dr. McNulty' s opinion the most recent and
up to date physician's opinion of Claimant's condition and restrictions. Brownell also relied
upon the functional capacity evaluation performed in September 2011 by Virginia Taft and the
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September 2012 addendum to that evaluation.

He opined that Claimant's most significant

physical limitation was her restriction from repetitively using her dominant right hand. Mr.
Brovmell opined that Claimant could not return to any of her prior occupations and that very
rarely are there jobs in her labor market that would be regularly available and compatible with
her physical limitations.
54.

Mr. Brownell reviewed Dr. Barros Bailey's report and did not agree with Dr.

Barros-Bailey's conclusion that Claimant could work as a cashier. Rather, Brownell cited Dr.
McNulty's and Virginia Taft's conclusions and opined that Claimant could not work
competitively as a cashier due to her 2008 industrial injury. He also opined that Claimant would
not be competitive for work as a parking lot attendant or ticket taker due to her right hand
limitations. Bmwnell concluded:
Based upon the claimant's entire case profile inclusive of age, education, work
skills and current physical capabilities, there are extremely limited work
opportunities. Also considered is the fact that these positions are filled and a
competitive unemployed labor force of hundreds await the competition for a new
job opening. Ms. Deon would also require a sympathetic employer who would
accommodate all her physical limitations.
Exhibit 6, p. 49.
55.

Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant suffers permanent disability of 85 to 90% or

greater, inclusive of permanent impairment.

He opined that none of this disability was

attributable to her cervical, shoulder, bilateral leg or right eye conditions.

Transcript p. 108.

He testified that Claimant had lost access to 90% of the labor market and that the 10% of the
labor market which she could still potentially access was comprised of unskilled sedentary jobs
for which she would have to compete with 6,500 other job-seekers to obtain.

Brownell

demonstrated keen familiarity with the extent of competition in Claimant's labor market. He
concluded that Claimant was "barely" employable and needed "definitely a sympathetic
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employer" in order to return to work. Transcript p. 95, 11. 10-11.
56.

Further analysis of the vocational opinions.

disability rating opinions are helpful.

All of the vocational experts'

However, none is entirely persuasive and without

limitation.
57.

Dr. Barros-Bailey's disability rating of 45% is unpersuasive because it arises from

failure to consider Claimant's full compensation (including her IRA and health insurance) at
H&J, a material misreading of Virginia Taft's 2011 hand functional capacity evaluation, failure
to consider the 2012 addendum to that evaluation, failure to consider Dr. McNulty's 2012 report,
and the erroneous assumption that Claimant could work competitively as a cashier. 2
58.

Dr. Collins' disability rating of 56% is not entirely persuasive because it fails to

consider Claimant's full compensation package (including her IRA and health insurance) at
H&J.
59.

Rating an injured worker's permanent disability by averaging her estimated loss

of labor market access and expected wage loss, as Drs. Collins and Barros-Bailey have done in
the instant case, can provide a useful point of reference. However, the averaging method itself is
not without conceptual and actual limitations. As the loss of labor market access becomes
substantial, and the expected wage loss negligible, the results of the averaging method become
less reliable in predicting actual disability. For illustration, as judged by the averaging method, a
hypothetical minimum wage earner injured sufficiently to lose access to 99% of the labor market
may theoretically suffer no expected wage loss if she can still perform any minimum wage job.
Calculation of such a worker's disability according to the averaging method would produce a
permanent disability rating of only 49.5% ([99% + 0%]

2

2) even though her actual probability

As previously noted, Dr. Barros-Bailey was never provided these 2012 reports.
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of obtaining employment in the remaining 1% of an intensely competitive labor market may be
as remote as ·winning the lottery. The averaging method fails to fully account for the reality that
the two factors are not fully independent.
60.

As the residual labor market becomes increasingly small, the disability rating

obtained by the averaging method becomes increasingly skewed, especially in labor markets
with high unemployment rates where competition for the remaining portion of suitable jobs will
be fierce.

This is exactly Claimant's situation herein.

All of the vocational experts

acknowledged that Claimant has lost access to a substantial portion of her labor market. Dr.
Barros-Bailey noted that Claimant suffered only a minimal expected wage loss. Mr. Brownell
testified that Claimant must compete with over 6,500 unemployed workers who are seeking jobs
in Claimant's labor market.
61.

Finally, neither Dr. Collins, Dr. Barros-Bailey, nor Mr. Brownell included the

limitations/restrictions related to Claimant's preexisting impairments, totaling 13 %, m
calculating Claimant's disability.

In Mr. Brov.rnell's case, he specifically testified that m

performing his evaluation he considered Claimant's preexisting impairments, but concluded that
none of Claimant's 85% - 90% disability is attributable to those preexisting impairments.
(Transcript 107/15 - 108/22)
62.

Similarly, Dr. Collins was aware of Claimant's prior injuries, noting in her report

that Claimant's pre-existing impairments did limit Claimant in some activities. (See Claimant's
exhibit 7 at 61). However, when it came to evaluating Claimant's disability, it appears that Dr.
Collins considered only those limitations/restrictions related to the subject accident. It is unclear
whether Dr. Collins felt that Claimant's pre-existing impairments and related limitations were
vocationally significant in light of the limitations stemming from the subject accident.
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63.

Like Dr. Collins, Dr. Barros-Bailey was aware of Claimant's pre-existing

impairments as well as the fact that these impairments permanently affected Claimant's function
to some extent. However, in evaluating Claimant's disability, it appears that Dr. Barros-Bailey
considered only the limitations/restrictions stemming from the subject accident. (See Claimant's
exhibit 8).

At hearing she explained that she did not include consideration of pre-existing

limitations in her report because those limitations were never quantified. (See transcript 130131,135).
64.

Having considered all of the vocational experts' permanent disability ratings, the

Commission declines to fully adopt any of the offered ratings. The Commission is the ultimate
evaluator of disability.
65.

Claimant has unsuccessfully looked for work in the Coeur d'Alene area on

herO\vn and through the unemployment office. She did not fully avail herself of Beth Grigg's
assistance and failed to follow-up on job leads Grigg provided. Claimant's

O\VTI

job search,

which she testified included submitting a "couple dozen" applications, is not consistent with a
diligent and earnest effort to find employment. There is no indication that Bro\\nell performed
an independent job search specifically on Claimant's behalf. However, Brovmell' s conclusionthat Claimant would need a sympathetic employer to accommodate all of her limitations such
that she could find employment-is amply supported by the record as a whole.

Brownell

testified that Claimant would not be competitive for ticket taker positions, parking lot attendant
positions, or the like. He also persuasively testified that Claimant's time of injury Employer is
the fifth or sixth largest employer in North Idaho, employing literally hundreds of workers, and
that if H&J could not accommodate Claimant's limitations, Claimant was unlikely to find an
employer that would--except for a sympathetic employer.
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66.

Based on Claimant's permanent impairments totaling 17% of the whole person,

her permanent physical restrictions, particularly those to her dominant right upper extremity, and
considering all of her medical and non-medical factors, including her age of 56 at the time of the
industrial accident, limited fonnal education, reading challenges, inability to return to previous
positions, outdated specialized training, and limited transferable skills, Claimant's ability to
compete in the open labor market and engage in regular gainful activity after her 2008 industrial
accident has been greatly reduced. The Commission concludes that Claimant has established a
permanent disability of 85%, inclusive of her 17% whole person impairment.
67.

Odd-lot. A claimant who is not 100% permanently disabled may prove total

permanent disability by establishing he is an odd-lot worker. An odd-lot worker is one "so
injured that he can perform no services other than those which are so limited in quality,
dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist." Bybee v.
State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 81, 921 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1996). Such
workers are not regularly employable "in any well-known branch of the labor market - absent a
business boom, the sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a
superhuman effort on their part." Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,
112, 686 P.2d 54, 57 (1984). The burden of establishing odd-lot status rests upon the claimant.
Durnaw v. J. L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 153, 795 P.2d 312, 315 (1990). A claimant
may satisfy his burden of proof and establish total permanent disability under the odd-lot
doctrine in any one of three ways:

(1) by showing that he has attempted other types of

employment without success; (2) by showing that he or vocational counselors or employment
agencies on his behalf have searched for other work and other work is not available; or (3) by
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showing that any efforts to find suitable work would be futile. Lethrud v. Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995).
68.

In the present case, Defendants assert that Claimant is employable and not an odd-

lot worker. Claimant has not demonstrated that she unsuccessfully attempted other types of
employment.

As noted above, Claimant has testified she submitted a "couple dozen"

applications and has been registered with job service for approximately four years. This suggests
a modest unsuccessful work search. However, far more persuasive, is Mr. Brownell's testimony
that it would require a sympathetic employer to accommodate Claimant's limitations in order for
her to obtain employment. As concluded above, Brownell's opinion in this regard is persuasive
and tantamount to a showing that efforts to find suitable work regularly and continuously
available in the open labor market would be futile. Claimant has established a prima facie case
that she is an odd-lot worker, totally and permanently disabled, under the Lethrud test.
69.

Once a claimant establishes a prima facie odd-lot case, the burden shifts to

defendants "to show that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to
the claimant." Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 112, 686 P.2d 54,
57 (1984). Defendants must prove there is:
An actual job within a reasonable distance from [claimant's] home which

[claimant] is able to perform or for which [claimant] can be trained. In addition,
the [defendants] must show that [claimant] has a reasonable opportunity to be
employed at that job. It is of no significance that there is a job [claimant] is
capable of performing if he would in fact not be considered for the job due to his
injuries, lack of education, lack of training, or other reasons.
Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 407, 565 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1977).
70.

In the present case, Defendants through Dr. Barros-Bailey identified only one

type of job-cashier-that she believed was suitable for Claimant given her physical restrictions.
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Mr. Brownell testified convincingly that Claimant is not competitive for a cashier position given
the restrictions enumerated by Virginia Taft and agreed upon by Dr. McNulty.
71.

Defendants have not shown that there is an actual job regularly and continuously

available which Claimant can perform and at which she has a reasonable opportunity to be
employed. Claimant has proven that she is totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the oddlot doctrine commencing November 18, 2009, the date Dr. Stevens found her medically stable
from her 2008 industrial injuries.
72.

Idaho Code § 72-406(1) apportionment. Inasmuch as Claimant is totally and

permanently disabled, the issue of apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406(1) is moot.
73.

Carev apportionment. The next issue is apportionment pursuant to the Carey

formula. Although Claimant settled with ISIF prior to hearing, a determination of ISIF's liability
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332 must be made before the extent of Defendants' liability can be
determined pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d
54, (1984).
74.

Idaho Code § 72-332(1) provides in pertinent part that if an employee who has a

permanent physical impairment from any cause or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by injury
arising out of and in the course of employment, and by reason of the combined effects of both
the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury suffers total and permanent disability, the
employer and its surety will be liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the
disability caused by the injury, and the injured employee shall be compensated for the remainder
of his income benefits out of the ISIF account.
75.

Idaho Code § 72-332(2) further provides that "permanent physical impairment" is

as defined in Idaho Code § 72-422, provided, however, as used in this section such impairment
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must be a permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such
seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining reemployment if the claimant should become unemployed. This shall be interpreted subjectively
as to the particular employee involved; however, the mere fact that a claimant is employed at the
time of the subsequent injury shall not create a presumption that the pre-existing physical
impairment was not of such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining
employment.
76.

In Durnaw v. J. L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990), the

Idaho Supreme Court identified four requirements a claimant must meet to establish ISIF
liability under Idaho Code§ 72-332. These include: (1) whether there was indeed a pre-existing
impairment; (2) whether that impairment was manifest; (3) whether the impairment was a
subjective hindrance to employment; and (4) whether the impairment in any way combined with
the subsequent injury to cause total disability. Dumaw, 118 Idaho at 155, 795 P.2d at 317.
77.

Pre-existing, manifest impairments.

The pre-existing physical impairments at

issue herein are those to Claimant's neck and shoulders (6%), and legs (7%), prior to her 2008
industrial accident. There is no dispute that her neck and shoulder, and her leg conditions existed
and were manifest in 1990 and 2006 respectively.

Claimant's neck, shoulder, and leg

impairments constitute pre-existing conditions for purposes of Idaho Code § 72-332 because
each preexisted and was manifest prior to her 2008 industrial accident. The first and second
prongs of the Dumaw test have been met.
78.

Hindrance or obstacle. The third prong of the Dumaw test considers "whether or

not the pre-existing condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment for the
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particular claimant." Archer v. Bonners Ferrv Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 172, 786 P.2d 557, 563
(1990).
79.

Claimant underwent cervical and bilateral first rib resection surgeries shortly after

suffering her 1990 assault injury.

Thereafter she changed employment, obtained drafting

training, and commenced working in a lighter industry.

Mr. Bmwnell acknowledged that

Claimant's job change was necessitated by her cervical limitations. Her pre-existing cervical
condition thus constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment.
80.

Claimant's pre-existing leg condition limited her walking ability. She testified

that even after recovering from the Rottweiler attack, she could only walk approximately onehalf mile due to the pain in her legs. Dr. McNulty opined that her leg condition limited her
ladder and stair climbing ability.
81.

The Commission

finds that Claimant's pre-existing neck, shoulder, and leg

impairments constituted a hindrance to her employment. The third prong of the Dumaw test is
met.
82.

Combination. Finally, to satisfy the "combines" element, the test is whether, but

for the industrial injury, the worker would have been totally and permanently disabled
immediately following the occurrence of that injury.

This test "encompasses both the

combination scenario where each element contributes to the total disability, and the case where
the subsequent injury accelerates and aggravates the pre-existing impairment." Bybee v. State,
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 81, 921 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1996). Significantly,
ISIF is not liable where the last industrial injury, itself, renders a worker totally and permanently
disabled. Selzler v. State ofldaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 124 Idaho 144, 857 P.2d
623 (1993).
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83.

The record in the instant case does not establish that Claimant's pre-existing

cervical and shoulder condition combines with her 2008 injuries to render her totally and
permanently disabled. To the contrary, the upper extremity restrictions arising from Claimant's
2008 industrial accident entirely supersede those resulting from her cervical and shoulder
condition.
84.

The record contains some evidence that Claimant's pre-existing leg impairment

contributes to her total and permanent disability. As noted, her pre-existing leg condition limited
her standing and walking tolerances and Dr. McNulty opined that her leg condition precluded her
from working on ladders or frequently using stairs.

However, Mr. Bmwnell persuasively

testified that Claimant's right upper extremity condition alone precluded her from competing in
the open labor market and relegated her to employment only by a sympathetic employer. Dr.
Barros-Bailey acknowledged that upper extremity limitations are among the most disabling
conditions. Neither Dr. Collins nor Dr. Barros-Bailey opined that Claimant's pre-existing leg
condition combined vv1.th her upper extremity condition to produce disability.
85.

The record does not establish that Claimant's pre-existing leg condition combined

with her 2008 industrial accident to render her totally and permanently disabled.

Rather,

Claimant's right upper extremity condition alone renders her totally and permanently disabled.
Thus apportionment pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109,
118, 686 P.2d 54, 63 (1984), is not appropriate.
86.

Medical care. The final issue is Claimant's entitlement to medical care. Idaho

Code § 72-432(1) mandates that an employer shall provide for an injured employee such
reasonable medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service,
medicines, crutches, and apparatus, as may be reasonably required by the employee's physician
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or needed immediately after an injury or manifestation of an occupational disease, and for a
reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may
do so at the expense of the employer. Of course an employer is only obligated to provide
medical treatment necessitated by the industrial accident, and is not responsible for medical
treatment not related to the industrial accident. Williamson v. Whitman Corp./Pet. Inc., 130
Idaho 602, 944 P .2d 1365 (1997). A claimant must provide medical testimony that supports a
claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability.

Langley v. State,

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 785, 890 P.2d 732, 736 (1995).
87.

Claimant herein requests medical benefits for reimbursement for a functional

capacity evaluation recommended by Dr. Greendyke and perfonned September 16, 2011, by
Virginia Taft.

When Defendants refused to provide the evaluation, Claimant, at the

recommendation of her attorney, had the evaluation performed at her own expense. Defendants
in their briefing do not expressly contest Claimant's request for reimbursement. The evaluation
was recommended by her then treating physician and is compensable.
88.

Claimant has proven her entitlement to reimbursement for her functional capacity

evaluation by Virginia Taft.
!/Ill
Ill/I
//Ill
//Ill
/////
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CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V AND ORDER

1.

Claimant has proven she suffers whole person permanent impairment of 17%,

including 4% whole person impairment due to her 2008 industrial accident.
2.

Claimant has proven she suffers permanent disability of 85% inclusive of

impairment, and has proven that she is an odd-lot worker, totally and permanently disabled under
the Lethrud test.
3.

Apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code 72-406 is moot.

4.

Apportionment pursuant to Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107

Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984), is not appropriate.
5.

Claimant has proven her entitlement to reimbursement for her functional capacity

evaluation by Virginia Taft.
6.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

matters adjudicated.
DATED this

rd

day of_(}1_G"'1-+----' 2013.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman

Participated but did not sign

Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner
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ATTEST:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,

I hereby certify that on the
day of vr1~
2013, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was
served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
STEVEN J NEMEC
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEURD'ALENEID 83814
ESCOTT HARMON
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,
Claimant,
v.

H & J, INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN COEUR
D'ALENE INN & CONFERENCE CENTER,

IC 2007-005950
IC 2008-032836

NOTICE OF RECONSIDERATION

Employer,
and

F
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION,
Surety,
Defendants.
The Commission hereby notifies the parties of its decision to reconsider, on its

O\:YTI

motion, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, per the provisions of LC. § 72718. By way of background, on or about May 3, 2013, the Commission issued its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in this matter. The decision, as originally drafted and
proposed by Referee Taylor was not adopted in its entirety by the Commission due to the
Referee's treatment of the vocational opinions offered by Nancy Collins, Mary Barros-Bailey
and Dan Bro\:vnell. The Commission revised the proposed opinion to give different treatment to
how Claimant's pre-existing permanent physical impairment of 13% of the whole person
affected his permanent disability. However, the Commission adopted Referee Taylor's ultimate
conclusion that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled as a result of the subject accident
alone, and that Employer therefore bears full responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent
disability.

NOTICE OF RECONSIDERATION - 1

As of the date of hearing, Referee Taylor was aware that Claimant had reached an
independent settlement with the ISIF, which settlement had been approved by the Industrial
Commission. However, it does not appear that Referee Taylor was aware of the substance of
that settlement and a copy of the settlement was not made an exhibit to the proceeding against
Employer/Surety.

Nor do we have any reason to believe that Employer/Surety has any

independent knowledge of the terms and conditions of Claimant's settlement with the ISIF.
However, having reviewed and approved the Claimant's settlement with the ISIF, as
guided by the court's recent decision in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147
Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009), the
settlement.

Commission~

aware of the terms and conditions of that

The conclusions reached in connection with Claimant's claim against

Employer/Surety implicate the need to consider the impact of the settlement with the ISIF on
the award made against Employer/Surety.

Essentially, the question is how or whether

Claimant's settlement with the ISIF, a copy of which is attached hereto as exhibit A, affects
Employer/Surety's obligation to pay total and permanent disability benefits to Claimant as
anticipated by the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Does Claimant's settlement
with the ISIF have some collateral estoppel effect against Claimant? See, e.g., Jackman v. State
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997). In particular, we

note that the subject lump sum settlement agreement specifies that the parties to that agreement
stipulated to a Carey apportionment of 60140, with ISIF accepting 60% responsibility for
Claimant's total and permanent disability for purposes of the settlement.

Of course,

Employer/Surety is not a party to that settlement agreement, so it cannot be bound by that
stipulation. However, the question that interests the Commission is whether the stipulation
binds Claimant in connection with her prosecution of the claim against Employer/Surety.

NOTICE OF RECONSIDERATION - 2

Under Idaho Code § 72-718, a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall
be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided, within twenty (20) days from the
date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision.
In any such event, the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or
reconsideration, or the filing of the decision on rehearing or reconsideration.
The Commission may reverse its decision upon a motion for reconsideration, or
rehearing of the decision in question, based on the arguments presented, or upon its own motion
provided that it acts within the time frame established in Idaho Code § 72-718. See, Dennis v.
School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated
Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)). However, in taking this action, it is not our

intention to foreclose either of the parties from themselves pursuing a motion for
reconsideration under LC. § 72-718 for any other issues they believe need to be reconsidered by
the Commission.
Because the issue that is of concern to us could not ripen in the absence of a particular
outcome in Claimant's case against Employer/Surety, and since the issue is not among those
originally noticed for hearing, the Commission invites the parties to submit additional briefing on
the issue for the Commission to consider before determining whether the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order should be reconsidered based on the approved lump sum
settlement agreement between Claimant and the ISIF. The Commission will set a telephone
conference in the immediate future to discuss with the parties how best to proceed.
Ill
Ill
Ill
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ORDER
Within ten (10) days, the parties are directed to submit available dates and times for such
conference.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

R.D. Maynard, Commissioner
'

ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of ff] fMj
, 2013, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF RECONSIDERATION was served by regular United
States mail upon each of the following:
STEVEN J NEMEC
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814
E SCOTT HARMON
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
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Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
. JONES, BROWER &C.t\LLERY, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P. 0. Box854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
.. (208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553
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tcallery@lewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COM.MISSION OF THE STATE OF IDA.HO
1

'
TRUDY DEON;
Case No. I.C. 07-005950
I.C. 08-032836

Plaintiff,

vs.

· __ , __

HAGADONE HOSPITALITY,
Employer,
. LIBERTY NORTITTVEST INSlJRANCE CO.,

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF
. LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND ORDER
OF APPROVAL Ml> DISCHARGE

Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this

/°t . day of

Oc7tJ/!, f> J22012,

by and between TRUDY DEON, hereinafter referred to as Claimant, and THE STATE OF
IDA.HO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, hereinafter referred to_ as the Fund;

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE Al't"'D
ORDER OF APPROVAL Al't1D DISCHARGE - 1

EXHIBIT A

WIT NE S SETH:
VlHEREAS, Claimant has filed a claim for benefits under the Worker's Compensation
laws of the State ofidaho, being Case Nos. I.C: 07-005950 and I.C. 08-032836.
WHEREAS, said case includes a claim against the Fund filed by the Claimant contending
that prior physical impairments consisting of a cervical spine injury and a left lower extremity
·injury that existed prior to October 4, 2008, when the Claimant was injured when her -right glove
got caught in an auger, resulting in a twisting injury to her right hand and wrist, which said
injuries combined resulting in Claimant being totally and permanently disabled.
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the Claimant and the Fund to finally compromise and settle
the dispute between the Fund and Claimant, subject to the approval of the Commission.
WHEREAS, the Claimant suffered from a cervical spine injury and

aleft lower extremity

' injury prior to the industrial accident that occurred on October 4, 2008.
WHEREAS, the Claimant incurred her left lower extremity injury secondary to a dog bite
in 2006. According to Dr. McNulty, the Claimant suffered a 7% whole person impairment for
loss of the plantar flexion strength in her lower left extremity.
WHEREAS, the Claimant entered into a lump sum agreement in a previous claim for
benefits under the Worker's Compensation laws of the State of Idaho, being Case No. LC. 88619272 and Case No. LC. 90-704093, awarding the Claimant a 6% whole person impairment for
her industrial accidents of 1988 and 1990 based on an independent medical evaluation. Other
medical providers, however, including Dr. Steven Sears, M.D., indicated that the Claimant could
return to work ~rith no restrictions and had no ratable impairment for her cervical condition.

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE A.."IW ·
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 2

. WHEREAS, the. Claimant was treated conservatively for the injury to her ring and little
finger consistent with a pip chronic joint sprain of the right hand. The Claimant continues to
suffer from chronic right hand pain and dysfunction. She received a 6% impairment of the ring
finger, and a 6% impairment of the little finger, which converts to a 3% upper extremity
impairment and further converts to a 2% whole person impairment for the injury of October 4,

2008 from Dr. John McNulty, M.D.
WHEREAS, the Claimant underwent an independent medical evaluation by Dr. J. Craig
Stevens, M.D., on November 18, 2009, at the request of the Surety. Dr. Stevens was of the
opinion the Claimant suffered a 2% upper extremity impairment apportioned to the injury of
October .4, 2008, which converts to a 1% whole person impairment.
WHEREAS, the Claimant is currently 57 years of age with a date of birth of September

9, 1955, and is currently a resident of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
WHEREAS, the Claimant has been employed as a forest service worker, short order
relief cook, certified nurse assistant, personal care attendant, draftsperson, and an HVAC
technician during her lifetime.
WHEREAS, the Claimant is a high school graduate. She has an Associate's Degree in
drafting from North Idaho College, as. well as a certificate in HVAC work from North Idaho
College.
ViTHEREAS, the Fund and the Claimant stipulate and agree that Claimant is totally and
permanently disabled based upon the combined effects of the Claimant's pre-existing cen1ica.l
spine injury and left lower extremity injury, combining with the injury to her right hand and
.wrist.

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 3

'\VHEREAS, based upon the medical records, the Claimant and the Fund stipulate that a
60140 Carey Formula apportionment with the Fund being responsible for 60% of the Claimant's

total and permanent disability is appropriate in this case. This Carey Formula apportionment is
based upon the impairment for Claimant's cervical spine injury and left lower extremity, and the

l

significant impairment to Claimant's right hand and wrist as a result of the October 4, 2008,

f

accident.

j

cervical impairment and her ability to return to medium level work as an HVAC technician after

~.

It further takes into account the conflicting evidence concerning the Claimant's

'

her cervical injury and lower extremity injury.
\VHEREAS, the Claimant was deemed to be at maximum medical improvement in
November 2009.
'\VHEREAS, it is in the best interest of justice and of each and all the parties hereto that
the above claim be fully, finally and forever settled, satisfied and discharged upon a lump sum
paymentto the Claimant in the sum of Seventy Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($70,000.00) to be
· paid by the Fund.
'\VHEREAS, the parties acknowledge and agree that the $70,000.00 lump sum to be paid
to Claimant under the terms of this agreement constitutes

comp~nsation

on a claim of total and

permanent disability that will affect Claimant for the rest of her life.
'\VHEREAS, the Claimant has financial needs that currently exist that would be satisfied

by a lump sum payment as opposed to statutory monthly payments.
WHEREAS, the Claimant has had a compromised health condition, including a cervical
spine injury, left lower extremity injury and right hand and wrist injury, it is reasonable for the
Clahnant to forego statutory annuity payments at this time in exchange for the certainty of a
. lilmp sum payment.

STIPULATION AND AGREEIVIENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 4

WHEREAS, the Claimant is accepting ,the $70,000.00 cash lump sum settlement due to
her personal circumstances rather than a monthly annuity.

This. decision is based upon the

Claimant's current age of 57 years. Further, the Claimant's date of stability being November
2009 would result in Claimant not being entitled to full statutory benefits from the Fund based on
a 60/40 Carey apportionment until November 2013, at which time, the Claimant would be 58
years of age.

WHEREAS, the decision to accept a lump sum, as opposed to a monthly annuity, has
been made after consultation by Claimant with her legal counsel, including consideration of the
Claimant's needs for immediate cash and that monthly annuity payments cease upon death
without survivor benefits.

WHEREAS, by law, the Fund would have no liability unless the Claimant was totally and
permanently disabled.

WHEREAS, the Fund and the Claimant admit and agree that the Claimant is totally and
permanently disabled.
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties hereto to fully and finally compromise and
settle said dispute subject to the approval of the Commission.

NOW THEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove stated, and in consideration of the
mutual covenants and conditions contained herein, IT IS AGREED by and between the parties
hereto as follows:
1.

It is in the best interests of justice and of each and all of the parties hereto that the

·. above-entitl~d claim be fully, finally and forever settled, satisfied and discharged upon a lump
sum paym~nt to Claimant in the sum of $70,000.00, to be paid by the Fund.

STIPULATION AND AGREE1\1ENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF A.PPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 5

I

2.

In consideration of the $70,000.00 payment by the Fll:lld, the Claimant. fully

releases the Fund from any further liability of any kind for past injuries and conditions,
relinquishing any right to, in the future, again make claim against the Fund as a result of past,
.present and future accidents, injuries, illnesses, diseases, or conditions of any kind.
3.

It is agreed that all damages, disability, loss, expense and injury in any way

resulting from or related to the industrial accident involved in this matter, foreseen and
recognized or not, and whether the same have accrued or may hereafter accrue, are included in
the above-captioned claim and are encompassed in and fully and finally settled and discharged
by this agreement.
4.

The parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be

deemed to adjudicate said accident, and resultant impairment industrial in nature or origin under
covered employment by Employer, as provided by the Workers' Compensation laws of the State
ofldaho.
5.

..

Claimant does indemnify and agree to save the Fund harmless from and against

any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related fo said industrial accident
and any resultant loss, damage or mjury, including any and all claims in any way related to
Claimant's condition.
6.

It is specifically understood and agreed that the Fund is fully, finally and forever

released of and from any and all liability or claims of any nature:whatever, whether now existing
or hereafter discovered, in any way relating to Claimant's condition or the treatment thereof or
any disability resulting therefrom.

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
OFLUMPSUMDIBCHARGEAND
ORDER OF APPROVAL A.l'i"'D DIBCHARGE - 6

7.

Claimant is represented herein and has been counseled by STEPHEN J. NEMEC,

whose name shall be included as a payee on any settlement draft, same to be delivered to said
attorney by the Fund.
8.

Claimant's obligations to pay attorney fees and reimburse her attorney for costs

advanced arise from a written Contingent Fee Agreement. From the lump sum payment to be
paid pursuant to this Agreement, the Claimant and her attorney represent that the sum of
$20,262.71 shall be paid to Claimant's attorney as fees and costs in accordance with their
agreement, and that the Claimant, after deduction of attorney fees and costs of litigation, shall
receive the net sum of $49,737.29 ..
9.

The parties acknowledge and agree that the $70,000.00 lump sum to be paid to

Claimant under the terms of this agreement constitutes compensation for total and permanent
disabiiity that will affect Claimant the rest of her life. Claimant's remaining life expectancy is 27
years or 324 months according to the 2007 Social Security Actuarial Life Table.
Therefore, even though paid in a lump sum, the Claimant's net benefits after deduction of
attorney fees in the amount of $17,500.00 and costs in the amount of $2,762.61 shall be
considered to be $153.51 a month for 324 months beginning December 1, 2012.
10.

Upon the Commission approving this agreement and excepting only payment of

. said Lump Sum by the Fund as aforesaid, the Fund shall be, and by these presents is fully, finally
and forever discharged and released of and from any and all liability on account of the alleged
industrial accident of Claimant.
11.

The terms of this agreement shall be binding upon all of the above parties, their

heirs, representatives, successors and assigns .

. STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF A.PPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 7

J.
12.

All parties waive the right of appeal or to re-open these proceedings as a part of

the consideration of and for this Agreement. The parties hereby specifically and expressly agree,
as a part of the consideration herein, that all parties waive the right to reconsideration of an
award otherwise provided under the Workers' Compensation Laws of Idaho, §72-718, Idaho
Code.
13. ·

.All portions of this instrument constitute binding covenants of the parties, and no

portion is a mere recital. ·
14.

By this instrument, the Claimant requests the Commission's approval hereof and

Order of Discharge pursuant hereto, and the Fund does join in said petition and stipulates that it
should be granted. Claimant acknowledges that she has, with the assistance of her counsel,
carefully read this Agreement and legal instrument in its entirety, understands its contents and
has executed the same .knowing that this agreement forever concludes and fully and finally
disposes 'of any and all claims of every kind and character she has or may have against the Fund
on account of the industrial accident. Claimant further understands that this agreement forever
precludes Claimant from filing any future claims against the Fund on account of any future
accidents, injuries or diseases and that these proceedings are concluded and forever closed by
reason hereof, subject only to Commission approval and Order, as aforesaid.
15.

Acceptance of this Agreement by Claimant according to the terms and conditions

stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge the Fund from liability for any claims forever,
regardless of whether such claims arise from the industrial accident which is the subject of this
cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or infirmities existing prior
hereto, or hereafter arising.

STIPULATION A.."'ID AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 8

'
DATED this /

9

day of

~f

'2012.

APPROVED:

Attorney for Claimant

THOMAS W. CALLERY, Attorney for
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund

STIPULATION Al'!l> AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 9

ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE
UPONLUMPSUMPAYMENT
The foregoing Stipulation and Agreement having duly and regularly come before this
Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and the Claimant, TRUDY DEON, are
and will be served by approving said Agreement and granting the Order of Discharge as prayed
for,
NOW THEREFORE, said foregoing Stipulation and Agreement shall be, and th.e same is,
hereby APPROVED.
Further, said Petition shall be and hereby is GRANTED, and the above-entitled
·proceedings are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this ~"--day of

/Jd.J~Ol2.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION \___

Member

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the S day of ·"1UV~~2012, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be served upon:
·

~
THOMAS W~ CALLERY
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. D
P.O. BOX 854.
D
LEWISTON, ID 83501
STEPHEN J. NEMEC
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Q/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D
Hand Delivered
D
Facsimile

~ U.S.Mail
JAMES F. KILE
Hand Delivered
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND D
Facsimile
P".O. BOX 83720
0
BOISE, ID 83 720-7901

by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last kno~'ll address as set forth above.
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I

JAMES. VERNON & "\llTEEKS, P.A.
'

I

1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone No. 208-6671-0683
Facsimile No. 208-664-;l 684
I

StephenJ Nemec ISBAI# 7591
Artorneyfor Claimant

~EFORE THE U'l'l)USTRIAL COMN.IISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
I

TRlJDY DEOf,
i

Claimant,

I

vs.

:

H&J INC., d/b;a BEST VVESTERN COEUR!
D' A..LENE fr,fN & C01'.TFERENCE
i
CRJ'\TER.
I

I

I
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-

•

and

Employer,

CASE NO.: 2007-005950
2008-032836
MOTION FOR MODIFICATION
OF ISIF SETTLE:M:ENT
AGREEMENTPURSUA~TTO

I.C. §72-719(3)

I

LIBERTY NOfzTff\VEST lNSlJRANCE
CO.,
I
I
I

Surety,

Defendants.

I
I

COMES NOW,jClaimant, by and through her attomey of record, Stepheo J. Nemec of the
firm James, Vernon

~

Weeks, P.A. and hereby requests that ti':te ISIF settlement agreement

approved by the Com4ssion on November 8, 2012 be modified pursuant to I.C. §72-719(3) on

the grounds of manifesi injustice.

I
I
I
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07/26/2013

I

11 43 [D:

0

451

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone No. 208-667-0683
Facsimile No. 208-664-1684
'::' r .

Stephen J Nemec !SBA# 7591
Attorney for Claimant
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BEFORE THE LNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,

I
Claimant,

CASE NO.: 2007-005950
2008-032836

vs.
I

H&J INC., d/b/a BEST \VESTERN COEUR
D' ALENE IN'N & CONFERENCE
CENTER,

1

MOTION FOR MODIFICATION
OF ISIF SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO
J.C. §72-719(3)

Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHVv'EST INSUR.l\.L"l\JCE
CO.,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through her attorney of record, Stephen J. Nemec of the
firm James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. and hereby requests that the ISIF settlement agreement
approved by the Commission on November 8, 2012 be modified pursuant to LC. §72-719(3) on
the grounds of manifest injustice.

MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF ISIF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO LC. §72-719(3)-1

I.

SUMMARY

On May 3, 2013 the Industrial Commission concluded that the Claimant was totally and
permanently disabled under the Lethrud test. The Commission further stated that apportionment
pursuant to LC. §72-406 and the Carey formula was inappropriate which in turn rendered the
employer and surety ("defendants") 100% liable for the Claimant's benefits. On May 3, 2013,
the Commission also entered a notice of reconsideration which appeared to implicate the
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. Following a teleconference on May 29, 2013 setting a
briefing schedule, both parties submitted opening and reply briefs in June and July of 2013
respectively.
In reviewing the defendants' briefing following the notice of reconsideration, it would
appear that the defendants seek to profit from the Claimant's settlement with the ISIF and pay
the Claimant a small fraction of her damages stemming from the industrial accident. As neither
the ISIF nor the Claimant intended the ISIF settlement to have any collateral estoppel effect with
respect to the defendants, the Commission is free to modify the ISIF settlement in the interests of
correcting a manifest injustice should the Commission be inclined to accept the defendants
arguments. Modifying the ISIF settlement agreement will render the prior briefing following the
notice of reconsideration moot.
II.

DISCUSSION

A. THE ISIF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION
PURSUANT TO LC. §72-719(3) TO CORRECT A MANIFEST INJUSTICE

Idaho Code provides for the modification of a settlement agreement approved by the
Industrial Commission by means of LC. §72-719(3). See Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho, 9, 12, 644
P. 2d 331, 334 (1982). Specifically, LC. §72-719(3) states as follows:

MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF ISIF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO LC. §72-719(3)-2

The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the date of
accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, may
review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice. Id.
"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood or recognized at once
by the mind; not obscure; obvious. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. Sines v.
Appel, 103 Idaho, 9, 13, 644 P. 2d 331, 335 (1982). "Injustice" has been defined to mean:

absence of justice, violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an unjust act
or deed; ·wrong. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. Id. The Court has held
that the Commission may review any order to correct a manifest injustice, even when a purported
manifest injustice is brought to the Commission's attention by either party or a third party. Page
v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, I 79 P.3d 265 (2008).

In this case, the defendants will owe the Claimant approximately $56,086.26 in total
permanent disability benefits for the period of time from November 18, 2009 thru August 31,
2013. (See Torelli Report, pg. 3). From September 1, 2013 through the remainder of Claimant's
life expectancy in February 28, 2039, Claimant will be entitled to approximately $587.923.08 in
future total permanent disability benefits. Id. at 6. If the Commission determines that the ISIF
settlement agreement has a collateral estoppel impact limiting the amount the defendants owe,
the result will be a profit of over $500,000.00 to the defendants.
The defendants have not provided any consideration to the Claimant for this windfall
they seek to obtain. Should the Commission accept the untimely affirmative defenses now being
raised for the first time following an adjudication on the merits, the Claimant will be left to spend
the rest of her life subsisting on a net income of $820.40/month in Social Security benefits. (CL
Ex. 2, pg. 26). This is precisely the type of situation LC. §72-719(3) was created to remedy.

MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF ISIF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PlJRSUANT TO LC.

719(3)-3

III.

CONCLUSION

To prevent a manifest injustice the ISIF settlement agreement should be modified to
delete any reference to the Carey formula and add a paragraph stating that:
The Industrial Commission recognizes that the purpose of this settlement agreement
is to resolve a disputed claim between the Claimant and the ISIF. This Order is not
intended to have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect benefiting the employer or
surety.

In Red Lion ]vfotor Inn Riverside v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 122 Idaho 464, 466, 835
P.2d 1275, 1277 (1992) an agreement with similar language was approved by the Commission,
and should be approved here as well. Modifying the ISIF settlement agreement in this fashion
will allow liability to rest with the defendants where it belongs.

Should the Commission

determine that additional language be added/redacted to the ISIF settlement agreement to prevent a
manifest injustice, the Commission is urged to do so.

DATED this 26th day of July, 2013.

JA.MES, VER."l\ION & WEEKS, P.A.
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Surety.
Defendants.
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)
) SS

State of Idaho

)

I, Stephen J. Nemec, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and says:

1.)

I am the Attorney of Record for the above-named Claimant and have
personal knowJedge of the facts stated in this Affidavit.

2.)

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the report of Dr.
Torelli examining the time Joss benefits owed to the Claimant.

3.)

Further your affiant sayeth naught.
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Surety,
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State of Idaho

)
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1.)

I am the Attorney of Record for the above-named Claimant and have
personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Affidavit.

2.)

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the report of Dr.
Torelli examining the time loss benefits owed to the Claimant.

3.)

Further your affiant sayeth naught.
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QUANTITATIVE
SOCIAL SCIENCE

Dr. Paul A. Torelli
Chief Economist
Quantitative Social Science
2600 2nd Avenue, Suite 2204
Seattle WA 98121

Mr. Steve Nemec
Attorney-at-Law
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur D'Alene ID 83814

Time Loss Benefits to Trudy Deon of Idaho State
Dear Mr. Nemec,
You have requested an analysis of the value of Ms. Trudy Deon's time loss benefits from 2009 through
her life expectancy. I received two files from your offices: the Idaho Workers' Compensation Benefits
Table, which shows the Average State Wage (ASW) from 2000 to 2013, and the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order given by the Idaho Industrial Commission in this matter, dated May 3,
2013. 1 In performing this analysis, I utilized publicly available information listed in footnotes. I
reserve the right to update this analysis if additional information becomes available in the future.
My Qualifications and Background

I am Chief Economist at Quantitative Social Science LLC (QSS), a Seattle-based consulting firm that
provides objective expert economic and statistical analysis for complex litigation and public policy
debates. I received my B.A. magna cum laude with distinction in Economics and Pure Mathematics
from the University of California at Berkeley, graduating as the top student in the Department of
Economics. Later I completed M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Economics from Harvard University on a
National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship. My background as a professional economist has
focused on the empirical measurement of social forces using the techniques of econometrics and
statistics, and in the past, I have provided economic analyses in a wide variety of litigation matters,
including damages calculations and liability determinations.
1

LC. 2007-005950 and LC. 2008-032836.
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Discounting to Present Value

Any present day award can be prudently invested in essentially risk-free securities that yield a positive
rate of return, so future economic loss should be deflated (or discounted) according to current risk-free
interest rates. I base discount rates on United States Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS),
which provide a real (or inflation-adjusted) rate of return that is fixed at the time of auction. The
advantages of TIPS as a safe vehicle for long-term savings that provides protection from inflation risk
are summarized in a recent study by prominent financial economists:
"Because expected inflation varies over time, long-term nominal Treasury bonds are not
safe in real terms; and because short-term real interest rates vary over time, Treasury bills
are not safe assets for long-term investors. Inflation-indexed bonds fill this gap by
offering a truly riskless long-term investment." 2
Panel A of Exhibit 1 displays real interest rates, yields, and prices at auction for longer-term TIPS (of at
least nine years) during US Treasury auctions in 2012 and 2013. Panel B shows average rates on these
TIPS by term of security. 3 Panel C, as a comparison, displays average real returns on US Treasury
Bonds in the post-World War II period. 4
The recent average real rate during 2012 and 2013 among TIPS of at least a nine year maturity at
auction is 0.3%. However, as Exhibit 1 clearly shows, these bonds have been selling at well above par
in 2012 and 2013. While the fixed real rate does not reflect the fact that each dollar of longer-term
TIPS bonds has been selling for significantly more than one dollar, the yield does incorporate the
above-par sales price. Accordingly, I utilize the average yield of -0.1 % among long-term term TIPS,
shown in Panel B, to discount future income streams to present value. 5 Based on an assumed 2013
hearing date, discounting commences in 2014. 6 Furthermore, I assume a future expected inflation rate
of 2.3%, as according to the most recent Philadelphia Federal Reserve Survey of Professional
Forecasters. 7 Since, by definition, the total (or nominal) discount rate is equal to the real discount rate
2

Page I of Campbell, John, Shiller, Robert, and Luis Viceira, "Understanding Inflation-Indexed Bond Markets," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009. Campbell is Professor of Economics at Harvard, Shiller is Professor of
Economics at Yale, and Viceira is Professor at the Harvard Business School.
3
Data on TIPS auctions are available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/Rl/OFAuctions?form=histQuery, last accessed May
7, 2013.
4
From Table 1-2 of Siegel, Jeremy, Stocks for the Long Run, New York City: McGraw-Hill, 4th Edition, 2008, a well
respected reference volume for investors. Siegel is Professor of Finance at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania. Long-term bonds, which averaged a real return of 1.6%, are comparable to the TIPS notes and bonds
shown in Panels A and B.
5
In other words, based on current market rates at auction, I assume that the award is invested in a bundle of long-term TIPS
notes and bonds that will yield a future real return of -0.1 %.
6
No prejudgment interest is included.
7
See http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professionalforecasters/2013/survq 113.cfm, last accessed May 7, 2013.
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plus expected inflation, I therefore assume a total discount rate of -0.1 % + 2.3% = 2.2% below.
Value of Past and Future Time Loss Benefits

Ms. Trudy Deon was born on
According to the most recent Social Security
Administration (SSA) Actuarial Life Tables for 2007, 57 year old American females can expect to live
another 26.53 years on average, indicating a natural life span through age 57 + 26.53 = 83.53. 8 Thus,
Ms. Deon's life expectancy extends approximately through the end of February 2039.
My understanding is that Ms. Deon is owed time loss benefits at 45% of the ASW during two distinct
time periods. The first period is from November 18, 2009 through August 31, 2013; in addition, there
is a mitigation amount of $2,039.40 that should be subtracted from the total payment. Exhibit 2
presents her time loss benefits over the first period. The benefits value in column six is equal to
column four multiplied by column five. The net value from 2009 to 2013 comes to $56,086.26.
The second period is from September 1, 2013 to her life expectancy, which extends through February
28, 2039. Exhibit 3 displays her time loss benefits over the second period. From 2000 to 2013, the
ASW has grown by 2.8% each year on average; 9 after 2013, I assume that the ASW will continue to
grow by 2.8% each year. As in Exhibit 2, the Exhibit 3 column six benefits value is equal to column
four multiplied by column five. In column seven, the present discounted value (PDV) of the benefits
value is calculated under a 2.2% discount rate. From September 1, 2013 through February 28, 2039,
Ms. Deon's benefits total $435,281.28 in present discounted value.
If there are any questions regarding this report, I can be reached by telephone at (206) 384-7072 or via

email at torelli@quantitativesocialscience.com.

Dr. Paul A. Torelli
Quantitative
Science LLC
Seattle, Washington
July 22°d, 2013

8
9

The SSA tables are available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html, last accessed May 7, 2013.
The calculation is ($674.00 I $471.00)" (1I13) = 1.02795.

Page 3

Exhibit 1: Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) of At Least 9 Year Term, 2012 and 2013
Panel A: TIPS At Auction
Year
2013
2013
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2013
2012
2012
2012

Type
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
Bond
Bond
Bond
Bond

Type
Note
Bond
All

Term
9 Year 10 Month
10 Year
9 Year 8 Month
9 Year 10 Month
10 year
9 Year 8 Month
9 Year 10 Month
10 Year
30 Year
29 Year 4 Month
29 Year 8 Month
30 Year

Term
About 10 Years
20 or 30 Years
10, 20, or 30 Years

Auction Date
3/21/13
1/24/13
11/21/12
9/20/12
7/19/12
5/17/12
3/22/12
1/19/12
2/21/13
10/18/12
6/21/12
2/16/12

Issue Date
3/28/13
1/31/13
11/30/12
9/28/12
7/31/12
5/31/12
3/30/12
1/31/12
2/28/13
10/31/12
6/29/12
2/29/12

Interest Rate %
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.125
0.625
0.75
0.75
0.75

Panel B: Average Rates on TIPS At Auction
Period
Average Interest Rate %
2012&2013
2012 & 2013
2012 & 2013

0.1
0.7
0.3

Yield%
-0.60
-0.63
-0.72
-0.75
-0.64
-0.39
-0.09
-0.05
0.64
0.48
0.52
0.77

Price Per $100
$107.0580
$107.5059
$109.1019
$108.5228
$107.7797
$106.4586
$102.2260
$101.6618
$99.4942
$109.4780
$108.2268
$99.3473

Average Yield %
-0.5
0.6
-0.1

Average Price Per $100
$106.29
$104.14
$105.57

Panel C: Averaae Real Returns on US Bonds Since World War II
Average Real Rate of Return on Short-Term US Government Bonds, 1946-2006:
Averaae Real Rate of Return on Lona-Term US Government Bonds, 1946-2006:

0.6
1.6

Note: Data on TIPS at auction is from the US Treasury web site at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/Rl/OFAuctions?form=histOuery. Yield may be below
interest rates because the price at auction may be above par (at $100). The average real return on government bonds during 1946-2006 is taken from Table
1-2 of Stocks for the Long Run by Professor Jeremy Siegel of the University of Pennsylvania (4th Edition, 2008).

Exhibit 2: Past Time Loss Benefits to Trudy Deon
- Loss Period from November 18, 2009 through August 31, 2013 - No Prejudgment Interest Included -

Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Age
54
55
56
57
58

Period Start
(1)
11/18/2009
1/1/2010
1/1/2011
1/1/2012
1/1/2013

Period End
(2)
12/31/2009
12/31/2010
12/31/2011
12/31/2012
8/31/2013

Period Days
(3)
44
365
365
366
243

Note: ASW taken from Idaho Workers' Compensation Benefits Table.

Period Weeks
(4)
6.29
52.14
52.14
52.29
34.71

45% of ASW (Weekly)
(5)
$286.20
$289.35
$290.70
$297.45
$303.30

Benefits
(6)
$1,798.97
$15,087.54
$15,157.93
$15,552.39
$10,528.84

Total:
Deduction:
Net:

$58,125.66
$2,039.40
$56,086.26

Exhibit 3: Future Time Loss Benefits to Trudy Deon
- Loss Period from September 1, 2013 through February 28, 2039- Discount Rate of 2.2% -

Year
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039

Age
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Period Start
(1)
9/1/2013
1/1/2014
1/1/2015
1/1/2016
1/1 /2017
1/1/2018
1/1/2019
1/1/2020
1/1 /2021
1/1/2022
1/1/2023
1/1/2024
1/1/2025
1/1/2026
1/1/2027
1/1/2028
1/1/2029
1/1/2030
1/1/2031
1/1/2032
1/1 /2033
1/1/2034
1/1/2035
1/1/2036
1/1/2037
1/1 /2038
1/1/2039

Period End
(2)
12/31/2013
12/31/2014
12/31/2015
12/31/2016
12/31/2017
12/31/2018
12/31/2019
12/31/2020
12/3112021
12/31/2022
12/31/2023
12/31/2024
12/31/2025
12/31/2026
12/31/2027
12/31/2028
12/31/2029
12/31/2030
12/31/2031
12/31/2032
12/31/2033
12/31/2034
12/31/2035
12/31/2036
12/31/2037
12/31/2038
2/28/2039

Period Davs
(3)
122
365
365
366
365
365
365
366
365
365
365
366
365
365
365
366
365
365
365
366
365
365
365
366
365
365
59

Period Weeks
(4)
17.43
52.14
52.14
52.29
52.14
52.14
52.14
52.29
52.14
52.14
52.14
52.29
52.14
52.14
52.14
52.29
52.14
52.14
52.14
52.29
52.14
52.14
52.14
52.29
52.14
52.14
8.43

45% of ASW (Weekly)
(5)
$303.30
$311.78
$320.49
$329.45
$338.66
$348.12
$357.85
$367.86
$378.14
$388.71
$399.57
$410.74
$422.22
$434.02
$446.15
$458.62
$471 .44
$484.62
$498.16
$512.09
$526.40
$541.11
$556.24
$571.79
$587.77
$604.20
$621.08

Benefits
(6)
$5,286.09
$16,256.96
$16,711.36
$17,225.51
$17,658.60
$18,152.16
$18,659.53
$19,233.62
$19,717.19
$20,268.30
$20,834.81
$21,475.83
$22,015.78
$22,631.13
$23,263.68
$23,979.43
$24,582.32
$25,269.41
$25,975.71
$26,774.90
$27,448.07
$28,215.26
$29,003.89
$29,896.25
$30,647.90
$31,504.53
$5,234.85

POV of Benefits
(7)
$5,286.09
$15,907.01
$15,999.63
$16, 136.88
$16, 186.49
$16,280.73
$16,375.53
$16,516.00
$16,566.77
$16,663.23
$16,760.25
$16,904.03
$16,955.99
$17,054.72
$17,154.02
$17,301.17
$17,354.36
$17,455.40
$17,557.04
$17,707.64
$17,762.08
$17,865.50
$17,969.52
$18,123.67
$18, 179.39
$18,285.24
$2,972.91

Total:

$587,923.08

$435,281.28

Note: ASW is assumed to grow by 2.795% each year after 2013. 'POV' stands for present discounted value. Discounting begins in 2014 based on 2013 hearing date.

Joseph M. Wager (ISB 8445)
LAW OFFICES OF KENTW. DAY
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
Telephone (208) 895-2583
Fax(800)972-3213
Employees of the Uberly Mutual Group
Attorneys for Defendants

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Trudy Deon,
Claimant,

v.
H & J Hospitality, Inc., d/b/a Best Western
Coeur d'Alene Inn,
Employer,
and
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp.,

) I. C. No.: 2008-032836
) I. C. No.: 2007-005950
)
) DEFENDANTS'RESPONSE
) TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
) FOR MODIFICATION OF ISIF
) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Surety,

)
)

Defendants.

)
)

COME NOW Defendants, H & J Hospitality, Inc., d/b/a Best Western Coeur
d'Alene Inn, Employer, and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation, Surety, by and
through their attorney of record, Joseph M. Wager, and respectfully submit Defendants'
Response To Claimant's Motion For Modification Of ISIF Settlement Agreement in the
above-referenced matter.

1 - DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
ISIF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

I.
INTRODUCTION
In response to the Commission's invitation, Defendants and Claimant submitted
opening and reply briefs on the impact of the LSA between Claimant and ISIF on the
Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law rendered May 3, 2013.

By

Order of the Commission all briefing was to be completed by July 19, 2013. Subsequent
to the Commission's briefing deadline, however, Claimant filed her Motion For
Modification Of ISIF Settlement Agreement Pursuant To l.C. §72-719(3), (hereinafter
"Claimant's Motion to Modify"), on July 26, 2013, asserting that the LSA entered into
between ISIF and Claimant on October 19, 2012, and approved by the Commission on
November 8, 2012, should now be modified on the grounds of "manifest injustice."
Specifically, Claimant contends that Defendants "seek to profit from the Claimant's
settlement with the ISIF and pay the Claimant a small fraction of her damages
stemming from the industrial accident." Claimant's Motion To Modify: p. 2.

For the

reasons discussed below, Defendants object to Claimant's Motion for Modification and
respectfully request that said Motion be stricken from the record.

II.
ARGUMENT

A.

Under the plain language of I. C. § 72-719 (3), the discretionary review of an
agreement to correct a manifest injustice is to be raised by motion of the
Industrial Commission
Claimant filed a Motion For Modification Of ISIF Settlement Agreement Pursuant

To l.C. §72-719 (3). Idaho Code provides for the review of an award or agreement to
determine the existence of a manifest injustice. If such issue is raised, the plain

2 - DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
ISIF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

language of the statute is clear that it is to be done upon motion made by the
Commission. I. C. §72-719 (3) states:
The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the
date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an
occupational disease may review a case in order to correct a manifest
injustice.
Idaho Code, Section §72-719(3). (Emphasis added). In contrast however, the statutory
opportunity for a party in interest, such as Claimant, to make application to the
Commission for review of an award or agreement, is governed by l.C. §72-719( 1),
which provides:
On application made by a party in interest filed with the commission at any
time within five (5) years of the date of the accident causing the injury or
date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, on the ground of a
change in conditions, the commission may, but not oftener than once in
six (6) months, review any order, agreement or award upon any of the
following grounds:
(a)
Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or
disablement; or
(b)
Fraud.
Idaho Code, Section §72-719( 1). (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, Claimant alleges neither a change in the nature or extent of
her injury/disablement nor the existence of fraud.

Rather, Claimant requests

modification of the LSA on the grounds of manifest injustice. Claimant's Motion To
Modify, p. 1, (emphasis added). Based upon the plain language of the statute, however,
the legislature has not authorized Claimant to raise this issue. As Claimant has filed a
motion for which she clearly has no standing, it appears Claimant's "motion" is actually
an attempt to submit additional evidence and arguments beyond the briefing previously
ordered by the Commission.

3- DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
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While the Commission itself is not precluded from raising this issue upon being
brought to its attention, the statutory language clearly articulates that the only available
procedural process for so doing is for the Commission to raise the issue sua sponte.
Banzhaf v. Carnation Co., 104 Idaho 700, 703, 662 P.2d 1144, 1147 (1983).
Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request that Claimant's Motion to Modify be
stricken from the record in the absence of the Commission raising this issue upon its
own motion.
B.

Should the Commission ultimately decide to review the LSA sua sponte,
ISIF must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In the event that the Commission determines that the LSA requires review for

manifest injustice, it should be noted that ISIF has thus far been silent on the issue.
The Commission's Notice of Reconsideration and accompanying invitation for briefing
was directed only to Claimant and Employer/Surety. Notice of Reconsideration, p. 1.
However, the issue now raised by Claimant in her Motion to Modify concerns Claimant's
request to modify the approved LSA between Claimant and /S/F. Claimant's Motion to
Modify, p. 1. As a party to the LSA, ISIF must be afforded notice of and an opportunity
to brief and be heard on the issue now raised by the Claimant. As stated by the Idaho
Supreme Court in an appeal taken from an order of the Industrial Commission denying
employment benefits:
Right to procedural due process guaranteed under State and United
States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process
by given meaningful notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Van Heukelom v. Pine Crest Psychiatric Center and State of Idaho, Department of
Employment, 106 Idaho, 898, 900, 684 P.2d 300, 302 (1984), (quoting Rudd v. Rudd,
105 Idaho 112, 113, 666 P.2d 639, 642 (1983). Should the Commission determine that
4 - DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
ISIF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

the LSA requires review and raise such issue on it's own motion, such review should
not be undertaken until ISIF, a party to the agreement under review, has been afforded
the same such rights that have been afforded to Claimant and Employer/Surety.

C.

Should the Commission ultimately decide to review the LSA sua sponte,
Claimant's suggested modification represents a manifest injustice by
enabling Claimant to side step the well established doctrine of collateral
estoppel.

It is undisputed that the Idaho Supreme Court has articulated the broad
construction and definition for which a manifest injustice is measured:
"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood
or recognized at once by the mind; not obscure; obvious .... "Injustice" has
been defined to mean: absence of justice; violation of right or of the rights
of another; iniquity; unfairness; an unjust act or deed; wrong. Sines v.
Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 13, 644 P.2d 331, 335 (1982)

Claimant makes the argument that it is manifest injustice to hold her to the
allegations and stipulated apportionments that she made willfully while inducing the ISIF
into a lump sum settlement.

Claimant seeks to retroactively introduce terms into a

settlement contract that will enable her to argue conflicting apportionments for the same
set of circumstances without regard to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Claimant has
provided you with a highly technical explanation as to the value of the total permanent
benefit. See Torelli Report.

However, the fact remains that the Claimant deliberately

and purposefully alleged that her total permanent disability was due to the combined
result of her industrial accident and her pre-existing conditions. See LSA. Claimant
agreed to settled 60% of her total disability award for a lump sum payment of $70,000.

See LSA.

The Commission is tasked determined that the medical evidence

substantiate the resolution reached before approving an LSA with the ISIF. Wernecke v.
5- DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
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St. Maries Joint School District #401, 147 Idaho 277, 286, 207 P.3d 1008, 1017 (2009).

Claimant now brings the argument that to hold her to that agreement would be
manifest injustice.

Claimant has made no allegation that she intends to rectify the

unjust enrichment that would be created by allowing her to retroactively modify the
terms of there lump sump agreement with the ISIF. See Claimant's Motion for
Modification of ISIF Settlement Pursuant to l.C. 72-719(3). Claimant does not allege
fraud that induced her into accepting the award nor that she was fraudulently induced
into the stipulated apportionment of ISIF liability. See Claimant's Motion for Modification
of ISIF Settlement Pursuant to l.C. 72-719(3).
Claimant is now asking you to find manifest injustice in the face of being held to a
lump sum agreement that was bargained for and resolved upon her own allegations and
that of her counsel. The true manifest injustice is to enable the Claimant to merely side
step the long standing principle of collateral estoppel in the absence of any clear
injustice.

Ill.
CONCLUSION
Employer/Surety asks for the Commission to strike Claimant's Motion from the
record as being an additional briefing in volition of the Order Setting Briefing dated May
30, 2013.
If the Commission raises this issue of manifest injustice upon its own motion in
accordance with l.C. 72-719(3), all parties should receive the benefit of proper notice
and the benefit of a briefing schedule.
Lastly,

in

the event the

Commission

acts on

Claimant's

motion,

the

6- DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
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Employer/Surety argues that the true manifest manifest injustice is created to the extent
Claimant's Motion for Modification is for the sole purpose of assuring her own unjust
enrichment, rather than correcting a clear miscarriage of justice.
DATED this

1~

day of August, 2013.
LAW OFFICES OF KENTW. DAY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
......~
I hereby certify that on the I
day of August, 2013, I caused a copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following by first class mail, postage prepaid:

Stephen J. Nemec
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Thomas W. Callery
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
JONES, BRO\VER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P. 0. Box 854
Le-vviston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553
tcallery@Jewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMJvfISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TRUDY DEON,
Claimant,

)
) Case No.: I. C. 2007-005950
)
I. C. 2008-032836
)

vs.

)
)

H.AGADONE HOSPITALITY,
Employer,

)
) RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
) TO MODIFY LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
)

LIBERTY NORTH\VEST INSURANCE CO.,~

I l ED

Surety, and

)
)
STATE OF IDAHO Th:'UUSTRlAL SPECIAL )
D<DEMNITY FlJl\D,
)
Defendants.

)
)

Comes now the Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO INuUSTRJAL SPECIAL JNDE:MNITY
FlJt\"'D, by and through its attorney of record, THOMAS W. CALLERY of Jones, Brower and
Callery, P.L.L.C. and hereby responds to the Claimant's motion for modification of ISIF
Settlement Agreement pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3) to correct a manifest injustice and
responds as follows.
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Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P. 0. Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553
tcallery@lewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TRUDY DEON,
Claimant,
vs.

)
) Case No.: I. C. 2007-005950
)
I. C. 2008-032836
)
)
)

HAGADONE HOSPITALITY,

)
) RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
Employer,
) TO l\'IODIFY LUMP SUM AGREEl\1ENT
)
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CO.,)
)

Surety, and

)
)
STA TE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL)
INDEMNITY FUND,

Comes now the Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY
FUND, by and through its attorney of record, THOMAS W. CALLERY of Jones, Brower and
Callery, P.L.L.C. and hereby responds to the Claimant's motion for modification of ISIP
Settlement Agreement pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3) to correct a manifest injustice and
responds as follows.
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1.

IDAHO CODE§ 72-719 DOES NOT APPLY TO LUMP SUM
AGREEMENTS.

The Claimant is requesting modification of the Lump Sum Agreement with the State of
Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund based upon Idaho Code § 72-719 which allows the
Commission, within five (5) years of the date of the accident, to review a case in order to correct
a manifest injustice. Idaho Code 72-719 states:
72-719. Modification of awards and agreements -- Grounds -- Time within which
made. (1) On application made by a party in interest filed with the commission at
any time within five (5) years of the date of the accident causing the injury or date
of first manifestation of an occupational disease, on the ground of a change in
conditions, the commission may, but not oftener than once in six (6) months,
review any order, agreement or award upon any of the following grounds:
(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disablement; or
(b) Fraud.
(2) The commission on such review may make an award ending, diminishing or
increasing the compensation previously agreed upon or awarded, subject to the
maximum and minimum provided in this law, and shall make its findings of fact,
rulings of law and order or award, file the same in the office of the commission,
and immediately send a copy thereof to the parties.
(3) The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the
date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an
occupational disease, may review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice.
(4) This section shall not apply to a commutation of pavments under section 72404[, Idaho Code].
Emphasis added.
Idaho Code § 72-404 authorizes lump sum payments and discharge of liability pursuant
thereto. Idaho Code § 72-719 by its explicit terms cannot be used as a basis to modify a Lump
Sum Agreement. The terms of the Lump Sum Agreement in the present case cannot be modified
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-719(3).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that an approved Lump Sum Agreement is final
and may not be modified absent proof of fraud:
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However, once a lump sum compensation agreement is approved by the
commission, that agreement becomes an award and is final and may not be
reopened or set aside absent allegations and proof of fraud. I.C. Sec. 72-718;
Fountain v. T. Y & Jim Hom, 92 Idaho 928, 453 P.2d 577 (1969); Vogt v. Hlestern
Geneal Dairies, 110 Idaho 782, 718 P.2d 1220 (1986).
Since, in the present case, the compensation award was made by means of a lump
sum agreement, the commission correctly held that Harmons' allegations of
manifest injustice were insufficient, even if proven, to permit the commission to
set aside the agreement. Thus, we find claimant's arguments on appeal that the
commission erred in so holding to be without merit.
Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co.Jnc., 112 Idaho 291 (1986).

2.

A MANIFEST INJUSTICE DID NOT OCCURR.

This case involved a claim by the Claimant, Trudy Deon, against both her employer and
the State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. After the initial complaint against the
employer and surety was filed, the Claimant added a claim against the Idaho Special Indemnity
Fund contending that a prior cervical spine injury and a left lower extremity injury combined
with her 2008 right hand and wrist injury rendering her totally and pennanently disabled. By
filing her complaint against the Fund, the Claimant alleged she was totally and permanently
disabled based on a combination of pre-existing impairments and her 2008 accident.
The Claimant requested a mediation which was conducted by Industrial Commission
Mediator, Dennis Burks. At the mediation the Claimant and the ISIF agreed to enter into a
Lump Sum Settlement for $70,000.00. The Claimant did not settle with employer and surety and
ultimately that claim went to Hearing. Prior to any decision on the employer/surety case, the
Lump Sum Agreement was signed by all parties and approved by the Idaho Industrial
Commission with the signature of two Commissioners. The Lump Sum Agreement was filed
with the Commission on November 8, 2012 and the claimant received the $70,000.00 cash
settlement shortly thereafter.
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The Lump Sum Agreement included specific language required by Wernecke v. St.
1\laries Joint School District, 147 Idaho 277. The Lump Sum Agreement noted that the Claimant

had prior physical impairments, including a seven percent whole person impairment for her
lower extremity injury and a six percent whole person impairment for her cervical injury.
Further, the Lump Sum Agreement stated that the Claimant was totally and permanently
disabled based upon the combined effect of Claimant's pre-existing cervical spine injury and her
left lower leg injury combined with her 2008 right hand and wrist injury. The Agreement also
expressly stipulated a 60/40 CAREY apportionment between the ISIF and the employer.
The Industrial Commission ultimately found after Hearing that the Claimant was totally
and permanently disabled solely as a result of the last accident involving the employer which
directly contradicts the Lump Sum Agreement.
The Claimant now argues that the Lump Sum Agreement should not have res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect so as to impact or reduce the Claimant's right to the total disability
benefits from the employer and surety based on the Industrial Commission's authority to correct
a manifest injustice.
"Manifest has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood or
recognized at once by the mind; not obscure; obvious. Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho
9, 13, 644 P.2d 331, 335 (1982). "Injustice" has been defined to mean: absence
of justice; violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an
unjust act or deed; wrong. Id. Therefore, a decision that results in manifest
injustice would be a decision that is obviously unfair or unjust, one that deprives a
party of a legal right or remedy to which he or she is entitled. In the context of
workers' compensation, an example of a manifestly unjust decision would be one
that deprives a claimant of benefits that she is obviously entitled to receive.
Troutwine v. Alliant Tech Systems, (2010) IIC 0351.
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In the Lump Sum Agreement, the Claimant agreed to accept a cash settlement in
exchange for giving up her right to a monthly lifetime annuity and the Agreement \Vas
specifically drafted to reflect that desire:
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge and agree that the $70,000.00 lump
sum to be paid to Claimant under the terms of this agreement constitutes
compensation on a claim of total and permanently disability that will affect
Claimant for the rest of her life.
WHEREAS, the Claimant has financial needs that currently exist that
would be satisfied by a lump sum payment as opposed to statutory monthly
payments.

Stipulation and Agreement ofLump Sum Discharge and Order ofApproval and Discharge, p. 4.
The decision to accept a cash payment was made by the Claimant in consultation with her
legal counsel.
WHEREAS, the decision to accept a lump sum, as opposed to a monthly
annuity, has been made after consulting by Claimant with her legal counsel,
including consideration of the Claimant's need for immediate cash and that
monthly annuity payments cease upon death without survivor benefits.

Stipulation and Agreement ofLump Sum Discharge and Order ofApproval and Discharge, p. 5.
Finally the claimant was well aware that she had a remaining statistical average life
expectancy of approximately 27 years.
9. The parties acknowledge and agree that the $70,000.00 lump sum to be
paid to Claimant under the terms of this agreement constitutes compensation for
total and permanent disability that will affect Claimant the rest of her life.
Claimant's remaining life expectancy is 27 years or 324 months according to the
2007 Social Security Actuarial Life Table.

Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and Order ofApproval and Discharge, p. 7.
It is clear that under the facts of this case the Claimant has not suffered a manifest

injustice. Quite the contrary, she obtained a cash settlement knowing full well that she was
compromising her right to a potential lifetime monthly annuity if she was found totally disabled
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in exchange for the certainty and benefit of receiving immediate cash. There is nothing unfair or
unjust about the Agreement.
Without knowing the potential social security offset issues involved, the Claimant's need
for immediate cash, and Claimant's actual life span as opposed to a statistical average life span,
it was and remains in all likelihood, in her best interest to have taken the lump sum as opposed to
a monthly annuity.

If a manifest injustice exists it is the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund that is the injured
party under the peculiar facts of this case.

SUMMARY
Idaho Code § 72- 719 cannot be used as a basis to modify or amend a lump sum
agreement approved by the Idaho Industrial Commission as the section specifically excludes
lump sum agreements from the reach of Idaho Code § 72- 719.

The Idaho Supreme Court has

held on more than one occasion that a lump sum agreement approved by the Commission is a
final award that may not be reopened or set aside absent allegation and proof of fraud.

In

Harmon supra the Idaho Supreme Court specifically recognized that manifest injustice cannot be
used as a basis to set aside a lump sum agreement.
Even if the Commission were to address the issue of manifest injustice, under the facts of
this case there simply is none. The Claimant filed a complaint against the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund alleging that pre-existing impairments combined with her last injury of record to
render her totally disabled. It was the Claimant herself who chose to add the Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund as a defendant in the case and the Claimant herself who detem1ined, in
consultation with her attorney, to accept a cash settlement and waive her right to a monthly
annuity. The Lump Sum Agreement is neither unfair nor inequitable or unjust in any way to the
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Claimant.

The Claimant received the cash benefit which she, with the advice of counsel,

determined was in her best interest.
The Commission should deny the Claimant's request to modify the Lump Sum
Agreement.
DATED this _-'--day of August, 2013.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

THOMAS W. CALLERY
Attorney for Defendant ISIF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l certify that on the

day of August, 2013, a trne and correct copy of the foregoing

was served by the method indicated below and addressed upon each of the following:

0
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0
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STEPHEN J. NEMEC
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1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

JOSEPH WAGER
HARMON&DAY
P.O. BOX 6358
BOISE, ID 83707-6358

li4"'

Facsimile to: 1-208-664-1684

0

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile to: 1-800-972-3213
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JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone No. 208-667-0683
Facsimile No. 208-664-1684

Stephen J Nemec .l)BA # 7591
Attorney.for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,
Claimant,

CASE NO.: 2007-005950
2008-032836

H&J INC., d/b/a BEST V/ESTERN COEUR!
D' ALENE INN & CONFERENCE
CENTER,

REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTTON FOR
MODIFICATION OF ISIF
SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO
I.C. §72-719(3)

VS.

Employer,

and

LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE

Fl

co.,
Surety,
Defendants.

COiv'fES NOW, Claimant, by and th.rough her attorney ofrecord, Stephen J. Nemec of the
finn. James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. and hereby responds to tbe employer, surety, and ISIF

arguments in opposition to modify the ISIF settlement agreement as follows:
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MOTTO~

FOR MODIFICATION OF ISW SETTLL'MENT PURSUANT TO 1.C §72-719(3) ·I
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JAMES, VERJ-JON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone No. 208-667-0683
Facsimile No. 208-664-1684

StephenJ Nemec !SBA# 7591
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,
Claimant,

CASE NO.: 2007-005950
2008-032836

H&J INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN COEUR
D' ALENE IN'N & CONFERENCE
CENTER,

REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
MODIFICATION OF ISIF
SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO
I.C. §72-719(3)

vs.

Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE

co.,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through her attorney ofrecord, Stephe~J.Nemec ofthe
-,
; ,•;

~)

firm James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. and hereby responds to the employer, ~~rety~;find ISIF
arguments in opposition to modify the ISIF settlement agreement as follows:
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I.

THE ISIF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION
PURSUANT TO J.C. §72-719(3) TO CORRECT A MANIFEST INJUSTICE

The Supreme Court cases holding that Commission approved settlement agreements may be
modified to correct manifest injustice are too numerous to list. See in part, Page v. McCain Foods,
Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008); Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995);
Matthews v. Department of Corrections, 121 Idaho 680, 827 P.2d 693, (1992); Sines v. Appel,

103 Idaho, 9, 644 P. 2d 331 (1982); Banzhaf v. Carnation Co. 104 Idaho 700, 662 P .2d 1144
(1983). It is telling that between the two briefs submitted in opposition to the motion to modify
the ISIF settlement, the closest Supreme Court case cited in support of the defendants'
proposition that a settlement cannot be modified is Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co. Inc., 112 Idaho
291, 732 P .2d 260 (1987) which discussed a motion made under a different statute. 1
In Banzhaf as in the case currently before the Commission, the Claimant had settled ·with
defendants prior to a hearing on the merits and subsequently attempted to modify the settlement
agreement. Following a hearing on the motion to modify, the Commission determined that the
Claimant was 100% disabled at the time the settlement agreement was signed and thus could
make no showing of "fraud or a change in condition" to justify modifying the settlement. Id. at
703. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's decision and noted that LC. §72-719(3)
over-rides the concept of res judicata and permitted the Commission to modify the prior
settlement agreement if necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. In the context of workers'
compensation, an example of a manifestly unjust decision would be one that deprives a claimant
of benefits that she is obviously entitled to receive. See Troutwine v. Alliant Tech Systems,
(2010) IIC 0351.

1

Claimant's motion for modification of the lSIF settlement award is made under LC. §72-719(3), not LC. §72-718 as discussed in Harmon.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF lSIF SETTLEMENT PCRSCANT TO LC. §72-719(3)-2

II.

CONCLUSION

To prevent a manifest injustice the ISIF settlement agreement should be modified to
delete any reference to the Carey formula and add a paragraph stating that:
The Industrial Commission recognizes that the purpose of this settlement agreement
is to resolve a disputed claim between the Claimant and the ISIF. This Order is not
intended to have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect benefiting the employer or
surety.

Applying the doctrine of res judicata in the form of collateral estoppel to a settlement not fully
adjudicated is contrary to the express purpose of the worker's compensation system to provide "sure
and certain relief for injured workmen." LC. §72-701. Defendants' arguments to the contrary
should be rejected and the employer/surety should be ordered to commence payment of total
permanent disability benefits immediately.

DATED this 14th day of August, 2013.

JAMES, VERNON & Vv'EEKS, P.A.

Attorney for Claimant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
14th
day
2013 a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document was served upon the following individuals by the method indicated below:
Fax: 800-972-3213
Joseph Wager
Law Offices of Kent Day
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707
Mailed
Bv Hand
Overnight Mail
Fax

Fax: 208-746-9553
Thomas W. Callery
Jones, Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed
Hand
i ht Mail
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,
Claimant,

IC 2007-005950
IC 2008-032836

v.
HAGADONE HOSPITALITY,
Employer,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
MODIFICATION OF ISIF
SETTLEMENT

and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURA.NCE
CORPORATION,
Surety,
and
ST A TE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,

The current motion before the Commission is Claimant's Motion for Modification of
ISIF Settlement Agreement Pursuant to LC. § 72-719(3) and Affidavit in Support. Defendant,
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF), filed a Response to Claimant's Motion to Modify
Lump Sum Agreement. Claimant also filed a reply.
This case has its genesis in complaints filed against Employer and ISIF in the above
entitled case.

Claimant resolved her claim with ISIF by way of a lump sum settlement

agreement which \Vas approved by the Industrial Commission on November 8, 2012.
On May 3, 2013, the Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order in this case dealing with the complaint against Employer. The Commission concluded that
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Claimant is totally and permanently disabled as a result of the subject accident alone, and that
Employer therefore bears full responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability.
Having reviewed and approved the Claimant's settlement with the ISIF, as guided by the
Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in Wernecke v. St. ]vfaries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147
Idaho 277, 207 P .3d 1008 (2009), the Commission is aware of the terms and conditions of that
settlement.

The conclusions reached in connection with Claimant's claim against

Employer/Surety implicate the need to consider the impact of the settlement with the ISIF on the
award made against Employer/Surety. Essentially, the question the Commission is concerned
with is how or whether Claimant's settlement with the ISIF affects Employer/Surety's obligation
to pay total and permanent disability benefits to Claimant as anticipated by the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. Does Claimant's settlement with the ISIF have some collateral
estoppel effect against Claimant? See, e.g., Jackman v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund,
129 Idaho 689, 931P.2d1207 (1997).
Claimant now seeks to have the settlement with ISIF modified pursuant to Idaho Code §
72-719(3) to correct a manifest injustice. Claimant argues that the lump sum settlement must be
subject to modification because if left as currently written, and if collateral estoppel applies to
the issues between Claimant and Employer, then Employer/Surety will profit by over $500,000.
Therefore, Claimant asks the Commission to add a paragraph to the settlement stating that the
settlement is not intended to have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect benefiting the
employer or surety.
ISIF argues that Idaho Code § 72-719 does not apply to settlements as set forth in Idaho
Code § 72-719(4). Further, ISIF contends that even if the Commission were to address the issue
of manifest injustice, under the facts of this case there simply is none.
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Idaho Code § 72-719 is set forth in full below.
Modification of awards and agreements -- Grounds -- Time within which made.
(1) On application made by a party in interest filed with the commission at any
time within five (5) years of the date of the accident causing the injury or date of
first manifestation of an occupational disease, on the ground of a change in
conditions, the commission may, but not oftener than once in six (6) months,
review any order, agreement or award upon any of the following grounds:
(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disablement; or
(b) Fraud.
(2) The commission on such review may make an award ending, diminishing or
increasing the compensation previously agreed upon or awarded, subject to the
maximum and minimum provided in this law, and shall make its findings of fact,
rulings oflaw and order or award, file the same in the office of the commission,
and immediately send a copy thereof to the parties.
(3) The commission, on its O\Vn motion at any time within five (5) years of the
date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an
occupational disease, may review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice.
(4) This section shall not applv to a commutation of payments under section 72404.
Emphasis added.
Subsection 4 unambiguously states that Idaho Code § 72-719 does not apply to lump sum
settlement agreements. A lump sum settlement is a final award of the Commission, and cannot
be set aside absent a showing of fraud once the appeal time has expired. Harmon v. Lute's

Const. Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 291, 732 P.2d 260 (1986).

Although certain awards may be

modified subsequent to the entry on the basis of manifest injustice, no such remedy is available
to the Commission where a dispute has been resolved through a lump sum settlement. Idaho
Code§ 72-719(4).
Claimant cites several cases in which the Idaho Supreme Court has discussed whether a
settlement agreement can be modified to correct a manifest injustice. The Commission agrees

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF ISIF SETTLEMENT - 3

that those cases exist but in the cases cited by Claimant the Court did not discuss subsection 4 of
Idaho Code § 72-719.

The Commission must apply the statute as it plainly reads.

Thus,

Claimant's Motion to Modify the ISIF Settlement Agreement pursuant to Idaho Code § 72719(3) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
~~~,:=:::::::..=:::.___,

2013.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of
l://f..
, 2013, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTi ~ FOR MODIFICATION OF ISIF
SETTLEMENT \Vas served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
STEVEN J NEMEC
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814
THOMAS W. CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON, ID 83501
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,
IC 2007-005950
IC 2008-032836

Claimant,

ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

v.

H & J, INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN COEUR
D'ALENE Il\TN & CONFERENCE CENTER,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION,
Surety,
Defendants.

This matter came before the

Commission on the

Commission's Notice of

Reconsideration pursuant to LC. § 72-718, filed May 3, 2013. Following a telephone conference
with the parties, a briefing schedule was set. Both parties filed opening briefs and reply briefs.
At issue is the question of the collateral estoppel effect, if any, of that lump sum settlement
agreement between Claimant and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) approved by the
Commission and filed on November 8, 2012. Being fully advised in the law and in the premises,
the Commission enters this Order on Reconsideration.
INTRODUCTION

Claimant suffered the subject industrial accident on or about February 9, 2007. She filed
her complaint against Employer/Surety on March 29, 2011. On or about June 9, 2011, Claimant
filed her complaint against ISIF, alleging that she was totally and permanently disabled as a
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION - 1

consequence of the combined effects of the subject accident, and certain pre-existing
impairments.

The two complaints were consolidated by order of the Industrial Commission

dated July 1, 2011. The case was set for hearing by order dated January 12, 2012. The noticed
issues included, inter alia, whether Claimant was totally and permanently disabled, whether the
ISIF bore some responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability and if so, how that
liability should be apportioned between Employer and the ISIF under the Carey formula. On or
about October 2, 2012, Claimant reached a tentative settlement with the ISIF at mediation.
Claimant's claim against Employer/Surety went to hearing as scheduled on October 16, 2012.
As of the date of hearing, the proposed lump sum settlement between Claimant and ISIF had not
been executed by the parties. That settlement was eventually executed and submitted to the
Commission for review and approval.

The Commission approved the lump sum between

Claimant and ISIF on or about November 8, 2012. That document is worthy of further review.
The settlement identifies two pre-existing conditions, a left lower extremity injury and a
cervical spine injury. The settlement specifies that Claimant was given a 7% PPI rating for the
pre-existing lower extremity injury.

The settlement reflects some ambiguity, however,

concerning the extent and degree of Claimant's impairment from her pre-existing cervical spine
condition: Following an independent medical evaluation Claimant was awarded a 6% PPI rating
for her cervical spine condition.

However, the settlement also specifies that other medical

providers, notably Dr. Sears, determined that Claimant suffered no ratable impairment for her
cervical spine condition. Concerning Claimant's ratable impairment for the subject accident, the
settlement agreement reflects that Claimant was given two independent ratings for her right
upper extremity injury. Dr. McNaulty gave Claimant a 2% PPI rating while Dr. Stevens awarded
Claimant a 1% PPI rating. At first blush, the settlement agreement appears to leave unresolved
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the question of whether Claimant is entitled to a 6% or 0% impairment rating for her pre-existing
cervical spine condition. However, other portions of the agreement clearly reflect that the parties
ultimately agreed that Claimant was entitled to an impairment rating of some type for her
cervical spine condition:
WHEREAS, the Fund and the Claimant stipulate and agree that Claimant
is totally and permanently disabled based upon the combined effects of the
Claimant's pre-existing cervical spine injury and left lower extremity injury,
combining with the injury to her right hand and wrist.
The quoted language strongly suggests that the parties stipulated and agreed that Claimant is
entitled to an impairment rating for her cervical spine condition, otherwise, there would be no
basis to include that condition among the pre-existing conditions which contributed to
Claimant's total and permanent disability.

With respect to Claimant's accident produced

impairment, the agreement does not reflect whether the parties stipulated to whether Claimant
was entitled to a 2% versus 1% impairment rating, although it does reflect the parties agreement
that Claimant did suffer impairment of some type as a consequence of the accident.
As noted, the agreement reflects the parties stipulation and agreement that Claimant is
totally and permanently disabled as the result of the combined effects of her pre-existing cervical
and lower extremity conditions and her accident produced right upper extremity condition. Let it
be assumed, for the sake of discussion, that Claimant suffered a 6% PPI rating for her cervical
spine, and a 2% PPI rating for her accident caused condition. With these assumptions in mind, it
is possible to calculate how responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability should
be apportioned between Employer and the ISIF using the Carey formula;
2115

x

13115

85
x

=

11.5 + 2 = 13.05%

85 = 73.95 + 13 = 86.95%.
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Therefore Employer would be responsible for the payment of disability in the amount of
13.05% of the \Vhole person before ISIF would assume responsibility for the balance of total and
permanent disability benefits for the rest of Claimant's life.
Interestingly, however, the parties to the lump sum settlement reached an agreement
concerning the apportionment of Claimant's total and permanent disability that is apparently
unrelated to the Carey apportionment arrived at by using the PPI ratings referenced in the lump
sum settlement. The agreement specifies that responsibility between employer and the ISIF shall
be apportioned as follows:
WHEREAS, based upon the medical records, the Claimant and the Fund
stipulate that a 60/40 Carey Formula apportionment with the Fund being
responsible for 60% of the Claimant's total and permanent disability is
appropriate in this case. This Carey Formula apportionment is based upon the
impairment for Claimant's cervical spine injury and left lower extremity, and the
significant impairment to Claimant's right hand and wrist as a result of the
October 4, 2008, accident. It further takes into account the conflicting evidence
concerning the Claimant's cervical impairment and her ability to return to
medium level work as an HVAC technician after her cervical injury and lower
extremity injury.
By the language of the agreement this "Carey apportionment" is a compromise which recognizes
the fact that there is a dispute over the extent and degree of Claimant's cervical spine
impairment, and the extent to which the pre-existing impairments affected her ability to engage
in remunerative activities prior to the subject accident. However, even if one redacts the cervical
spine condition from the Carey calculation, the apportionment yielded by that analysis does not
resemble the 60/40 split referenced above:
20.02 + 2 = 22.02%

219

x

91

719

x

91 = 70.98 + 7 = 77.98%.

=
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Simply, there is no way to juggle the various impairment numbers referenced in the lump
sum to produce any type of Carey apportionment that comes close to the 60/40 split referenced
in the agreement.
\Vhile acknowledging that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled as a result of the
combined effects of the work accident and her pre-existing conditions, the parties to the lump
sum agreement asked the Commission to approve an order commuting the ISIF's liability by the
payment of a lump sum of $70,000.00. Essentially, the parties asked of the Commission to
approve the payment of a lump sum amount in lieu of Claimant receiving weekly statutory total
and permanent disability benefits for the rest of her life. The Industrial Commission accepted the
averments of the parties that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, and that her total and
permanent disability arose as the result of the combined effects of the pre-existing lower
extremity and cervical spine conditions and the accident produced right \vrist injury.

The

Commission further found that the facts of the case warranted the commutation of Claimant's
entitlement to life time permanent and total disability benefits by the lump sum payment of
$70,000.00.

The Commission approved the lump sum settlement agreement on or about

November 8, 2012.
As noted, the claim against the Employer/Surety went to hearing on October 16, 2012.
The transcript of hearing reveals that all parties were aware that the Claimant and ISIF had
reached a tentative settlement of Claimant's claim against the ISIF, but that the proposed
settlement had not been executed by Claimant. The matter went to hearing on remaining noticed
issues, including issues relating to ISIF liability. Even though the ISIF had reached a tentative
settlement with Claimant, Employer/Surety retained the right to argue that should Claimant be
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found to be totally and permanently disabled, some portion of her total and permanent disability
should be assigned to the ISIF.
The Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on May 3,
2013 and determined, on the basis of the evidence adduced at hearing, that Claimant was totally
and permanently disabled, but that Employer was entirelv responsible for Claimant's total and
permanent disability.

Specifically, the Commission found that Claimant's October 4, 2008

industrial accident was the sole cause of her total and permanent disability and that the preexisting impairments to her cervical spine and lower extremity did not combine with the effects
of the work accident to contribute to Claimant's total and permanent disability.
Neither the parties, nor the Commission, appreciated that impact of the lump sum
settlement agreement on the claim against Employer/Surety and, indeed, it was only as a result of
the Commission decision placing full responsibility on the shoulders of Employer that the issue
assumed some significance. The Commission can perhaps be criticized for not recognizing (or
remembering) its approval of the lump sum settlement while drafting the decision in the case
against Employer/Surety. However, the Commission necessarily relies on the parties to identify
the issues that bear on the resolution of a case. Regardless, it is critical to the resolution of this
matter that the Commission's decision regarding the liability of Employer/Surety be reconciled
in some fashion with the Commission's approval of the lump sum settlement which recognized
that some portion of Employer's liability is appropriately assigned to the ISIF. Pursuant to the
authority granted it under LC. § 72-718 to sua sponte reconsider its decision, the Commission
notified the parties of its intention to reconsider the case and invited briefing on the question of
whether, or to what extent, Claimant is collaterally estopped by the lump sum settlement
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agreement from asserting that Employer is solely liable for Claimant's total and permanent
disability.
Essentially, Claimant argues that Defendants' failure to raise collateral estoppel as an
affirmative defense at any time during these proceedings constitutes a waiver of that defense by
Defendants. Further, Claimant contends that collateral estoppel does not apply to the lump sum
settlement at issue since that settlement does not constitute a prior adjudication on the merits.
For their part, Defendants argue that the lump sum settlement agreement is a final
judgment, and that Claimant would be unjustly enriched if Employer/Surety was held solely
responsible for Claimant's total and permanent disability where Claimant has already received a
substantial 1ump sum settlement to commute the ISIF' s shared responsibility for Claimant's total
and permanent disability. Defendants argue that the lump sum settlement estops Claimant from
now asserting that Employer should be held responsible for 100% of Claimant's total and
permanent disability. Employer/Surety asks of the Commission that it revise its decision to be
consistent with its previous order approving the sixty-forty apportionment of responsibility
between Employer and the ISIF.
DISCUSSION

Under I. C. § 72-718, a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final
and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided, within twenty (20) days from the date of
filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision. In any
such event, the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or reconsideration,
or the filing of the decision on rehearing or reconsideration.
The Commission may reverse its decision upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing
of the decision in question, based on the arguments presented, or upon its ovvn motion, provided
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that it acts within the time frame established in LC. § 72-718. See, Dennis v. School District No.
91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar, Co., 114 Idaho

284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)).
The Commission's Notice of Reconsideration was timely filed on May 3, 2013. As
stated in that notice, the Commission's Notice of Reconsideration was not intended to foreclose
the parties from themselves pursuing motions for reconsideration under LC. § 72-718 on any
other issues they believed appropriate for reconsideration. Neither party has filed such a motion.
On one important point there is no disagreement between the lump sum settlement and
the Commission's decision in the subsequent case: Claimant is totally and permanently disabled.
The issues before the Commission on reconsideration are as follows: (1) Is Employer entitled to
rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent Claimant from arguing that Employer bears
responsibility for 100% of Claimant's total and permanent disability; and (2) If so, is Claimant
estopped from relitigating the issue of how responsibility between Employer/Surety and the ISIF
should be apportioned?
I.

Is Employer entitled to rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent
Claimant from arguing that Employer bears responsibility for 100% of
Claimant's total and permanent disability?

Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel). Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a subsequent action between the
same parties upon the same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Ticor
Title Company, v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007). As between Claimant and

Employer/Surety the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable inasmuch as Employer/Surety was
not a party to the lump sum settlement agreement between Claimant and the ISIF. Although the
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ISIF would have participated in the hearing had it not reached a settlement with Claimant, the
claim against the ISIF was the subject of a separate complaint, which was consolidated with
Claimant's complaint against Employer/Surety for the purposes of hearing only. The doctrine of
res judicata is inapplicable to the resolution of this matter.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to prevent the relitigation of an issue previously
determined. The doctrine applies to prevent the relitigation of an issue decided in a previous
case when the following elements are satisfied:
(1) Did the party "against whom the earlier decision is asserted ... have a 'full and
fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case?' "(2) Was the issue
decided in the prior litigation "identical with the one presented in the action in
question?" (3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior litigation? This may be
dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment."
(4) "Was there a final judgment on the merits?" ( 5) "Was the party against whom
the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?"

See Magic Valley Radiology, PA v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993); Stoddard v.
Haggadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 207 P.3d 162 (2009).

On the question of whether or not Claimant is barred from relitigating the issue of
whether ISIF liability has been established, it is clear that the elements essential to the
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel have been satisfied.
First, Claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in the prior case
against the ISIF. Necessarily, before the ISIF could be found liable in that case, Claimant bore
the burden of demonstrating that she was totally and permanently disabled, and that all elements
of ISIF liability were met. Claimant could not prevail against the ISIF without meeting her
burden of proof in this regard. The previous claim against the ISIF afforded Claimant a full and
fair opportunity to litigate these issues.
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Next, the issue decided in the prev10us case 1s identical to the issue before the
Commission in Claimant's claim against Employer/Surety.

As demonstrated in the

Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, among the issues before the
Commission are whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, and if so, whether
apportionment is appropriate under the Carey formula. The issue of Carey apportionment would
not arise except for a finding that all elements of ISIF liability had been met. Whether the
elements of ISIF liability had been satisfied was argued by the parties and addressed by the
Commission.
As noted above, Claimant's primary objection to the application of the doctrine rests on
her assertion that the lump sum settlement does not constitute the litigation of any issue on the
merits and that she therefore had no opportunity, much less a full and fair one, to litigate the
issue oflSIF liability until the October 16, 2012 hearing before the Industrial Commission. The
issue of whether or not a lump sum settlement constitutes a decision on the merits received
extensive treatment in the case of Jackman v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho
689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997). That case, which bears many similarities to the case at bar, warrants
closer review.
As in the instant matter, Jackman involved separate complaints against employer/surety
and the ISIF. Prior to the August 13, 1986 industrial accident Jackman suffered from longstanding problems with his hip. He had undergone a 1997 hip replacement surgery and a 1983
revision surgery. The evidence established that prior to the 1986 industrial accident claimant had
significant limitations as a result of his hip condition. In August of 1986 claimant suffered a slip
and fall which caused further injury to his hip. He underwent a second total hip revision surgery
in 1987, and thereafter underwent a back surgery for unrelenting back pain. In 1989 claimant
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was given a 33% impairment rating for his hip condition. Importantly, the impairment included
consideration of the multiple surgeries on claimant's hip. In 1990 Jackman and employer/surety
entered into a lump sum settlement.

That agreement referenced the payment of a 33%

impairment rating for claimant's right hip and low back condition by employer. The lump sum
settlement did not reference any apportionment of that impairment rating between the work
accident and claimant's documented pre-existing condition.
In 1994, claimant filed a complaint against the ISIF alleging, inter alia, that the combined
effects of his pre-existing right hip condition and the subject accident left him totally and
permanently disabled.

The Commission found that claimant was totally and permanently

disabled, and that the ISIF shared responsibility with employer for claimant's total and
permanently disability. The ISIF appealed the Commission's decision to the Idaho Supreme
Court. On appeal the ISIF argued that Jackman's claim against it was barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Jackman argued that although the lump sum settlement agreement reflected
the 33% impairment rating, that agreement did not address the issue of apportionment of that
rating between pre-existing and accident produced conditions. Jackman argued that the evidence
would show that claimant had a 13 % impairment rating referable to his pre-existing hip
condition and a 20% impairment rating referable to the 1986 accident. The Court rejected this
argument, ruling that Jackman was collaterally estopped from arguing that the 33% impairment
rating referenced in the lump sum (and paid by employer/surety) could later be apportioned
between the subject accident and claimant's pre-existing condition in order to support a claim
against the ISIF. In this regard the Court stated:
Jackman cannot rely upon the same percentage impairment rating in order to
attain further benefits from ISIF. Jackman must present additional evidence of
impairment in order to increase his impairment rating. The issue presented in the
proceeding against SIF and SHS, compensating Jackman for his impairment
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rating of 33% whole person, is identical to the issue Jackman presently raises:
whether ISIF must compensate Jackman for a portion of the same 33% whole
person impairment.
The Jackman Court also addressed Jackman's argument that the lump sum settlement did not
constitute a final judgment on the merits. Citing Davidson v. H H Keim Company, 110 Idaho
758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986), the Court ruled that a lump sum agreement approved by the
Commission under LC. § 72-404 constitutes a final decision of the Commission and is therefore
a final judgment on the merits.
We believe that Jackman is controlling in the instant matter and that the lump sum
settlement between Claimant and the ISIF estops Claimant from asserting that Employer bears
100% of the liability for Claimant's total and permanent disability.
In Jackman, the lump sum settlement specified that all of claimant's 33% impairment
was apportioned to employer.

This actually litigated the question of apportionment, and

precluded claimant from asserting an apportionment scheme in subsequent litigation different
from the apportionment reflected in the lump sum. Similarly, the lump sum in the instant matter
specifically reflects the parties' agreement that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, and
that she suffered from certain pre-existing conditions which combined with the work accident to
result in total and permanent disability.
settlement.

Therefore, this issue was actually litigated in the

This is made even more clear by the recent case of Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint

School District No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009). In that case, the Court made it
clear that the Industrial Commission does not even have jurisdiction to consider a proposed lump
sum settlement between an injured worker and the ISIF absent the Commission's threshold
determination that the injured worker is indeed totally and permanently disabled and that all
elements of ISIF liability have been satisfied. In this regard the Court stated:
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Section 72-318(2) sets out the State's policy that agreements purporting to waive
an employee's rights to compensation under the Act are void. Section 72-332
provides a narrow exception for cases that meet the requirements therein
specified. ISIF's liability may only be invoked when the conditions specified in
the statute, as defined in Garcia, are present. That requires findings by the
Commission. Unless the Commission finds that the requisite elements exist, it
may not approve a lump sum settlement agreement involving ISIF. Such findings
are for the benefit of both the claimant - - to protect him or her from himself or
herself - - and of ISIF - - to keep it from making unwarranted payments when
there are no findings establishing ISIF's liability. In this regard, the Commission
plays a gatekeeper role and must scrupulously perform that function. The
requisite findings may be made by the Commission upon a hearing on the merits
or upon a stipulation of the parties considered and approved by the Commission.
ISIF's liability under section 72-332 is not invoked unless the four elements
requisite to such a claim are found by the Commission to be present. If the
Commission does not make the requisite findings, it has no authority or
jurisdiction to hold ISIF liable on a claim.
Here the parties stipulated that Claimant was totally and permanently disabled and that the
liability of the ISIF was established because Claimant's pre-existing cervical spine and lower
extremity impairments combined with her accident caused impairment to cause total and
permanent disability. The Commission necessarily found the stipulated facts to be true in order
to consider whether it was appropriate, under the facts of the case, for Claimant to commute her
right to statutory life time benefits by the payment of the lump sum of $70,000.00. Therefore, as
a prerequisite to the Commission's approval of the lump sum, the question of whether the ISIF
bore responsibility for some portion of Claimant's total and permanent disability was actually
and necessarily adjudicated.
Next, per Jackman, Supra, it is clear that the order approving the lump sum settlement
does constitute a "final judgment on the merits".
Finally, the party against whom the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to be applied was a
party to the previous action. Claimant was a party to the action against the ISIF and in that
action alleged that the ISIF bore responsibility for her total and permanent disability. Claimant is
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also a party to the action against Employer/Surety, and in that case, argues that 100% of the
liability for her total and permanent disability should be born by Employer.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
prohibits Claimant from relitigating the issue of whether the ISIF bears responsibility for some
portion of Claimant's total and permanent disability. Claimant is estopped from asserting that
Employer is entirely responsible for her total and permanent disability. Claimant is bound by the
Commission's order approving the lump sum settlement, an order which establishes that some
portion of Claimant's total and permanent disability must be born by the ISIF.
II.

Is Claimant estopped from relitigating the issue of how responsibility for
Claimant's total and permanent disability should be apportioned between
Employer and the ISIF?

The next question before the Commission is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel
bars Claimant from relitigating how responsibility should be apportioned between the ISIF and
Employer/Surety. First, it is worth noting that this is an issue that is different from the question
of whether the ISIF bears some responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability. To
say that the ISIF bears some responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability does not
answer the more particularized inquiry of how that responsibility should be apportioned between
the Employer and the ISIF. Indeed, disputes over the issue of apportionment are among the
issues that are typically resolved in a lump sum settlement between an injured worker and the
ISIF.

See

Havens

v.

State

of

Idaho

Industrial

Special

Indemnity

Fund,

http://v.rvvw.iic.idaho.gov/decisions/2009/09 09/havens v state of idaho.pdf (Sept. 21, 2009).
Although the parties to a case may stipulate that the ISIF bears some responsibility for an injured
worker's total and permanent disability, the parties may dispute the particular impairment ratings
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which attach to the work related injury or claimant's pre-existing conditions. Identifying these
impairment ratings is important to the application of the Carey formula for assigning
responsibility between Employer/Surety and the ISIF in a total and permanent disability case. In
Jackman, the evidence established that the issue of how an impairment rating should be

apportioned was addressed in the lump sum settlement, and that Claimant could not argue for a
different apportionment in a subsequent proceeding. In this regard, the Jackman Court stated:
Jackman cannot rely upon the same percentage impairment rating in order to
attain further benefits from ISIF. Jackman must present additional evidence of
impairment in order to increase his impairment rating. The issue presented in the
proceeding against SIF and SHS, compensating Jackman for his impairment
rating of 33% whole person, is identical to the issue Jackman presently raises:
whether ISIF must compensate Jackman for a portion of the same 33% whole
person impairment.
The lump sum settlement in this case, too, addresses the issue of the apportionment of
responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability between the ISIF and
Employer/Surety. However, as developed above, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the
stipulated 60/40 split with the various impairment ratings which are also referenced in the lump
sum settlement. As well, the settlement does not purport to specify which of the conflicting
impairment ratings the Commission should adopt in approving the lump sum. The language of
the lump sum strongly suggests that the 60/40 apportionment referenced in the document
represents a compromise of the apportionment issue which recognizes that the parties disputed
certain facts which impacted how much of Claimant's total and permanent disability should be
apportioned to the ISIF:
WHEREAS, based upon the medical records, the Claimant and the Fund
stipulate that a 60/40 Carey Formula apportionment with the Fund being
responsible for 60% of the Claimant's total and permanent disability is
appropriate in this case. This Carey Formula apportionment is based upon the
impairment for Claimant's cervical spine injury and left lower extremitv, and the
significant impairment to Claimant's right hand and wrist as a result of the
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October 4, 2008. accident. It further takes into account the conflicting evidence
concerning the Claimant's cervical impairment and her ability to return to
medium level work as an HV AC technician after her cervical injury and lower
extremity injury.
Emphasis added.
Unlike the uncontested recital of how the 33% impairment rating should be apportioned
in Jackman, Supra, the sixty-forty apportionment referenced in the instant lump sum settlement
agreement is not consistent with recitals made in other parts of that document, and appears to
represent a compromise of the disputed issue of apportionment. As such, we do not regard the
issue of how responsibility should be apportioned between the Employer and the ISIF to have
been "actually litigated" in the lump sum settlement. Nor do we believe that deciding the issue
of apportionment was necessary to our approval of the lump sum settlement. See Brown v. State
of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 138 Idaho 493, 65 P.3d 515 (2003). In addition to

disputed Carey apportionment the Commission determined that other facts supported its decision
to approve the commutation of Claimant's right to lifetime benefits.

Among these were

Claimant's expressed need for immediate cash, and the fact that she wanted the peace of mind of
a lump sum rather than statutory benefits; upon Claimant's death statutory benefits cease, leaving
her survivors with no ongoing income stream. In summary we do no regard the issue of Carey
apportionment to have been actually litigated by the lump sum settlement, nor necessary to our
approval of the settlement.
For these reasons, we conclude that the lump sum settlement agreement does not bar
litigation of the question of how responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability
should be apportioned between the ISIF and Employer/Surety. Moreover, we do not believe that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel would allow Employer/Surety, a non-party to the lump sum
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settlement, to be bound by that document's recitation that Employer/Surety should be held
responsible for 40% of Claimant's total and permanent disability.
Since we have found that the lump sum settlement does not bar litigation of the issue of
apportionment, we are free to apportion responsibility between Employer and ISIF on the basis
of the facts adduced at hearing. Again, the lump sum settlement agreement clearly anticipates
that Claimant's total and permanent disability is a result of the combined effects of the preexisting cervical spine and lower extremity impairments and the impairment from the subject
accident. With this stipulation in mind, it is possible to ascertain how responsibility should be
apportioned between Employer/Surety and the ISIF using the Commission's findings on
impairment and the Carey formula. Under the Carey formula, the relative responsibilities of
Employer/Surety and the ISIF are calculated as follows:
4/17

x

83 = 19.92 + 4 = 23.92

13/17 x 83

63.08 + 13 = 76.08.

Therefore, Employer is responsibility for disability of 23.92%, with credit for impairment
paid to date. 1 The responsibility of the ISIF was settled by way of the aforementioned lump sum
settlement agreement.
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill

1

We recognize that Employer has only asked of the Commission that Claimant be required to honor the 60/40 split
referenced in the lump sum settlement, while our decision obligates Employer to pay a substantially smaller portion
of Claimant's total and permanent disability. However, Employer's position in this regard necessarily follows from
its argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of the issue of how disability should be
apportioned. Because we have determined that the doctrine does not bar relitigation of that issue we do not feel
bound by what might otherwise be regarded as Employer's waiver of a more favorable apportionment scheme.
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CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

In accordance with this decision on reconsideration, the Commission enters these revised
conclusions of law and Order.
1.

Claimant has proven that she suffers whole person impairment of 17% of the

\Vhole person referable to her pre-existing conditions, and a 4% whole person impairment
referable to her 2008 industrial accident.
2.

Claimant has proven that she suffers permanent disability of 85% inclusive of

impairment, and has further proven that she is an odd-lot worker, totally and permanently
disabled under the Lethrud test.
3.

Claimant is estopped from asserting that 100% of Claimant's total and permanent

disability should be born by Employer/Surety, and is bound by the prior lump sum settlement in
which she stipulated and agreed that the ISIF bears some responsibility for her total and
permanent disability on account of pre-existing cervical spine and lower extremity impairments.
4.

The lump sum settlement agreement does not collaterally estop Claimant from

adjudicating, in this proceeding, how Claimant's total and permanent disability should be
apportioned between the ISIF and Employer.
5.

Employer's responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability is

calculated as follows under Carey, Supra:
4117

x

83

=

19.92 + 4 = 23.92

Employer is responsible for the payment of disability equaling 23.92%, with credit for
impairment paid to date. The liability of the ISIF was previously compromised and commuted
by the aforementioned November 8, 2012 lump sum settlement agreement.
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'

6.

Pursuant to LC. § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all matters

adjudicated.
DATED this__,__ day
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Thd'mas P. Baskin, Chairman

Participated but did not sign

R.D. Maynard, Commissioner

ATTEST:

Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the
day of
2013, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION was served by regular United States
Mail upon each of the following:
STEVEN J NEMEC
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814
JOSEPH M WAGER
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
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1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone No. 208-667-0683
Facsimile No. 208-664-1684
snemec@jvwfaw.net

Stephen J Nemec !SBA# 7591
Attorney for Appellant/Claimant
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CASE NO.: 2007-005950
2008-032836

VS.

H&J INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN
COEURD' ALENE Il\1N &
CONFERENCE CENTER, Employer,
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CO., Surety,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Filing Fee: $109.00
Defendants-Respondents,
and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendant.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, H&J INC. d/b/a BEST WESTERN
COEUR D' ALENE INN & CONFERENCE CENTER and LIBERTY
NORTHWEST INSURANCE COMPANY and Respondents' attorney JOSEPH
WAGER and the CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Notice of Appeal -1

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
I.

The above-named Claimant-Appellant, Trudy Deon, appeals against the abovenamed Respondents, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the order on
reconsideration entered in the matter on November 4, 2013, Commissioner
Thomas Baskin, Commissioner R.D. Maynard, and Commissioner Thomas
Limbaugh, presiding.

2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the order
described in Paragraph 1 is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l).

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intends
to assert in the appeal; provided, such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal:
(a)

Did the Commission err in raising the affirmative defense of collateral
estoppel sua sponte on reconsideration to deny payment of total permanent
disability benefits to the Claimant?

(b)

Did the Commission violate the Claimant's right to due process?

(c)

Did the Commission correctly find that the elements of the collateral
estoppel test as set forth in Stoddard v Hagadone Corp, 14 7 Idaho 186,
207 P.3d 162 (2009) were met?

(d)

Is the ISIP settlement void as a matter of law thereby rendering collateral
estoppel inapplicable?

(e)

Did the Commission err m refusing to modify the ISIF settlement
agreement pursuant to LC. §72-719(3)?
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(f)

Can the Commission's conclusions of law be supported in light of the
Commission's findings of fact?

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript:

a.

6.

No additional preparation of the transcript is necessary as court
reporter Neil Cooley previously filed a complete and accurate
transcript of the hearing (163 pages) that occurred on October 16,
2012 in which Referee Alan Reed Taylor presided with the Idaho
Industrial Commission on October 30, 2012.

The Appellant requests the follmving documents to be included in the Clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
a.)
b.)
c.)
d.)
e.)
f.)
g.)
h.)

01/18/11
01127/11
03/31111
04/11111
06/14/11
06/16/11
07/01111
01/12/12

i.)

10/02/12

j.)

10/04112

k.)

10/05112

I.)
m.)

10/30/12
11/08/12

n.)
o.)
p.)
q.)
r.)
s.)
t.)

11127/12
12/17/12
12/21/12
04/08/13
05103113
05/03/13
06/26/13
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Complaint to Employer/Surety for October 4, 2008 Injury
Defendant Employer/Surety Answer for October 4, 2008 Injury
Complaint to Employer/Surety for February 9, 2007 Injury
Defendant Employer/Surety Answer for February 9, 2007 Injury
Complaint to ISIF
Defendant ISIF Answer to Complaint
Order to Consolidate 2007-005950 and 2008-032836
Notice of Hearing and Notice of Pre-Hearing Telephone
Conference
Claimant's Pre-Hearing Notice of Witnesses, Exhibits, and
Post-Hearing Depositions
Defendant ISIF Notice of Exchange of Exhibits and Disclosure
Pursuant to Rule 10
Defendant Employer/Surety Joint Supplemental Notice of
Witnesses, Exhibits, and Post-Hearing Depositions
Transcript of October 16, 2012 Hearing
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and Order of
Approval and Discharge (ISJF)
Claimant's Opening Brief
Defendant Employer/Surety Response Brief
Claimant's Reply Brief
Referee's Recommendation Opinion
Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Commission's Notice of Reconsideration
Defendant Employer/Surety Opening Brief: Impact of IC

u.)
v.)

06/28/13
07 /17/13

w.)
x.)

07/19/13
07/26113

y.)

07/26/13

z.)

08/07/13

aa.)

08/09/13

bb.)

08114113

cc.)
dd.)

09/27/13
11/04/13

7.

I certify:
(a)

Approval oflSIF Settlement Agreement upon the May 3, 2013 IC
Decision and Motion for Reconsideration
Claimant's Opening Brief Following Notice of Reconsideration
Defendant Employer/Surety Reply Brief: Impact ofIC Approval
oflSIF Settlement Agreement upon the May 3, 2013 IC Decision
and Motion for Reconsideration
Claimant's Reply Brief Following Notice of Reconsideration
Claimant's Motion for Modification of ISIF Settlement Agreement
Pursuant to LC. §72-719(3)
Claimant's Attorney Affidavit in Support of Motion to Modify
ISIF Settlement Agreement Pursuant to LC. §72-719(3)
Defendant Employer/Surety Response to Claimant's Motion for
Modification of ISIF Settlement Agreement
Defendant ISIF Response to Claimant's Motion to Modify Lump
Sum Settlement
Claimant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Modification of
ISIF Settlement Pursuant to LC. §72-719(3)
Order Denying Motion for Modification of ISIF Settlement
Order on Reconsideration

That the estimated fee of $100 for preparation of the agency's records has
been paid.

(b)

The appellate filing fee has been paid.

( c)

Service has been made upon all the parties required to be served pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.

DATED this 12th day ofNovember, 2013.

JAMES, VERNON & \VEEKS, P.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
12th day of November, 2013 a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document was served upon the following individuals by the method indicated
below:

Joseph Wager
Law Offices of Kent Day
' P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707
. Attornevfor Emplover & Surety
I
Mailed
By Hand
Overnight Mail
x Fax: (800)-972-3213
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Thomas W. Callery
Jones , Brower & Callery
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneyfor I.S.I.F.
Mailed
By Hand
Overnight Mail
x Fax: (208)-746-9553
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)
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Employer, and LIBERTY NORTHWEST
INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety,
Defendants/Respondents.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman presiding

Case Numbers:

IC 2007-005950 & IC 2008-032836

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
filed May 3, 2013, and Order on Reconsideration,
filed November 4, 2013.

Attorney for Appellant:

Stephen J. Nemec
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur D'Alene ID 83814

Attorney for Respondents:

Joseph M. Wager
Po Box 6358
Boise Id 83707-6358

Appealed By:

Trudy Deon, Claimant/Appellant

Appealed Against:

H&J, Inc., d/b/a Best Western Coeur d'Alene Inn &
Conference Center, and Liberty Northwest
Insurance Corporation, Defendants/Respondents,

Notice of Appeal Filed:

November 14, 2013

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR TRUDY DEON - 1

Appellate Fee Paid:

$109.00 to Supreme Court and
$100.00 to Industrial Commission
Checks were received.

Name of Reporter:

Neil Cooley, M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc.

Transcript Requested:

Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript
has been prepared and filed with the Commission.

Dated:

November 15, 2013

Assistant Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATION

I, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the
State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the
Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order; and Order On
Reconsideration, and the whole thereof, in IC case numbers 2007-005950 & 2008-032836 for
Trudy Deon.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission this 15th day of November, 2012.

Assistant Commission Secretary
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Telephone No. 208-667-0683
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snemec@jvwlaw.net

Stephen J. Nemec ISSA# 7591
' Attorney for Appellant/Claimant
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRUDY DEON,
Claimant-Appellant,

CASE NO.: 2007-005950
2008-032836

vs.

H&J INC., d/b/a BEST WESTERN
COEUR D' ALENE Th.TN &
CONFERENCE CENTER, Employer,

FIRST AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL
· SUPREME COURT NO. 41596

LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CO., Surety, STATE OF IDAHO
INDUSTRJAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY
FUND,

Filing Fee : None

Defendants~Respondents,

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, H&.J INC. d/b/a BEST

WESTER.J.~

COEUR D' ALENE INN & CONFERENCE CENTER and LIBERTY
NORTHWEST INSURANCE COMPANY and Respondents' attorney JOSEPH
WAGER and STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
and Respondent's attorney THOMAS CALLERY and the CLERK OF THE
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named Claimant-Appellant, Trudy Deon, appeals against the aboveuamed Respondents, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the order on
reconsideration entered in the matter on November 4, 2013, Commissioner
Thomas Baskin, Commissioner R.D. Maynard, and Commissioner Thomas
Limbaugh, presiding.

2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the order
described in Paragraph 1 is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho

Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l).

3.

A preliminary statement of th.e issues on appeal which the Appellant then intends
to assert in the appeal; provided, such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal:
(a)

Did the Commission err in raising the affirmative defense of collateral
estoppel sua sponte on reconsideration to deny payment of total permanent
disability benefits to the Claimant?

(b)

Did the Com.mission violate the Claimant's right to due process?

(c)

Did the Commission correctly find that the elements of the collateral
estoppel test as set forth in Stoddard v Hagadone

Corp~

147 Idaho

186~

207 P.3d 162 (2009) were met?
( d)

Is the ISIF settlement void as a matter of law thereby rendering collateral
estoppel inapplicable?

(e)

Did the Commission err m refusing to modify the ISIF settlement
agreement pursuant to l.C. §72-719(3)?
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(f)

Can the Commission's conclusions of law be supported in light of the
Commission's findings of fact?

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The Appellant requests the preparation of the follovvin.g portions of the reporter's
transcript:

a.

6.

No additional preparation of the transcript is necessary as court
reporter Neil Cooley previously tiled a complete and accurate
transcript of the hearing ( 163 pages) that occurred on October 16,
2012 in which Referee Alan Reed Taylor presided "With the Idaho
Industrial Commission on October 30, 2012.

The Appellant requests the follovving documents to be included in the Clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included unde,r Idaho Appellate Rule 28:

a.)
b.)
c.)
d.)
e.)
f.)
g.)
h.)

01118111
01/27/11
03/31/11
04/11/11
06/14/11
06/16/11
07101111
01/12/12

i.)

10/02/12

j.)

10/04/12

k.)

10/05/12

1.)
m.)

10/30/12
11/08/12

n.)
o.)
p.)
q.)
r.)
s.)
t.)

11127/12
12/17/12
12/21/12
04/08/13
05/03/13
05/03/13
06/26/13

Complaint to Employer/Surety for October 4, 2008 Injury
Defendant Employer/Surety Answer for October 4, 2008 Injury
Complaint to Employer/Surety for February 9, 2007 Injury
Defendant Employer/Surety Answer for February 9, 2007 Injury
Complaint to ISIF
Defendant ISIF Answer to Complaint
Order to Consolidate 2007~005950 and 2008-032836
Notice of Hearing and Notice of Pre-Hearing Telephone
Conference
Claimant's Pre-Hearing Notice of Witnesses, Exhibits, and
Post-Heming Depositions
Defendant ISIF Notice of Ex.change of Exhibits and Disclosure
Pursuant to Rule 10
Defendant Employer/Surety Joint Supplemental Notice of
Witnesses, Exhibits, and Post-Hearing Depositions
Transcript of October 16, 2012 Hearing
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and Order of
Approval and Discharge (ISIF)
Claimant's Opening Brief
Defendant Employer/Surety Response Brief
Claimant's Reply Brief
Referee's Recommendation Opinion
Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Commission's Notice of Reconsideration
Defendant Employer/Surety Opening Brief: Impact ofIC
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v.)

06/28/13
07/17/13

w.)
x.)

07119/13
07/26/13

y.)

07/26/13

z.)

08/07113
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08/09/13

bb.)

08/14/13

cc.)
dd.)

09/27/13
11/04/13

7.

I certify:

u.)

(a)

Approval ofISIF Settlement Agreement upon the May 3, 2013 IC
Decision. and Motion for Reconsideration
Claimant's Opening Brief Following Notice of Reconsideration
Defendant Employer/Surety Reply Brief: hnpact ofIC Approval
of ISIF Settlement Agreement upon the May 3, 2013 IC Decision
and Motion for Reconsideration
Claimant's Reply Brief Following Notice of Reconsideration
Claimant's Motion for Modification of ISIF Settlement Agreement
Pursuant to I.C. §72-719(3)
Claimant's Attorney Affidavit in Support of Motion to Modify
IS IF Settlement Agreement Pursuant to I. C. §72-719(3)
Defendant Employer/Surety Response to Claimant's Motion for
Modification of ISIF Settlement Agreement
Defendant ISIF Response to Claimant's Motion to Modify Lump
Sum Settlement
Claimant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Modification of
ISIF Settlement Pursuant to I.C. §72-719(3)
Order Denying Motion for Modification ofISIF Settlement
Order on Reconsideration

That the estimated fee of $100 for preparation of the agency's records has
been paid.

(b)

The appellate filing fee has been paid.

(c)

Service has been made upon all the pa..'1.ies required to be served pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.

DATED this 22nd day ofNovember, 2013.

JAMES, VERNON & \VEEKS, P.A.
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Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
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IC 2007-005950 & IC 2008-032836

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
filed May 3, 2013, and Order on Reconsideration,
filed November 4, 2013.

Attorney for Appellant:
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Against:

Notice of

H&J, Inc., d,b/a Best Western Coeur d'Alene Inn &
Conference Center, and Liberty
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Filed:
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Appeal Filed:
Appellate Fee Paid:
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$109.00 to Supreme Court and
$100.00 to Industrial Commission
Checks \\ ere received.
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Name of Reporter:

Neil Cooley, M&M Court Repol1ing Service,

Transcript Requested:

Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript
been prepared and
with
Commission.

Dated:

November 26,

13

Assistant Comn:ission Secretary
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CERTIFICATION
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e undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of

·al Commission

the

State ofldaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the First
Amended Notice of Appeal, and tbe \Vhole thereof, in IC case numbers 2007-005950 &
2008-032836 for Trudy Deon.
IN \VITNESS \VHEREOL J have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission this 26th day of November
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CERTIFICATION OF RECORD

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court
No. 41593 on appeal by Rule 28(b )(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b ).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein.
DATED this

day
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SUPREME COURT NO. 41593
NOTICE OF COMPLETION
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STEPHEN KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and
Stephen J. Nemec, for the Claimant/Appellant; and
Joseph M. Wager, for the Defendants/Respondents Employer & Surety; and
Thomas W. Callery, for the Defendant/Respondent ISIF.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been served
by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
STEPHEN NEMEC
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814
JOSEPH M WAGER
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358
THOMAS W CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501
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YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Agency's Record,
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the Agency's
Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record
shall be deemed settled.
1A.IA

DATED this o<J/_ day
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